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Chapter 1
Introduction
I have collected the following three essays under the title of Essays on Institutions,
Aid, and Conflict. Each is a self-contained essay, but there are two themes motivating
and tying them together. First, there is a substantive focus on understanding how
climate-induced crises and emergencies interact with political institutions to affect
violence, political outcomes, and human welfare. One strand of research asks how
disasters and environmental change might influence political upheaval and violence
within and between states (e.g., Stalley 2003; Nelson 2010; Drury and Olson 1998;
Nel and Righarts 2008; Omelicheva 2011; Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Slettebak 2012;
Nardulli, Peyton and Bajjalieh 2013). Another considers how states might cooperate
to effectively mitigate and prevent climate-related crises (e.g., Haas, Keohane and
Levy 1993; Biermann and Boas 2010; Keohane and Victor 2011; Tir and Stinnett
2012). Here I address both traditions, but also go further to consider the political
implications of states’ aid strategies for domestic politics in recipient countries.
Second, there is a theoretical emphasis on using existing social science theories to
understand current, real-world problems. I apply leading theories – economic theo-
ries of democratization, principal-agent theory, and theories of political survival and
the risk of consequences of losing office – to questions of the aid-democratization
relationship, the design of institutions for emergency relief, and climate-conflict con-
nections. In doing so, I highlight a number of shortcomings of those theories and
offer refinements and extensions. The rest of this brief introduction outlines the main
arguments, methods, and findings of the three essays.
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1.1 Summary of Chapters
Chapter 2: “Bypass Aid and Unrest in Autocracies”
Scholars and policymakers have argued that bypassing recipient governments by
channeling aid through intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations can
help donors pursue development goals without bolstering autocratic regimes. In
Chapter 2, I argue that bypass aid can subsidize government transfers to citizens
and thus help autocrats deter challenges to their rule. I show that autocracies experi-
ence less domestic unrest as the proportion of aid delivered through bypass channels
increases. To address potential endogeneity, I conduct an instrumental variables anal-
ysis. I argue that scandals where governments are suspected of or caught misusing aid
should exogenously affect the distribution of aid across channels by causing donors
to deliver more aid through bypass channels overall. I use an original data set of aid
scandals to instrument for bypass aid in two-stage models to confirm the baseline
results.
Chapter 3: “The Design of International Institutions for Humanitarian Aid”
Strategic and political interests tend to dictate states’ allocations of bilateral emer-
gency aid. In 2006, the United Nations created the Central Emergency Response
Fund (CERF) to counteract this bias and help provide emergency humanitarian re-
lief efficiently and impartially. A key feature of the organization is the banning of
earmarking. What are the implications of this institutional design choice for the
supply of humanitarian relief and welfare in recipient countries? In Chapter 3, I for-
malize a donor’s decision to provide aid bilaterally ex post versus (or in combination
with) delegating ex ante to a more efficient institution that may allocate aid in ways
contrary to donor interests. I consider how allowing for limited earmarking affects
the supply of international humanitarian aid. Using the models and a simulation, I
2
show that a policy of allowing partial earmarking increases contributions and may
improve average outcomes for crisis victims.
Chapter 4: “Leader Survival, Natural Disasters, and International Conflict”
Existing work finds that natural disasters affect leader survival, and that the risk
and consequences of losing office influence leaders’ international conflict behavior. In
Chapter 4, I consider how disasters may indirectly affect the risk of international
conflict by affecting leader survival. I argue that disasters should only matter for the
conflict behavior of large-coalition leaders. As disaster deaths increase, large-coalition
leaders fearing irregular removal from office should be more prone to conflict, while
those anticipating regular removal should engage in conflict less frequently. I find
evidence that deaths from disasters are associated with modest increases in conflict
initiation among large-coalition leaders facing irregular removal throughout the period
of 1950 to 2007. Against the expectations of the theory, however, large-coalition
leaders facing regular removal also appear to become more likely to initiate conflicts
in the wake of disasters. Consistent with the theory, disaster deaths are unrelated to
conflict behavior for small-coalition leaders. However, small-coalition leaders facing
irregular removal appear to be less likely to initiate conflicts as more disaster events
occur, which is the opposite of what existing theory would expect. In arguing that
different types of threats to leader survival survival matter differently for international
conflict, Chapter 4 offers an important qualification to theories of leader survival and
international conflict.
3
Chapter 2
Bypass Aid and Unrest in Autocracies
2.1 Introduction
Does foreign aid undermine demand for democratic accountability in autocracies?
Existing work on this question focuses on government-to-government aid, yet donors
frequently bypass recipient governments by giving aid through intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations (IGOs and NGOs). For example, more than 60% of
the $700 million Haiti received in development assistance in 2008 went to NGOs,
multilateral organizations, or public-private partnerships (Dietrich 2013, 698). That
figure was nearly 80% for $2.5 billion in international aid to Sudan in 2009 (OECD
2014). By preventing recipient governments from misusing aid, bypassing is thought
to be one way that donors can better achieve development goals (Dietrich 2013, 699;
Ear 2013; Acht, Mahmoud and Thiele 2015). However, political scientists have given
relatively little attention to the domestic political implications of bypass aid for recip-
ient countries. Many who argue that aid helps stabilize autocratic regimes limit the
scope of their arguments to government-to-government aid (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2009, 315; Kono, Montinola and Verbon 2013; Ahmed and Werker 2015),
yet this is problematic given that donors tend to bypass poorly-governed, autocratic
regimes (Dietrich 2013, 705).
In this paper I consider how bypass aid affects autocratic survival. Optimists
point out that aid is often less fungible than critics assume, partly because donors
can bypass corrupt recipients (e.g., Altincekic and Bearce 2014, 21; Bermeo 2016, 7).
But it is not clear that bypass aid should be politically neutral given that other types
of non-government foreign income – e.g., remittances – can help autocrats (Ahmed
2012, 148). Using a simple model of revolution I show how bypass aid can reduce
4
unrest in autocracies. The intuition is straightforward: insofar as bypass aid improves
the wellbeing of a recipient population, it lowers the concessions that an incumbent
regime would have to make to retain power. Thus, while bypass aid can further
humanitarian goals, it simultaneously acts as a political subsidy to autocrats. This
is consistent with research that shows that aid of any kind – government or bypass –
undermines pressures for democracy (e.g., de Waal 1997; Terry 2002; Polman 2010).
Using data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD 2014), I show that bypass aid is associated with less frequent domestic unrest
in autocracies. This finding is robust to a number of different model specifications
that account for confounding factors and various operationalizations of bypass aid,
including an original alternative measure of bypass aid I construct from the AidData
organization’s project-level data set (Tierney et al. 2011). However, there is po-
tentially an endogeneity problem: governments that have a greater latent repressive
capacity and can deter unrest should also be more likely to receive aid through bypass
channels. To address this difficulty, I collected an original data set of international
aid scandals – instances where media sources reveal a recipient government’s misuse
of aid – to identify exogenous variation in bypass aid. When donors observe aid
scandals, they should be more inclined to deliver aid through bypass channels. Thus,
international aid scandals should act as an exogenous shock to overall aid channel
distribution. The instrumental variables analysis provides more evidence bypass aid
can reduce unrest in autocratic countries.
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, the paper highlights the po-
tential consequences of an aid strategy that many see as politically innocuous. Indeed,
others have pointed out that donors appear to resolve the dilemma of not wanting to
aid poorly-governed recipient countries where aid is most needed by bypassing recipi-
ent governments (e.g., Acht, Mahmoud and Thiele 2015, 20). In fact, Bermeo (2016)
builds into her formal model the assumption that fungible aid reduces the likelihood
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of democratization while non-fungible aid – which includes “bypass” aid – does not.
While bypassing could plausibly advance development goals, this paper shows that
it can also undermine pressure for political reform. Second, it answers a neglected
question in the literature on aid and political survival: why do autocratic govern-
ments allow bypass aid? If anything, existing work seems to suggest that autocrats
should be wary of bypass aid for its potential to sustain rebel movements (Nunn and
Qian 2014, 1632-1633; Polman 2010, 111). The answer I provide is that bypass aid,
like government aid, can reduce domestic unrest and enhance an autocrat’s ability to
retain power. Third, the paper introduces a new data set of international aid scandals
that is well suited for making causal inferences about the effect of aid channel distri-
bution on political outcomes in recipient countries. Fourth, I develop a new measure
of bypass aid using data from the AidData project (Tierney et al. 2011). This measure
provides a reasonable alternative (or complement) to OECD data when scholars are
concerned about underreporting during years where donors were plausibly adapting
to new reporting requirements. Finally, by studying the political effects of bypass aid,
the paper contributes to our understanding of economic development given that po-
litical institutions are important determinants of economic (under)development (e.g.,
Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
2.2 Aid and Democratization
A key question in the foreign aid literature is whether or not aid is bad for democ-
racy. Many argue that aid makes democratization less likely (e.g., van de Walle 2001;
Bra¨utigam and Knack 2004; Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008; Kono and
Montinola 2009; Ahmed 2012; Ear 2013; Kono, Montinola and Verbon 2013). Fol-
lowing arguments that link the historical development of democracy to elites’ needs
to tax citizens (e.g., Tilly 1990), aid skeptics contend that, “non-tax revenue enables
leaders to forgo taxing the citizenry, resulting in a decreased demand for represen-
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tative democracy and good governance” (Dietrich and Wright 2013, 60; Djankov,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2008; Morrison 2009). Thus, when aid substitutes for
tax revenue, governmental demands on citizens are less onerous, depressing popular
demand for democratic accountability. Others argue that aid allows autocrats to in-
crease repressive capacity and deter revolution (Kono, Montinola and Verbon 2013).
Yet many are less pessimistic (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Wright 2009; Kersting
and Kilby 2014). Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that donors can incentivize de-
mocratization with the promise of future aid, though Wright (2009) suggests this is
only true for autocratic leaders who are likely to retain office following a democratic
transition. There are also studies that find no effect of aid on democratization (e.g.,
Knack 2004; Altincekic and Bearce 2014). A primary source of disagreement concerns
the different empirical strategies used to test these theories (Wright 2009).
While recent literature on the determinants of states’ aid allocation decisions con-
siders different types and channels of aid (e.g., Milner 2006; Dietrich 2013; Acht,
Mahmoud and Thiele 2015), few have explored the political consequences of bypass-
ing recipient governments.1 Indeed, aid increasingly flows through NGOs and UN
agencies that operate relatively autonomously within recipient countries (e.g., Rid-
dell 2007; Bu¨the, Major and Souza 2012; Dietrich 2013). Scholars usually ignore this
type of aid when studying the relationship between aid and democratization, focusing
instead on government-to-government aid. This matters for two reasons. First, cor-
ruption in the recipient country is a strong predictor of bypass (Dietrich 2013; Acht,
Mahmoud and Thiele 2015; Ear 2013, 10). Second, the theoretical mechanisms that
link foreign aid to autocratic stability depend on government control of aid (Bueno
1A vast literature on the determinants of aid giving considers many different conceptual dimen-
sions of aid, including the choice of bilateral versus multilateral channels and the purpose for which
aid is given (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003; Drury, Olson and Van Belle 2005; Dollar and
Levin 2006; Milner 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009;
Fink and Redaelli 2011; Milner and Tingley 2012; Raschky and Schwindt 2012; Dreher, Fuchs and
Nunnenkamp 2013; Heinrich 2013; Fuchs, Dreher and Nunnenkamp 2014; Kevlihan, DeRouen and
Biglaiser 2014).
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de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009).2 As Altincekic and Bearce (2014) point out, aid
is often less fungible than these theories suggest, and it is not obvious that existing
theories apply to non-fungible aid.
Though Altincekic and Bearce (2014) are right to encourage engaging theories of
democratization,3 they assume that non-fungible aid presents no strategic advantage
to a recipient government. Bermeo (2016) takes this assumption as given in arguing
that while non-fungible aid may provide utility to a recipient government, it does
not harm the prospects for democratization. Whether this conclusion follows from
the theoretical framework that Altincekic and Bearce (2014) adopt – Acemoglu and
Robinson’s (2001) model of democratization – is unclear. For instance, Ahmed (2012)
argues that remittances, a source of income that governments have little control over,
can help autocrats. However, as Altincekic and Bearce (2014) point out, Ahmed’s
(2012) empirical tests combine government-to-government aid with remittances into
one measure of “unearned foreign income.” Theoretically, Altincekic and Bearce
(2014) focus only on how aid influences the incentives and behavior of the recipient
government, yet the incentives of opposition actors are equally important determi-
nants of equilibrium outcomes in Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001) model. In other
contexts, work that emphasizes the importance of opportunity costs in the decision
to revolt also suggests that focusing on state capacity provides only a partial view of
the relevant incentives (e.g., Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004).
In sum, we know little about the political effects of bypass aid in autocratic
regimes. While some speculate that bypass aid could stymie political reform (Dietrich
2013, 708; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009), and case studies suggest that bypass
aid sometimes undermines democracy (e.g., Ear 2013; de Waal 1997), others see
bypassing recipient governments as a way to increase aid effectiveness, or at least as
2An exception is literature on democracy aid. This literature finds some evidence that democracy
aid promotes democratic governance in recipient countries (Goldsmith 2001; Dunning 2004; Finkel,
Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n and Seligson 2007; Scott and Steele 2011; Dietrich and Wright 2013).
3See also Wright (2009).
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a reason to doubt the existence of a political aid curse (Altincekic and Bearce 2014;
Bermeo 2016). In the next section, I develop a formal model of dictatorship and
revolution to bring some clarity to this question.
2.3 Bypass Aid and Autocratic Survival
Many theories seek to explain transitions from autocracy.4 Following Altincekic
and Bearce (2014), I consider the role of bypass aid within the context of economic
theories of democratization (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). The willingness of
elites to cede power to regime opponents is an important part of democratization, and
popular resistance, both violent and non-violent, can sometimes exert pressures on
elites to democratize or can constrain the direction of institutional change (Bermeo
1997; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008; Teorell 2010). In emphasizing the role of crises
in bringing about institutional or leadership change, some have noted that“[m]ass
protests, riots, strikes, uprisings, and assorted terrorist actions are often prominent
features of crises, helping to shape their severity and paths” (Dogan and Higley 1998,
7). However, exerting political pressure is costly and requires overcoming collective
action problems (Olson 1965). Actors’ willingness to try to overcome these problems
depends on the benefits they receive in the status quo and expected future benefits.
Foreign aid, insofar as it provides a source of relief under the status quo, can affect
these considerations, and thus affect the likelihood of domestic unrest. Where goods
go unprovided, people are more willing to incur costs if it means a potential change
from the status quo. For instance, “[i]n the second half of the nineteenth century,
by its reluctance to take on responsibility for famine relief, the British Government
discredited itself and so nurtured the nationalist movement [in India], which in turn
sought to use famine as an issue for mass mobilization” (de Waal 1997, 12). Chan-
neling aid directly to people through local or international NGOs thus potentially
4For an extensive review of theories of democratization, see Coppedge (2012).
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removes a source of grievance, decreasing the likelihood that an unpopular govern-
ment faces resistance or collapses. This is the intuition of how bypass aid can affect
the incentive to revolt in the model below.
Though this is a straightforward hypothesis, I formalize the argument for a few
reasons. First, Altincekic and Bearce (2014) draw on Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001)
formal model in arguing that non-fungible aid should not benefit autocratic regimes.
Since I am using the same theoretical framework to predict the opposite outcome,
the model helps show that I am not introducing any new or unstated assumptions
to the argument. Second, using the formal model allows me to derive a clear com-
parative static on the variable of interest: the proportion of aid delivered through
bypass channels. This is important since including measures of total aid along with
a proportion that is calculated using total aid may raise concerns about bias in the
empirical tests. Lastly, incorporating aid into this framework provides an important
baseline for future extensions. In particular, the baseline model should prove useful
in endogenizing donor choices over aid channels with an explicit model of domestic
politics in the recipient country.
2.3.1 The Model
Consider a dynamic game played between a group of elites and a population.5 At
the start of the game, the elites control the government. In any round, the elites
can choose to allot a portion x of the available resources, R, to the population. I
assume that prior to receiving any international aid, the stock of resources is 1. In
every round the country receives an amount of aid denoted by a > 0. For simplicity I
assume that a is exogenous and constant across rounds. Let β ∈ [0, 1] (also exogenous)
be the proportion of aid that goes directly to the population. In every round, the
5The game closely follows a simplified version of Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2001) model presented
in Gehlbach (2013). The solution concept is Markov perfect equilibrium. Similar to others (e.g.,
Meirowitz and Tucker 2013), I abstract away from problems of collective action in treating the elites
and the population as unified actors, acknowledging that these problems are not trivial.
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population derives utility from any foreign aid it receives directly (βa), plus whatever
the government allocates to it (x). (The total amount of bypass aid is therefore
equal to βa.) The government derives utility from the portion of aid that it receives
((1− β)a) as well any remaining state resources (1− x).
The state of the world in time period t is defined by the pair (Gt, ct) where
Gt ∈ {A,R} and ct ∈ {cL, cH}. If Gt = A, the country is in a state of autocracy,
while if Gt = R the country is in the state of a revolutionary regime. The parameter
c indicates the cost to the population of removing the incumbent regime from power
in a given state. Thus, the government can be either in one of two autocratic states –
(A, cL) or (A, cH) – or one of two states of a revolutionary (i.e., post-autocratic) regime
– (R, cL) or (R, cH). I assume that cL ∼ U [0, 1] is drawn at the beginning of the game
by Nature and applies in all future rounds. As a simplifying assumption, I follow
Gehlbach (2013) in assuming that cH is high enough such that the population never
chooses to initiate a revolution in the state (A, cH) even when the regime transfers no
resources to the population.6 In the state (A, cL), however, the population may want
to revolt. In either state of autocracy, the population can decide whether or not to
oust the elites from office and take over the government. If the population initiates
a revolution, it takes over the government and inherits the government’s resources,
minus the costs of revolution.
In any given round, the probability that the next state is (A, cL) (if there is no
revolution) is q ∈ (0, 1) and the probability that the state is (A, cH) is 1 − q. Let
δ ∈ (0, 1) be a common discount factor. Denote the value to the population of state
(A, cH) as V (A, cH) = βa+ δ[qV (A, cL) + (1− q)V (A, cH)]. Here x is zero because an
autocrat has no incentive to make concessions when revolution is not credible. The
above expression can be rewritten in terms of V (A, cH) as
6This amounts to assuming that cH ≥ 1 + (1 − β)a. Alternatively, one could assume that the
opposition does not get to move if c = cH and derive the same result.
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V (A, cH) =
aβ + δqV (A, cL)
δ(q − 1) + 1 . (2.1)
When costs are low enough so that revolution is politically possible, the elites may
want to transfer some resources to the population to prevent a revolution. I assume
that the elites receive nothing under a revolutionary government. The value to the
population of living in state (A, cL) is now a function of the resources transferred to
them by the elites, the amount of foreign aid they receive, and their expectations
about the likelihood of being in the other of the autocratic states in the future, which
can be expressed as
V (A, cL) = x+ βa+ δ[qV (A, cL) + (1− q)V (A, cH)]. (2.2)
Substituting (2.1) into (2.2) and simplifying yields V (A, cL) =
aβ+δ(q−1)x+x
1−δ . The
population will be content under autocracy if the amount of resources that the elites
transfer to the population makes them at least as well off as they would be under
a revolutionary regime.7 Since a revolution succeeds with certainty, the value of a
revolutionary regime is V (R, cL) =
1+(1−β)a−cL
1−δ . To avoid revolution, the elites’ offer
must satisfy V (A, cL) ≥ V (R, cL), or
aβ + δ(q − 1)x+ x
1− δ ≥
1 + (1− β)a− cL
1− δ . (2.3)
The government’s utility is decreasing in x, so it sets x such that Equation 2.3
holds with equality. Solving for this optimal offer and taking its first derivative with
respect to β shows that the government’s equilibrium transfer is decreasing in the
proportion of bypass aid (∂x
∗
∂β
< 0). As the proportion of aid delivered through
bypass channels increases, smaller offers from the government deter unrest. So long
7Under the assumption that the value of a revolutionary regime also includes the full amount of
future bypass and government aid (V (R, cL) =
1−cL+a
1−δ ), the offer that buys off the population is
still decreasing in β (∂x
∗
∂β = − aδ(q−1)+1 ≤ 0 ).
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as aid provides some direct benefit to the population, governments can more easily
stave off revolution.8 This is independent of any effect that government aid would
have on allowing the government to make bigger offers. The intuition behind the
result for the proportion itself is that as more of the total “pie” of aid goes directly
to the population now, there is less to be gained from taking over the government
(and, by extension, the aid it receives). In sum, in periods that are unfavorable
for revolution, bypass aid acts as a humanitarian boon – without it the population
would get nothing. In periods where revolution is possible, bypass aid acts a political
subsidy to the government by making it easier to buy off the opposition. In the next
section I develop a research design to test this hypothesis.9
2.4 Research Design
Testing the theory requires data on autocratic regimes, domestic unrest, and aid.
Following recent work on the effects of aid on government survival and democra-
tization (e.g., Wright 2009), I use country-year-level data on OECD-aid-receiving
authoritarian regimes from Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). The data set includes
information on 61 autocratic countries from 2005 to 2010.10
Since others have shown that domestic unrest threatens authoritarian regimes
(Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010), I use Kono, Montinola and Verbon’s (2013)
indicator of domestic unrest as my dependent variable. This variable is a count of
8For proof that the probability of revolution decreases with bypass aid, see Appendix A. In the
Supplementary Files I consider an extension of the model where bypass aid not only increases the
population’s utility but also increases the likelihood of a successful revolution. Even if bypass aid
increases the likelihood of a successful revolution, incumbents may nevertheless allow it because it
can improve their survival prospects under some conditions.
9It might also be the case that bypass aid could stabilize a regime if the regime intercepts aid or
coopts bypass actors to invest in repressive capacity. In this case, the prediction would essentially be
the same as models that assume government control of aid, but through a different mechanism. While
the results here are similar to those in Smith (2008), the model here shows that government control
of aid is not a necessary condition for aid to deter unrest. In Section 2.7.9 of the Supplementary
Files I examine the relationship between bypass aid and military expenditures in the sample and
find that it is not associated with changes in military expenditures.
10The names of the countries appear in Table 2.7 in Section 2.7.2 of the Supplementary Files.
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peaceful demonstrations, general strikes, and riots from Banks (2011). These events
are particularly relevant for testing the theory, since the model emphasizes that the
costs of organizing and demonstrating may deter revolution. While the theory also
makes predictions about the incidence of regime failure, the temporal bounds on the
aid and autocratic regime data sets leave only six years – 2005 through 2010 – for
testing the theory (after lagging the independent variables by one year). Given that
the temporal domain of this study is relatively short, using a measure of unrest rather
than a measure of regime failure allows me to capture more variation in an alternative,
relevant dependent variable.
To measure bypass aid, I follow Dietrich (2013) in using the OECD’s Creditor
Reporting System (CRS) data base. Beginning in 2004, the OECD CRS database
reports amount of aid that OECD donors delivered through public channels, NGOs,
multilateral organizations, public-private partnerships, and “other” channels (OECD
2014). I use gross disbursements of Official Development Assistance for all types of aid
to all sectors from all donors (not just DAC donors) in constant 2012 US dollars11 to
create a proportional measure of bypass aid that divides aid received through NGOs
and civil society, multilateral organizations, and public-private partnerships by all aid
categories.12 While some of this aid may be given to governments, the OECD database
does not provide enough information to determine where aid actually ended up in a
given case. For instance, some aid channeled through the International Monetary
Fund or World Bank would be labeled as multilateral bypass aid even if the loans
ultimately end up going to the government. This same critique might apply to some
NGOs that work closely with recipient governments. However, in many other cases
it is reasonable to expect that multilateral aid does bypass the recipient government.
For example, much of the work carried out by the United Nations Refugee Agency
11I accessed the OECD CRS database on April 7, 2015. The data base allows users to select either
“Commitments” or “Gross Disbursements,” but not “net” disbursements.
12As discussed below, the results are robust to various operationalizations of this measure, includ-
ing one that excludes public-private partnerships.
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is conducted independently by that organization. Absent detailed information on
the eventual destination of aid given through these channels, this is the best existing
measure and one that follows previously published research (e.g., Dietrich 2013).
I control for a few factors that may both affect unrest and the distribution of
aid across channels in a recipient country.13 Since I am interested in evaluating
the relationship between bypass aid and domestic unrest rather than developing an
explanatory model of unrest, the primary model specification focuses on potential
confounders. Because more corrupt countries may be more likely to receive bypass
aid and less likely to face mass unrest, I follow Dietrich (2013) in using the World
Governance Indicators data set to create a measure of governance quality ranging
between 0 and 5, with greater values indicating better governance. Involvement
in civil conflict may lead donors to choose bypass to avoid directly aiding openly
belligerent governments, and conflict may affect unrest. Alternatively, aid through
government channels may increase in times of civil conflict if third parties attempt
to bolster a friendly regime. As such, I control for a count of civil conflicts in the
previous year using the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014 (Gleditsch
et al. 2002). Finally, because the occurrence of disasters may lead to more aid being
delivered through specialized NGOs (or to governments weakened by a disaster) and
disasters may affect unrest in autocratic systems (Quiroz Flores and Smith 2013),
I control for a count of natural disasters from the International Disaster Database
(EM-DAT 2009). I account for unobserved heterogeneity within years using year-
fixed effects in most models. To account for the possibility that unrest events in one
year make unrest events in the following year more likely, I include a one-year-lagged
measure of unrest events. In another model, I account for additional determinants
of unrest by including a logged measures of real GDP from Gleditsch (2002), total
population from the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers and Aten 2012), a logged
13I lag all independent variables by one year to alleviate concerns about reverse causality.
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measure of total aid, and a count of the number of terrorist attacks in the previous
year from the Global Terrorism Database.14 Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for
the main variables in the analysis.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Unrest Events 344 0.663 1.868 0 18
Bypass Share 344 15.239 17.119 0.000 79.587
Governance Index 350 2.003 0.704 0.780 4.496
Civil Conflicts 350 0.223 0.568 0 4
Natural Disasters 350 2.323 4.144 0 37
Year 350 N/A N/A 2005 2010
Total Government Aid (log) 344 4.053 2.028 0.000 7.758
Total Bypass Aid (log) 344 3.370 1.901 0.000 8.290
Total Aid (log) 344 5.529 1.969 0.000 8.881
Terror Attacks 350 0.080 0.421 0 5
Real GDP (log) 344 10.663 1.617 7.459 16.048
Population (log) 338 9.452 1.323 7.121 14.096
2.5 Results
Before moving on to the statistical models, it is instructive to take a first look
at the relationship between bypass aid and domestic unrest. Figure 2.1 plots the
proportion of aid delivered through bypass channels in a given country against the
count of unrest events in the subsequent year. A casual look at this figure suggests
that there may be a negative relationship between bypass aid and unrest.
To be a bit more rigorous, Table 2.2 reports the results of five regression models.15
The key independent variable in each model is the proportion of aid delivered through
bypass channels in year t− 1. The models in Table 2.2 consistently show a negative
14Following Dietrich (2013), I include only attacks that were directed against US targets/symbols.
15Since the outcome variable is over dispersed, I follow Kono, Montinola and Verbon (2013)
in using negative binomial regression models rather than a Poisson model throughout the paper.
Results for an alternative specification where the outcome is a dichotomous indicator of whether or
not at least one unrest event occurred and the results of zero-inflated negative binomial regression
models are in Sections 2.7.5 and 2.7.6 of the Supplementary Files.
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Figure 2.1: Scatterplot of Bypass Aid and Domestic Unrest, 2005-2010
association between the percentage of bypass aid and the occurrence of domestic un-
rest. Model 1 controls for potential recipient-level confounders, and Model 2 adds
year dummies to Model 1. In both models, the relationship between the share of aid
received through bypass channels and domestic unrest is negative and statistically sig-
nificant. As expected, better governance is associated with less unrest. The measure
of previous civil conflicts is positive (except for in Model 3) but is never statistically
significant. The count of natural disasters is a statistically significant and positive in
all models except Model 3. As expected, unrest in year t− 1 is positively associated
with unrest in year t and is statistically significant.
Model 3 accounts for additional determinants of unrest which entails losing about
five percent of the observations due to missing data. Here the coefficient on the bypass
share variable is still negative, though it does drop in statistical significance to the
90% confidence level. The coefficient on real GDP output is negative though not
statistically significant, as is the measure of total aid. The estimated coefficient for
the count of terrorist attacks is positive and not statistically significant. Finally, the
population variable is positive and statistically significant. While these variables may
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affect unrest, it is not clear they would affect the distribution of aid across channels,
and as such should not confound the relationship between bypass aid and unrest.
Because of this, I omit these variables from the remainder of the analysis.
The formal model produces a clear prediction about the relationship between
bypass aid and the likelihood of domestic unrest: regardless of the total size of aid
flows, as more aid is delivered through bypass agents, domestic unrest should decrease.
An alternative way to articulate the main hypothesis is that, holding government
(i.e., non-bypass aid) aid fixed, an increase in total bypass aid should reduce unrest.
Model 4 reports the results of replacing the bypass share variable with measures of
total bypass and government aid. Consistent with the other models, the relationship
between bypass aid and domestic unrest is negative and statistically significant even
when controlling for the total amount of aid delivered through government channels.
Interestingly, the effect of total government aid on unrest is positive and statistically
significant, highlighting possible heterogeneous effects of aid on unrest.
Finally, to ensure the main results are not sensitive to the choice of estimating the
parameters using a negative binomial regression model, Model 5 reports the results
of OLS estimates using the same variables included in Model 2. Again, the share of
bypass aid is negatively associated with unrest.
To provide a substantive interpretation of this result, I calculated expected counts
of unrest events using Model 1 in Table 2.2. To implement this procedure, I bootstrap
random samples (B=1000, with replacement) from the data and estimate coefficients
for Model 1 in Table 2.2 on each data set. For each set of coefficients, I calculate the
expected count of unrest events across a range of values for the bypass aid variable
from 0% to 50% (in increments of .5) holding the control variables (governance,
civil conflicts, and natural disasters) at their unconditional mean values. I estimate
E[Unrest Eventsij|βˆi, Xj]=eβˆiXj where βˆi is a vector of calculated coefficients from
bootstrapped sample i with i = 1, ..., 1000 and Xj is a vector of 100 values for bypass
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Table 2.2: OECD Aid Channels and Domestic Unrest, 2005-2010
Dependent variable: Count of Unrest Events
Negative Binomial Regression OLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Bypass Share −0.029∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006)
Total Bypass Aid (log) −0.286∗
(0.155)
Total Government Aid (log) 0.316∗∗
(0.144)
Governance Index −1.216∗∗∗ −1.473∗∗∗ −1.398∗∗∗ −1.308∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.245) (0.331) (0.255) (0.102)
Civil Conflicts 0.157 0.129 −0.343 0.041 0.233
(0.278) (0.281) (0.350) (0.291) (0.227)
Natural Disasters 0.111∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ −0.005 0.114∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.034) (0.035) (0.060)
Lagged Unrest 0.149∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗
(0.059) (0.057) (0.063) (0.060) (0.090)
Real GDP Output (log) −0.167
(0.238)
Total Aid (log) −0.158
(0.160)
Terrorist Attacks 0.229
(0.250)
Population (log) 0.868∗∗
(0.389)
Constant 1.518∗∗∗ 2.225∗∗∗ −3.352 1.690∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗
(0.478) (0.542) (2.088) (0.730) (0.314)
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 338 338 320 338 338
R2 0.213
Adjusted R2 0.189
Log Likelihood −281.889 −279.160 −258.757 −281.174
θ 0.215∗∗∗ (0.042) 0.222∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.258∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.213∗∗∗ (0.041)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 575.779 580.320 547.514 586.349
Residual Std. Error 1.666
F Statistic 8.854∗∗∗
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (HC1 variant) in parentheses.
Models 1-4 are negative binomial regression models. Model 5 estimated via OLS.
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aid (which varies across iterations of Xj) and the control variables held at their means.
Figure 2.2 reports the mean predicted count of unrest for each level of bypass aid
along with the 2.5% to 97.5% quantiles of the distribution. The x-axis plots various
values of the bypass aid share variable and the y-axis plots the expected count of
unrest events. Increasing the share of aid delivered through bypass channels from
0% to the mean amount (about 15%) leads to a decrease in the expected count of
unrest events of about 36% (from 0.59 to 0.38). Changing from 0% to one standard
deviation above the mean leads to a decrease in the expected count of unrest events
of about 61% (from 0.59 to 0.23).
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Figure 2.2: Expected Count of Unrest Events Across Possible Bypass Aid Shares
One potential concern in using the OECD data on aid channels is that the data
could be subject to measurement bias due to underreporting as donors were adjust-
ing to new reporting requirements that the OECD implemented in 2004.16 Unfortu-
nately, no other source provides comprehensive data on aid channels. However, the
AidData project (Tierney et al. 2011), which records aid data at the project level,
does contain information about the stated purpose for which donors commit aid.
To create an alternative indicator of bypass aid, I search for patterns in the “pur-
16Dietrich (2013, 702) also acknowledges this issue in footnote 13 in her article.
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Figure 2.3: Comparing Aid Measures
The dashed line is the mean level of OECD bypass aid for all countries in the sample, and the
dotted line is the mean level of bypass aid using my measure constructed from AidData. The
shaded areas mark 95% confidence intervals.
pose” variable that might indicate that aid was given through bypass channels. The
string of patterns I search for in R (R Core Team 2014) is “ngos|NGOs|NGO’s|civil
society|food|Food|Material relief.” I create a measure of the proportion of aid
that was committed to projects that included one or more of these terms for each
recipient year.17 This measure is moderately correlated with the measure constructed
from OECD data (ρ = 0.54).
Figure 2.3 plots the means of each measure ± 1.96 standard deviations for ev-
ery year from 2004 to 2009. The mean level of bypass aid in the OECD measure is
closely clustered around about four percent in 2004, while the AidData measure is
more varied, centered around eight percent. The AidData measure is relatively con-
sistent across time and may be undercounting bypass aid. Whether this is the case
is unclear, though the measure is arguably less susceptible to concerns about under-
reporting during the early years of OECD reporting requirements. Table 2.3 reports
17Though disbursements would be more appropriate, this data is not available from AidData.
See Section 2.7.10 in the Supplementary Files for a description of a validity check for this coding
procedure.
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the results of the basic model specification of Model 2 from Table 2.2 substituting in
the alternative measure of bypass aid. Again, there is clear support for the theory
in that the measure of bypass aid is negatively associated with unrest events. Model
6 uses the same sample from Table 2.2, while Model 7 extends the data set back to
1996. Because the results are similar and in the post-2004 sample and there is no
clear benchmark to compare AidData measure in the pre-2004 period (and Figure
2.3 suggests that undercounting may not be actually much of a concern), I use the
OECD measure in the remainder of the analysis. Additionally, the AidData measure
captures only commitments, not disbursements. Because donors often withhold or
delay the disbursement of aid commitments, using the OECD data on actual disburse-
ments likely does a better job capturing the political effects of bypass aid in recipient
countries. Still, the congruity of the results from using this alternative measure with
the OECD measure is encouraging.
2.5.1 Exogenous Variation in Bypass Aid
So far the analysis provides support for the theory: bypass aid is associated with
less domestic unrest in autocratic countries. Substantively, an increase from zero to
the mean level of bypass aid is associated with a modest decrease in the expected
count of unrest events. This finding is robust to using alternate operationalized
versions of the bypass aid variable (See Section 2.7.11 of Appendix) and controlling
for a number of potential confounders and determinants of unrest. Most importantly,
the analysis above attempts to account for observable and unobservable potentially
confounding variables.18 The main threat to inference is that a government’s latent
capacity for repression may affect both the propensity of donors to give through
bypass channels and the likelihood of unrest, which I attempt to account for with
Dietrich’s (2013) measure of governance quality. Though not reported, the main
18The main result is also robust to including continent-, region-, or country-fixed effects. See
Section 2.7.12 of the Supplementary Files.
22
Table 2.3: AidData Measure of Bypass Aid
Dependent variable:
Model 6 Model 7
Bypass Share (AidData) −0.031∗∗ −0.022∗∗
(0.016) (0.010)
Governance Index −1.233∗∗∗ −0.884∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.250)
Civil Conflicts 0.231 0.216
(0.243) (0.181)
Natural Disasters 0.114∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.015)
Lagged Unrest 0.195∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.027)
Constant 1.776∗∗∗ 1.166∗
(0.646) (0.675)
Year-fixed Effects? Y Y
Observations 338 655
Log Likelihood −299.927 −544.248
θ 0.234∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.212∗∗∗ (0.030)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 621.853 1,120.496
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
White’s (1980) HC1 standard errors in parentheses.
Negative binomial regression models.
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results in Table 2.2 are robust to including a measure of military expenditures as a
percentage of government spending from the World Bank, but including that measure
reduces the number of observations in the data set by more than half (from 338 to
140 observations) due to missing data. There would be a problem of reverse causality
if domestic unrest affects the distribution of aid across channels in a country. This
would matter if outside countries channeled more resources to imperiled governments
in times of unrest, since the data would then capture a relative decrease in bypass
aid during times of heightened unrest. Yet this is unlikely to be driving the results
in the main analysis since I lag the bypass share variable by one year and include a
lagged dependent variable.
Nonetheless, concerns about endogeneity may remain. My strategy is to identify
an exogenous source of variation in bypass aid using an instrumental variables ap-
proach. The goal is to construct a measure that is (1) plausibly causally related to
and strongly correlated with the distribution of aid in country i at time t, (2) not
caused by unrest or factors that affect bypass aid or unrest in country i at time t,
and (3) does not affect unrest through alternate channels.
I attempted to do this by constructing a new data set of international aid scandals,
distinguishing between “major” and “minor” scandals. I define a major aid scandal
as an instance where an aid donor expressed concern or alleged that a recipient gov-
ernment had used aid funds for purposes other than those intended by the donor(s)
and at least one major media outlet reported on those allegations. I define a minor
scandal as an instance where an international news source published an article that
discusses actual or potential aid misuse by a specific recipient government. Aid scan-
dals should be a good instrument since when these scandals and concerns about aid
use are prominent, international donors should be more inclined to bypass recipient
governments. Anecdotal evidence suggests that donors respond to concerns about
corruption and mismanagement by channeling aid to NGOs and civil society actors
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(French 1996; Akam 2012). It might be that leaders of donor countries intrinsically
value improving the human condition in foreign countries and want recipient govern-
ments to use aid effectively in pursuit of that goal. Alternatively, a leader may see
aid as an important diplomatic tool that helps her attain foreign policy goals, and
when domestic audiences observe misuse by recipient governments they may with-
draw support for aid. As Lancaster (2007, 7) argues, “publics in aid-giving countries
will turn against aid for development and other purposes if they regard it as having
been wasted or used corruptly.” Since scandals may attract media attention and help
turn aid policy into a salient political issue, they should be associated with changes
in aid policy. Reorienting one’s aid portfolio so that aid more often bypasses recipient
governments is one way to redeem the aid enterprise and retain an important foreign
policy tool.
I focus specifically on allegations of corruption that are linked to aid use, not
general corruption, and only include cases related to development and emergency aid
rather than military aid. I count only scandals reported in news stories about specific
recipient countries, not general articles about foreign aid and corruption (many of
which are opinion pieces). Articles must be about corruption in using aid at that
time or new revelations of recent corruption in aid practices. For example, I do not
count articles that reference previously well-documented aid misuse by a regime that
is no longer in power at the time of writing. The data set also excludes cases where
agents of donor countries were complicit in corruption (for example, a 1993 scandal
in the use of Italian aid in Bangladesh).19 With these guidelines in place, I collected
data on international aid scandals from 1990 to 2010.20 The primary analysis below
includes a total of 27 aid scandals in the years 2003 through 2008 – 15 major scandals
and 12 minor scandals.21 The main measure I use counts all major aid scandals in
19See Section 2.7.7 of the Supplementary Files for a description of the data collection process.
20I limited the initial collection effort to the post-Cold War period to avoid problems associated
with political aid giving during the Cold War, but also for feasibility.
21The complete data set extends up to 2014, though since the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014)
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year t − 2 (for the purpose of predicting the bypass share in year t − 1) outside of
country i.22
A potential threat to the validity of the instrument is that scandals may affect
unrest in autocracies through other channels. One possibility is that aid scandals
in country A could lead to unrest in country A, which could spillover to country B.
Another possibility is the opposite relationship: autocrats may preemptively employ
repressive measures to deter unrest when other neighboring autocracies are facing
threats to survival. Alternatively, if citizens in country B use country A as a bench-
mark and see that the regime in charge of country A is misusing international aid
supplies, they may favorably update their beliefs about their own leaders in country
B, which might lead to less unrest. While these mechanisms are plausible in principle,
it is not clear they would apply in autocracies where outside information is controlled
and restricted.23
Still, to reduce the chances that aid scandals would affect unrest through these
channels, I create a second measure of “extra-continental aid scandals” that counts
major scandals that occurred outside country i’s continent.24 If aid scandals do
lead to unrest in a country, it should be less likely that that unrest spills over to
a country outside the region of the country experiencing the scandal and unrest.
Further, scandals that occur outside a country’s continent should be less salient to
the population in country i, and it should be less likely that citizens in country i
use a country outside their region as a benchmark against which to evaluate their
own leaders. As such, aid scandals outside country i’s continent should influence the
data ends in 2010, I only use the aid scandal data up to 2008 given the two-year lag. Section 2.7.7
in the Supplementary Files reports a slightly simplified version of the data that also lists cases used
in a robustness check below.
22The results below are unaffected by including a control variable that counts any scandals that
occurred in country i.
23It might be the case that aid scandals lead donors and/or human rights to apply pressure for
reform more broadly, which could affect domestic unrest in outside countries. However, in this case
it would seem that the effect on domestic unrest would be positive, which is the opposite of what I
predict.
24The results are also robust to instead using UN regions rather than continents.
26
distribution of aid in that country only by affecting donors’ overall aid strategies.
While in principle all scandals are relevant for the analysis, the idea is that excluding
these scandals from the analysis helps satisfy the exclusion restriction.
A challenge of the data is that while the scandals vary across years, they vary
little within years. Thus, including year-fixed effects makes it difficult or impossible
to estimate any independent effect of aid scandals. Because the theory linking aid
scandals to the distribution of aid relies on an effect that is common to multiple
countries, the use of year-fixed effects eliminates the ability to detect this type of
effect. I address this in two ways. First, I control for year-level factors that might
confound the relationship between aid scandals, bypass aid, and unrest. Economic
instability might lead more recipient governments to misuse aid, leading to an uptick
in scandals, and may set in motion political conflict that leads to unrest. I take the
average GDP growth and average inflation for consumer prices for all countries in
the year t − 2 (the year in which any aid scandals occurred) using data from the
World Bank World Development Indicators data set (World Bank 2013). Similarly,
the occurrence of natural disasters might put unexpected pressure on governments,
increasing the temptation to redirect development aid toward patronage uses and
affecting global unrest. I include a count of the total number of natural disasters in
year t − 2 as recorded in the International Disaster Database. Controlling for these
factors in both stages of the model should reduce the chances that some year-level
factor confounds the key relationship of interest.25
Second, to permit the use of year-fixed effects, I calculate a third measure that
weights scandals by the foreign policy similarity of recipient country i to countries
where an aid scandal occurred. First, I create a measure of the average foreign policy
25I omit recipient country-fixed effects from the main analysis below because of problems with
model convergence caused by the loss of a large number of degrees of freedom in a small data set
in the bootstrapping procedure to adjust standard errors. However, the second-stage coefficient
on the predicted bypass share remains statistically significant at the 90% confidence level when
including recipient country-fixed effects in both stages of the unadjusted instrumental variables
models implemented below.
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similarity for each country dyad throughout the ten years up to and including the
scandal using a measure of voting similarity in the United Nations General Assembly
(Strezhnev and Voeten 2013) then rescale this measure to vary between 0 and 1.
I record any countries outside country i’s continent that experienced a major aid
scandal or a minor scandal in The New York Times,26 and sum the rescaled affinity
scores of country i with those countries. The value of this measure in country i during
year t is therefore xit =
∑J
j=1 τij, where τij is the average foreign policy similarity
of country i and country j throughout the ten years up to and including the year
of the scandal and J is the total number of countries outside country i’s continent
that experienced a major or minor aid scandal in year t. The idea is that when
scandals occur, donors might disproportionately reconsider aid policies to countries
with international policy preferences that align with countries that misuse aid. This
measure allows for variation across countries within years (that is not just due to
differences in continents) and at least makes the use of time-fixed effects sensible.
I use these measures to predict bypass share in year t − 1. I follow Dietrich
(2013) (who follows Aitchison (1986)) in first transforming the bypass aid proportion
variable by taking the natural log of the ratio of bypass aid to non-bypass aid to make
the measure continuous.27 Table 2.4 reports the first stage regressions and shows
that the coefficient on all three measures of aid scandals are statistically significant,
positive, and have F-statistics that exceed the rule-of-thumb threshold of at least 10
recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997) in all three models.28
26Because not all years have major aid scandals, the inclusion of minor scandals from the New
York Times prevents the loss of a large number of observations (due to the inclusion of year-fixed
effects) while still retaining a relevant factor that should influence donors’ policies.
27To avoid taking the natural log of zero, I add .0001 to the numerator of each case. Estimating
the first stage models on the raw bypass percentage variable also indicates that the three instruments
exceed the F > 10 threshold, but generating predictions from those models can lead to expected
values outside the [0,100] interval. The transformation process keeps the variable values within a
sensible range and follows Dietrich (2013).
28In Section 2.7.8 of the Supplementary Files I carry out the “plausibly exogenous” test for relaxing
the exclusion restriction outlined by Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012). The instrumental variables
results weaken in that test, but are qualitatively in the same direction as the results in the main
text. Use of that method requires using two-stage least squares and does not allow for transforming
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The first and second stage equations for the instrumental variables regression are
Count[Unrest Eventsi,t] = αBi,t−1 + βXi,t−1 + ηit (Negative binomial, Stage II )
(2.4)
E[Logged Bypass Ratioi,t−1] = γSi,t−2 + βXi,t−1 + it (OLS, Stage I ), (2.5)
where Bi,t−1 is the proportion of bypass aid in country i in year t − 1, Xi,t−1 is
a vector of country-specific control variables in year t − 1, and Si,t−2 is the measure
of aid scandals outside country i in year t − 2. The dependent variable in the first
stage is a (log-transformed) proportion and the dependent variable in the second
stage is a count of unrest events. To implement the two-stage model, I generate
predicted values of bypass aid and include them in the models predicting unrest. I
then transform these predicted values back into the interval [0, 100] and include them
in a model predicting a count of domestic unrest events, excluding the instrument
(aid scandals) used in the first stage.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report the results from the first and second stage models,
respectively. In all of the second-stage models in Table 2.5, the predicted bypass
share is negatively associated with domestic unrest, though the result weakens in
Model 9 (the one-tailed p-value is 0.06). Because the measure of bypass aid included
in the second stage is an estimate with associated uncertainty that is not accounted
for, this procedure underestimates standard errors. I adjust for this by bootstrapping
random samples (with replacement) from the data. For each sample, I estimate the
models depicted in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. I repeat this process 1000 times, extracting
the second stage model coefficients to obtain a distribution. Table 2.6 reports the
mean of the coefficient estimates on the predicted bypass share from the two second
the bypass ratio variable, so I am unable to implement the procedure using the exact same models
as the main models here. As such, a direct comparison with the results here is unfortunately not
possible.
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Table 2.4: Stage I - Aid Scandals and Aid Channel Distribution, 2005-2010
Dependent variable: Logged Bypass Ratio
(Model 8, Stage I) (Model 9, Stage I) (Model 10, Stage I)
Major Aid Scandals 0.24∗∗∗
(0.03)
Extra-Continental Scandals 0.31∗∗∗
(0.04)
Extra-Continental Scandals (Affinity Weighted) 0.23∗∗∗
(0.07)
Governance Index −1.82∗∗∗ −1.79∗∗∗ −1.79∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Civil Conflict 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Natural Disasters 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged Unrest −0.06 −0.04 −0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Average Global GDP Growtht−2 0.33∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Average Global Inflationt−2 0.003∗ 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Total Global Disasterst−2 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant −6.81∗∗∗ −6.05∗∗∗ −0.82∗∗
(1.31) (1.25) (0.33)
Year Dummies N N Y
F-Statistic on Instrument 55.78 58.41 10.86
Observations 338 338 338
R2 0.51 0.51 0.52
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.50 0.51
Residual Std. Error 1.48 (df = 329) 1.47 (df = 329) 1.46 (df = 327)
F Statistic 42.51∗∗∗ (df = 8; 329) 43.08∗∗∗ (df = 8; 329) 36.06∗∗∗ (df = 10; 327)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
Estimated standard errors in parentheses.
OLS estimates.
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stage models along with 90% confidence intervals. The 90% confidence interval on
the predicted bypass share does not include zero in Model 8, though it does in Models
9 and 10. Still, the result is clearly close to reaching statistical significance, and for
both Models 9 and 10, the 80% confidence interval does not include zero. Given
the relatively small sample size, the possibly conservative nature of bootstrapping
procedure, and the fact that the estimated coefficient is always leaning negative,
it seems reasonable to interpret these results as supporting the conclusions of the
“na¨ıve” statistical models.
Table 2.5: Stage II - Bypass Aid and Unrest, 2005-2010
Dependent variable: Count of Unrest Events
(Model 8, Stage II) (Model 9, Stage II) (Model 10, Stage II)
Predicted Bypass Share −0.05∗∗ −0.03 −0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Governance Index −1.64∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗ −1.71∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.39) (0.48)
Civil Conflicts 0.11 0.07 0.11
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Natural Disasters 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Lagged Unrest 0.15∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.15∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Average Global GDP Growtht−2 −0.26 −0.28
(0.20) (0.20)
Average Global Inflationt−2 0.01∗ 0.01
(0.004) (0.003)
Total Global Disasterst−2 −0.0000 −0.001
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 3.53 3.51 2.62∗∗∗
(2.20) (2.20) (0.99)
Year Dummies N N Y
Observations 338 338 338
Log Likelihood −281.95 −283.09 −281.87
θ 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.04)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 581.89 584.18 585.74
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
Estimated standard errors in parentheses.
Negative binomial regression models.
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Table 2.6: Bootstrapped Second Stage Coefficients
Variable
¯ˆ
β sˆe(β) 90% lower 90% upper
Model 8 Predicted Bypass Share -0.054 0.027 -0.098 -0.010
Model 9 Predicted Bypass Share -0.035 0.024 -0.074 0.004
Model 10 Predicted Bypass Share -0.050 0.031 -0.102 0.002
Results from 1000 random samples (with replacement) from data.
N in each sample is 338.
First-stage outcome variable is logged bypass ratio.
Second-stage outcome variable is count of unrest events.
In the Supplementary Files I conduct a number of robustness checks. The results
are robust to a variety of research design choices including dropping riots from the
count of unrest events in the dependent variable, using a logit model with a dichoto-
mous indicator for unrest events, using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression
model, including continent-, region-, or country-fixed effects, and using alternative
measures for bypass aid. I also present some tests to evaluate the plausibility of
the exclusion restriction in the instrumental variable models in Section 2.7.8 of the
Supplementary Files.
On balance the results provide fairly consistent support for the theory. In the
baseline models I consistently find a negative association between the proportion
of aid received through bypass channels and the occurrence of domestic unrest in
autocracies. This finding is mostly confirmed in an analysis that uses aid scandals as
an instrument for bypass aid, and the analysis suggests that these scandals are likely
a valid instrument for bypass aid.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper shows both theoretically and empirically that bypassing recipient gov-
ernments has political implications. Whereas some are ambivalent about the role of
bypass aid in the story of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009),
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or assume that bypass aid is politically neutral (Altincekic and Bearce 2014; Bermeo
2016), the results here suggest that bypassing can still benefit autocratic regimes in
terms of reducing domestic unrest. While bypass aid may improve human welfare in
the short term, it may also reduce the incentive for people to challenge autocratic
governments. Unlike existing theories, the theory does not rely on a government in-
tercepting, misusing, or taxing aid. At the very least, the paper shows that much of
what has been treated as “non-fungible” aid is arguably fungible for recipient govern-
ments and suggests that the assumption that bypass aid does nothing to harm the
prospects for political reform is unfounded. This is not to say that bypass aid fails to
achieve development goals or uniformly deters incentives for democratization. There
may be important variation within countries that mutes any effects of bypass aid on
unrest, and it is possible that some types of aid that get labeled as “bypass aid” –
such as aid that is intended to promote the development of democracy – can help the
process of political reform. But the results here show that, on average, bypass aid is
associated with a lower frequency of unrest in autocracies. Insofar as acts of unrest
place can pressure autocratic governments to take steps toward democracy, this study
is relevant for understanding potential obstacles to democratic reform.29
From a policy perspective, donors concerned with promoting democracy should
be wary (or at least cognizant) of the potential for bypass aid to undermine political
resistance to autocracies. The results suggest that bypass aid should not be seen
as an alternative to conditional aid, as it is sometimes implicitly treated (Altincekic
and Bearce 2014). Further, the findings also have implications for studying the ef-
fectiveness of sanctions by highlighting indirect mechanisms through which strategies
designed to avoid or punish corruption may fail to achieve foreign policy objectives.
29Of course, this assumes that popular resistance is an important stage of democratization, which
may not always be true. Future research might consider the conditions under which autocratic
regimes may be most vulnerable to domestic unrest to test for a conditional effect of bypass aid
on regime failure. However, the limited availability of data on bypass aid makes it difficult to get
leverage on this question given the rarity of regime failure.
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The theory and empirical results suggest a few interesting extensions. First, al-
though the model does not account for bargaining over aid-for-policy deals (e.g.,
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009), it suggests that bypass aid might facilitate such
deals through a mechanism different from what Bermeo (2016) suggests if bypass
aid helps autocrats survive. Perhaps constituents in democratic donor countries do
care about helping the poor (e.g., Milner 2006), but donors understand the strategic
implications of bypass aid in deciding to delegate to multilateral or nongovernmental
organizations. Alternatively, endogenizing the choice of aid channels by donors would
be an interesting extension to the framework here if we assume donors are concerned
with promoting democracy. Indeed, democracy-minded donors might withhold by-
pass aid in periods that are favorable to revolution. In fact, the findings here suggest
that the decision to bypass should be endogenous to the political effects of bypass-
ing. Second, treating bypass aid as a strategic resource for authoritarian governments
points to a potential explanations for attacks on aid groups by rebel movements. If
aid depresses the incentive to revolt, then groups fighting for political change may
seek to expel aid groups to boost citizens’ motivations to resist an incumbent regime.
Future research should address these questions. For now, the model and results here
provide reasons to think that bypass aid is not politically neutral.
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2.7 Appendix for “Bypass Aid and Unrest in Autocracies”
2.7.1 Extensions to Model
2.7.1.1 Probability of Revolution
The probability of revolution in the model is the probability that the optimal
transfer x∗ is less than the resources available to the government, which can be written
as
Pr(x∗ < 1 + (1− β)a), (2.6)
or
Pr(cL < δ(q − 1)(a(β − 1)− 1)− aβ). (2.7)
Since cL ∼ U [0, 1], this is equivalent to δ(q − 1)(a(β − 1) − 1) − aβ, which is
decreasing in β.
2.7.1.2 What If Bypass Aid Makes Revolution Easier?
An important stylized fact to account for is that bypass aid may actually help
sustain rebel groups. That is, while it may remove a source of grievance, aid may
simultaneously empower or keep afloat groups with the capability to challenge the
government. Sometimes this may even be a strategic objective of donors. For exam-
ple, following the Russian Civil War, the Hoover administration in the United States
tried to use humanitarian aid to undermine the Bolsheviks:
“[B]y creating a food and medicine distribution system outside the control
of the Soviet government, Hoover hoped to establish an alternative power
center through which the loyalty of the recipient populations, weakened
as they were at the end of the civil war by massive starvation and disease,
might be turned against the Bolsheviks” (Belgrad 1997, 4)
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The baseline model assumes that an attempted revolution succeeds with certainty. I
now relax this assumption to account for the possibility of a failed revolution, which
also allows me to account for the fact foreign aid may affect the probability of a
revolution succeeding.30 Let ρ(β) ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability that a revolution is
successful, and let 1−ρ(β) denote the probability of failure. Let ρ(β) be an increasing,
concave function of the proportion of bypass aid.31 For now I assume that in the case
of success the resources of the state are available to be evenly divided across the
population forever, minus the costs of revolution. If revolution fails, the population
gets nothing forever. I also assume that the government can decide how much aid to
allow into the country up to some exogenously determined threshold, aˆ. Think of this
as the maximum amount of aid that the international community would be willing
to contribute.
Now the population chooses not to revolt if
aβ + δ(q − 1)x+ x
1− δ =
ρ(β) (a(1− β)− cL + 1)
1− δ . (2.8)
The value of x that will buy the population off is now
xˆ =
ρ(β) (a(−β) + a− cL + 1)− aβ
δ(q − 1) + 1 . (2.9)
The derivative of this optimal xˆ with respect to β is
∂xˆ
∂β
= −aρ(β) + ρ
′(β) (a(β − 1) + cL − 1) + a
δ(q − 1) + 1 , (2.10)
where ρ′(β) denotes the first derivative of the probability that the revolution
30Additionally, governments may host humanitarian aid operations that pose threats to their
neighbors. Polman (2010, 111) details a number of international aid efforts that inadvertently
financed rebel groups (“refugee warriors”) challenging one or more neighboring governments.
31Note that the model implicitly accounts for the possibility that government aid increases the
odds that the government wins in a revolutionary contest, since as the proportion of bypass aid
decreases, the probability that the government wins (1− ρ(β)) increases.
36
succeeds with respect to β. Now the optimal xˆ is decreasing in β only if
ρ′(β) ≤ ρ′(β)∗ ≡ − a(ρ(β) + 1)
a(β − 1) + cL − 1 , (2.11)
which is always positive. This threshold is less than 1 (i.e., it is possible that the
relationship between bypass aid and the optimal offer may be negative or positive)
if the condition a(β + ρ(β)) + cL − 1 > 0. This highlights that governments may
allow aid to bypass them even when it potentially increases the likelihood of a suc-
cessful revolution because of the effects that it has on undermining the incentive for
revolution.
2.7.2 Countries Included in Analysis
Table 2.7 reports the country names (sometimes abbreviated) used in the analysis
as they appear in the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) data.
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Table 2.7: Temporal and Spatial Domain
Country Year(s) in Data
1 Afghanistan 2010
2 Algeria 2005 - 2010
3 Angola 2005 - 2010
4 Armenia 2005 - 2010
5 Azerbaijan 2005 - 2010
6 Bangladesh 2008 - 2008
7 Belarus 2005 - 2010
8 Botswana 2005 - 2010
9 Burkina Faso 2005 - 2010
10 Cambodia 2005 - 2010
11 Cameroon 2005 - 2010
12 Cen African Rep 2005 - 2010
13 Chad 2005 - 2010
14 China 2005 - 2010
15 Congo-Brz 2005 - 2010
16 Congo/Zaire 2005 - 2010
17 Cuba 2005 - 2010
18 Egypt 2005 - 2010
19 Eritrea 2005 - 2010
20 Ethiopia 2005 - 2010
21 Gabon 2005 - 2010
22 Gambia 2005 - 2010
23 Guinea 2005 - 2010
24 Iran 2005 - 2010
25 Ivory Coast 2005 - 2010
26 Jordan 2005 - 2010
27 Kazakhstan 2005 - 2010
28 Kuwait 2005 - 2010
29 Kyrgyzstan 2005 - 2010
30 Laos 2005 - 2010
31 Libya 2005 - 2010
Country Year(s) in Data
32 Madagascar 2010
33 Malaysia 2005 - 2010
34 Mauritania 2005 - 2010
35 Morocco 2005 - 2010
36 Mozambique 2005 - 2010
37 Myanmar 2005 - 2010
38 Namibia 2005 - 2010
39 Nepal 2005 - 2006
40 Oman 2005 - 2010
41 Pakistan 2005 - 2008
42 Rwanda 2005 - 2010
43 Saudi Arabia 2005 - 2010
44 Singapore 2005 - 2010
45 Sudan 2005 - 2010
46 Swaziland 2005 - 2010
47 Syria 2005 - 2010
48 Tajikistan 2005 - 2010
49 Tanzania 2005 - 2010
50 Thailand 2007
51 Togo 2005 - 2010
52 Tunisia 2005 - 2010
53 Turkmenistan 2005 - 2010
54 Uganda 2005 - 2010
55 United Arab Emirates 2005 - 2010
56 Uzbekistan 2005 - 2010
57 Venezuela 2006 - 2010
58 Vietnam 2005 - 2010
59 Yemen 2005 - 2010
60 Zambia 2005 - 2010
61 Zimbabwe 2005 - 2010
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2.7.4 Measure of Unrest Excluding Riots
Following Kono, Montinola and Verbon (2013), the dependent variable used in
the main text is a count of strikes involving more than 1,000 people directed at
the government or national policies, riots involving more than 100 people, and anti-
government demonstrations involving more than 100 people from Banks (2011). Since
the theory emphasizes actions that would challenge a government specifically and
the count of riots does not specify that the riots need to have anything to do with
government policies, it is important to ensure that the main result does not depend
on the inclusion of riots in the dependent variable. (Additionally, from a normative
perspective, it might be desirable for bypass aid to reduce unrest if the unrest events
it affects are riots.) Table 2.9 reports the results of rerunning the first two models in
Table 2.2 while excluding riots from the count variable. In both models the results
are consistent with those reported in the main text.
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Table 2.9: OECD Aid Channels and Domestic Unrest (Excluding Riots), 2005-2010
Dependent variable:
(1) (2)
Bypass Share −0.027∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.012) (0.016)
Governance Index −1.107∗∗∗ −1.282∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.273)
Civil Conflict 0.336 0.283
(0.290) (0.299)
Natural Disasters 0.115∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.030)
Lagged Unrest 0.109 0.121∗
(0.067) (0.063)
Constant 0.767 1.258∗∗
(0.545) (0.598)
Observations 338 338
Year-fixed Effects? No Yes
Log Likelihood −218.452 −216.496
θ 0.229∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.241∗∗∗ (0.057)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 448.905 454.992
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
Negative binomial regression models.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.
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2.7.5 Logit Models for Dichotomous Unrest Variable
To ensure that the results of the count models are not driven by outlying cases
with many unrest events, Table 2.10 reports the results of the key models from Table
2.2 in the main text where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes on
a value of “1” when there is at least one unrest event in the data. In both models, the
relationship between bypass aid and unrest is negative and statistically significant.
Table 2.10: OECD Aid Channels and Domestic Unrest (Dichotomous Dependent
Variable), 2005-2010
Dependent variable: Unrest Dummy
(1) (2)
Bypass Share −0.023∗∗ −0.028∗∗
(0.011) (0.013)
Governance Index −0.951∗∗∗ −1.044∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.330)
Civil Conflict −0.149 −0.152
(0.287) (0.301)
Natural Disasters 0.150∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059)
Lagged Unrest 0.388∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.117)
Constant 0.141 0.506
(0.666) (0.710)
Year-fixed Effects? No Yes
Observations 338 338
Log Likelihood −139.922 −137.142
Akaike Inf. Crit. 291.843 296.284
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
Logit regression models. Estimated standard errors in parentheses.
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2.7.6 Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression
To account for the possibility of excessive zeroes in the dependent variable, Table
4.8 reports the results of two negative zero-inflated binomial regression models where
the inflation variable is a factored version of the country code variable. (I omit the
coefficients on the model of the probability of observing a zero count.)
Table 2.11: Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression Models
Dependent variable: Count of Unrest Events
(1) (2)
Bypass Share −0.020∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
Governance Index −0.313 −0.778∗
(0.362) (0.406)
Civil Conflict 0.401∗ 0.460∗
(0.235) (0.238)
Natural Disasters 0.043∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.019) (0.020)
Lagged Unrest −0.002 −0.024
(0.039) (0.040)
Constant 1.295∗ 2.138∗∗∗
(0.706) (0.818)
Year Dummies N Y
Observations 338 338
Log Likelihood −222.704 −219.802
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
Standard errors in parentheses.
Zero-inflated negative binomial regression models.
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2.7.7 Aid Scandal Cases
Table 2.12 reports the basic case information for the aid scandals used in the
construction of the instrumental variable. A complete version of the data with full
citation information will be available on the author’s website. I conducted the data
collection in three rounds as follows: On the first round, I used Lexis Nexis Academic
to search for “corruption AND foreign aid” in the category of newspapers from 1990
to 2014, sorted the results by relevance, and then manually sifted through the results
to identify and record possible scandals. In the second round, I repeated this process
but with the search phrase “aid AND misus* AND government.” In the third round
of data collection, I again searched for “aid AND misus* AND government,” but did a
separate search for each individual year from 1990 to 2014. Note that the observations
are scandals (or minor scandals), not news stories about scandals, even while they
are based on news stories.
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Table 2.12: Cases from Aid Scandal Data, 2003-2008
Number Year Month Day Country Major?
1 2003 10 18 Philippines 0
2 2003 10 19 Zimbabwe 0
3 2004 2 24 Iraq 1
4 2004 7 14 Haiti 0
5 2005 1 13 Indonesia 0
6 2005 2 13 Sri Lanka 1
7 2005 7 6 Nigeria 0
8 2005 12 7 Malawi 0
9 2006 1 22 Cambodia 0
10 2006 5 7 Vietnam 0
11 2006 6 1 Uganda 1
12 2006 10 4 Macedonia 1
13 2007 2 20 Colombia 1
14 2007 7 31 Iraq 0
15 2007 8 20 Zimbabwe 1
16 2007 12 27 Pakistan 0
17 2008 2 6 Afghanistan 1
18 2008 2 11 Indonesia 1
19 2008 3 26 Afghanistan 0
20 2008 5 8 Myanmar 1
21 2008 6 30 Pakistan 1
22 2008 7 4 Pakistan 1
23 2008 7 19 Bulgaria 1
24 2008 7 27 Costa Rica 1
25 2008 9 23 Iraq 1
26 2008 10 15 Tajikistan 0
27 2008 11 3 Zimbabwe 1
2.7.8 Evaluating Exclusion Restriction
While the requirement that the instrumental variable be strongly correlated with
the endogenous variable of interest is straightforward to evaluate, it is more difficult
to ensure that the aid scandals do not affect unrest through alternate channels. As
discussed above, there are a few potential mechanisms through which outside aid scan-
dals could potentially affect domestic unrest independently of their effects on bypass
aid. In the main text I argued that these threats should not be serious theoretically
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given that one of the key instrumental variables is a count of aid scandals that oc-
curred outside country i’s continent in year t − 2. Here I perform some statistical
tests to evaluate those potential violations of the exclusion restriction.
Table 2.13 presents the results of a series of bivariate models. One concern is
that aid scandals might affect overall aid amounts, which could affect a government’s
repressive capacity. However, there are equally plausible arguments for both a positive
and negative effect here. On one hand, aid scandals might lead donors to reduce
overall aid flows in light of evidence of misuse. On the other hand, donors may only
reduce aid to the country experiencing an aid scandal, reallocating fixed aid budgets
to other countries and regions. In any case, while aid scandals are strongly correlated
with the channel distribution of aid in a given country, Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.13
shows that they do not appear to affect total aid amounts.
Models 3 and 4 shows that there appears to be no direct effect of aid scandals
on unrest, and Model 5 shows (perhaps surprisingly) that there is no effect of aid
scandals in country i on unrest in country i. Model 6 shows that outside unrest is
weakly correlated with less unrest in country i, and Model 7 suggests that unrest
outside a given country’s continent is not associated with domestic unrest. A possi-
ble explanation for the result in Model 6 is that autocrats increase repression when
outside countries experience unrest to deter unrest, but since there is no evidence that
scandals in country i affect unrest in that country (Model 5), this concern should not
apply to aid scandals.
Implementing Conley, Hansen and Rossi’s (2012) “Plausibly Exogenous” Test
The tests in the previous section seek to identify potential theoretical mechanisms
through which aid scandals might affect unrest outside of their effects on the distri-
bution of bypass aid. On balance, it seems reasonable that aid scandals would serve
as an exogenous source of variation in aid channel distribution.
Others have outlined procedures for formally relaxing the exclusion restriction
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Table 2.13: Evaluating Exclusion Restriction
Dependent variable:
DV: Total Aid DV: Unrest Events
OLS Negative
binomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Major Aid Scandals 16.195 −0.024
(19.961) (0.054)
Major Aid Scandals Outside Continent 31.847 −0.008
(26.259) (0.070)
Scandals in Country −1.864
(1.295)
Outside Unrest −0.031∗
(0.018)
Unrest Outside Continent −0.005
(0.019)
Constant 734.114∗∗∗ 721.415∗∗∗ −0.353∗ −0.398∗∗ −0.386∗∗ 0.678 −0.310
(77.673) (73.893) (0.206) (0.197) (0.159) (0.660) (0.443)
Observations 344 344 344 344 344 344 344
R2 0.002 0.004
Adjusted R2 −0.001 0.001
Log Likelihood −323.800 −323.892 −322.810 −322.211 −323.865
θ 0.140∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.140∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.146∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.140∗∗∗ (0.024)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 651.599 651.784 649.620 648.421 651.729
Residual Std. Error (df = 342) 1,104.885 1,103.578
F Statistic (df = 1; 342) 0.658 1.471
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(Conley, Hansen and Rossi 2012) in the context of two-stage least squares estimation
(2SLS). Implementing those procedures here is messy for a number of reasons. First,
the models in the main paper use different estimators in each stage of the analysis
to accommodate the count structure of the outcome variable (unrest events). I use
OLS to estimate the relationship between the various measures of aid scandals and the
logged bypass ratio, and then negative binomial regression to estimate the relationship
between bypass aid and a count of unrest events. To adjust for the incorrect standard
errors in the second stage of this procedure, I rely on bootstrapped coefficients from
the second stage to draw inferences. Second, the analysis in the main paper transforms
the predictions for the first stage dependent variable (logged bypass ratio) before
including it as a covariate in the second stage. The transformation of the dependent
variable is intended to make the dependent variable continuous following Dietrich
(2013). When transforming the predictions from these models back into the [0,100]
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Figure 2.4: Union of Confidence Intervals Approach to Relaxing Exclusion Restric-
tion.
interval, the models generate predictions that lie in that interval. This is not the case
when using the raw percentage variable, which in the prediction stage can result in
negative values or values above 100. For these reasons, the main analysis does not
implement 2SLS.
Nonetheless, I implemented the procedures in Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)
using modified versions of two of the models in the main text (Models 8 and 9). I use
the percentage of bypass aid as the endogenous regressor in the first stage in all three
models. The second stage outcome variable is a dummy variable indicating whether
or not at least one unrest event occurred. I estimated robust standard errors using
Stata’s vce(robust) command. The procedures outlined in Conley, Hansen and
Rossi (2012) allow for researchers to relax the exclusion restriction in an instrumental
variables model by introducing a parameter γ that represents any direct effect that
the excluded instrument may have on the second-stage outcome variable (in this case,
any direct effect that aid scandals could have on the likelihood of unrest.) The user
specifies the minimum and maximum bounds for γ, call these γL and γH . I set γL=0
for all three models, and set γH equal to the estimated coefficient from a regression
of the dichotomous unrest variable on each of the aid scandals measures. This value
is -.007 for both Model 8 and Model 9.
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Figure 2.4 reports the results of this procedure including the instruments used in
Models 8 and 9 from the main text along with the control variables included in those
models. In all three cases, the mean of the estimated coefficient on the logged bypass
ratio is negative, though the 80% union of confidence intervals includes zero in all three
cases. As the assumption of no direct effect on the outcome is relaxed, the confidence
intervals widen slightly. Again, a direct comparison with the results in the paper is
not possible given the different methods employed in each case. That is, the models
used in the “plausibly exogenous” test are not the same as those reported in the main
paper, and are less appropriate for evaluating the key hypothesis given the nature
of the data. Although the results are weaker when using this alternative framework,
it is at least encouraging that these different design choices produce produce results
that point substantively to the conclusions in the main analysis.
Ultimately the exogeneity of the excluded instrument needs to be justified on
theoretical grounds, and the previous section identifies some potential threats to
inference and shows that they are likely unwarranted. Further, the results in the main
text show that the association between bypass aid and unrest is robust to a variety of
alternate research design choices in ways that are consistent with the theory. Indeed,
the main analysis explicitly seeks to control for confounders, and, as noted in the
main text, the main results are also robust to controlling for military expenditures.
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2.7.9 Bypass Aid and Investment in Repressive Capacity
The theory suggests that government control of aid is not a necessary condition
for aid to depress the incentive to revolt. Still, it is possible that bypass aid would
influence unrest not through benefitting citizens, but rather because recipient regimes
intercept or tax bypass aid and use these resources to invest in greater repressive
capacity. In Table 2.14 I regress (logged) changes in military expenditures as a percent
of goverment spending from the World Bank from year t to t − 1 on bypass aid.
Model 1 uses the proportion of bypass aid as the key independent variable. Model
2 uses the logged total of bypass aid in millions of US dollars, controlling for logged
government aid. Since interstate crises and civil conflicts might affect both bypass aid
and military expenditures, I control for a count of militarized interstate disputes and
civil conflicts in the previous year. The count of the number of militarized interstate
disputes (MIDs) that a country was involved in during the previous year is based on
data from the Correlates of War project (Palmer et al. 2015). (The results do not
depend on the inclusion of these variables.) To account for unobserved heterogeneity,
I include year-fixed effects. In both models, the relationship between bypass aid and
and changes in military expenditures is negative, though not statistically significant.
This is consistent with the theory. If bypass aid provides a service that benefits
people, then autocratic regimes need not invest in greater repressive capacity.
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Table 2.14: Bypass Aid and Change in Military Expenditures (% Gov. Spending)
Dependent variable: Change in Military Expenditures
(1) (2)
Bypass Share −0.020
(0.021)
Total Bypass Aid (log) −0.145
(0.169)
Total Government Aid (log) 0.190
(0.176)
International Disputes 0.213 0.200
(0.250) (0.240)
Civil Conflict −0.533 −0.657
(0.642) (0.623)
Constant −0.341 −0.513
(0.363) (0.512)
Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 140 140
R2 0.055 0.054
Adjusted R2 0.005 −0.003
Residual Std. Error 2.425 (df = 132) 2.436 (df = 131)
F Statistic 1.107 (df = 7; 132) 0.940 (df = 8; 131)
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
White’s (1980) HC1 standard errors in parentheses.
OLS estimates.
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2.7.10 Validity Check for AidData Measure
A preliminary validity check suggests that the coding procedure used to construct
the alternate measure of bypass aid from the AidData project succeeds in identify-
ing cases where bypass is likely. In a random sample of 50 cases where the bypass
indicator takes a value of “1,” all of the coded projects could plausibly bypass the
government. The unique purpose codes in the sample are: “Democratic participation
and civil society, Material relief assistance and services, Strengthening civil society,
Support to international NGOs, Emergency food aid, Food crop production, Support
to national ngos, Food aid/Food security programmes, Food security programmes/-
food aid, Support to local and regional ngos.” Of course, there is still potential for
measurement error. For example, it could be the case that a donor gives aid for the
purpose of “Support to national ngos,” but does so through the recipient gov-
ernment, and the aid never makes it to NGOs (or never makes it to citizens). As
discussed in the main text, this is the same problem scholars face in using the OECD
data. Still, relative to aid labeled as “budget support,” we should be confident that
a great deal of what this measure picks up is in fact bypassing the government.
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2.7.11 Alternative Operationalizations of Bypass Aid with OECD Data
Table 2.15 reports the results of models that use alternative operationalizations
of bypass aid. Model 1 calculates the bypass share variable excluding aid delivered
through public-private partnerships. Model 2 uses a measure of bypass aid as a
percentage of real GDP output. As in the main text, bypass aid is statistically
significant and negatively associated with unrest events.
Table 2.15: Alternate Measures of Bypass Aid and Unrest, 2005-2010
Dependent variable: Unrest events
(1) (2)
Bypass Share (Excluding Public-Private Partnerships) −0.038∗∗∗
(0.014)
Bypass Aid as % GDP −0.839∗
(0.479)
Governance Index −1.482∗∗∗ −1.183∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.280)
Civil Conflicts 0.130 0.338
(0.281) (0.412)
Natural Disasters 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025)
Lagged Unrest 0.153∗∗∗ 0.096∗
(0.057) (0.055)
Constant 2.243∗∗∗ 1.703∗∗∗
(0.542) (0.630)
Year Dummies Y Y
Observations 338 295
Log Likelihood −279.085 −262.536
θ 0.222∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.268∗∗∗ (0.055)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 580.171 547.071
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
White’s (1980) HC1 standard errors in parentheses.
Negative binomial regression models.
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2.7.12 Controlling for Continent, Region, and Recipient Country
To account for unobserved heterogeneity that might affect the results in ways not
captured by the included covariates, Table 2.16 reports the results of the main model
when controlling for continent-, region, and country-fixed effects. Across all three
models, the relationship between bypass aid and unrest is negative and statistically
significant.
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Table 2.16: Continent-, Region-, and Country-fixed Effects Models, 2005-2010
Dependent variable: Count of Unrest Events
(1) (2) (3)
Bypass Share −0.040∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Governance Index −1.473∗∗∗ −1.348∗∗∗ −3.018∗∗
(0.249) (0.339) (1.306)
Civil Conflicts 0.178 0.105 0.694∗∗
(0.288) (0.334) (0.353)
Natural Disasters 0.130∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.026) (0.031) (0.059)
Lagged Unrest 0.158∗∗∗ 0.051 −0.102∗∗
(0.060) (0.057) (0.043)
Constant 2.223∗∗∗ 2.173∗ 5.406∗
(0.584) (1.217) (2.808)
Year Dummies Y Y Y
Continent Dummies Y N N
Region Dummies N Y N
Country Dummies N N Y
Observations 338 338 338
Log Likelihood −278.550 −266.173 −214.403
θ 0.224∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.319∗∗∗ (0.069) 0.958∗∗∗ (0.255)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 585.100 578.346 570.806
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (Two-tailed tests).
White’s (1980) HC1 standard errors in parentheses.
Negative binomial regression models.
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Chapter 3
The Design of International Institutions for Humanitarian Aid
Need often comes second to politics in explaining patterns of both development
and emergency aid (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2003; Drury, Olson and Van
Belle 2005; Dollar and Levin 2006; Stro¨mberg 2007; Fink and Redaelli 2011; Dreher,
Fuchs and Nunnenkamp 2013). Many studies find that “colonial links, alliances, [and]
strategic interests” drive donors’ foreign aid policies (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 34).
A recent review of the foreign aid literature remarks that, “the finding that strategic
concerns of the donor countries are important driving forces persists across studies of
different contexts, data, and methods such that there is a reasonable consensus that
foreign aid is often unrelated to the needs of the recipient country” (Qian 2015, 280).
This is no less true of humanitarian aid and disaster relief (e.g., Drury, Olson and
Van Belle 2005; Stro¨mberg 2007; Fink and Redaelli 2011).1
Policy makers and aid agencies are well aware of this problem. In an attempt
to distribute aid more equitably, the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs formed the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in
2006 as a “pooled relief fund.” The CERF is unique as an aid organization in that
it collects contributions before humanitarian crises occur, so donors cannot give or
withhold aid based on whether or not they want to help a particular country. Instead,
states contribute to the CERF, and the organization allocates aid where it is needed.2
Unlike many of its development-oriented counterparts (e.g., multilateral development
1Of course, aid may be genuinely humanitarian and strategic in cases where donors perceive a
strategic interest in improving welfare. For instance, former US President George W. Bush intensified
the fight against AIDS in Africa partly because of his belief that hopelessness and underdevelopment
is a root cause of terrorism (Bush 2010, 336).
2The CERF website highlights a number of independent reports that suggest that this is, in fact,
how the organization operates. I provide a novel test in the Appendix that suggests further support
for this claim.
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banks), states are not allowed to earmark their contributions to the CERF. In 2013,
about 60 states contributed a total of $466 million to the organization. Unfortunately,
CERF aid as a proportion of global humanitarian aid has failed to exceed five percent
since the organization’s founding.
This paper argues that the key institutional design feature of the CERF – the
complete banning of earmarking – may limit the effectiveness of the organization
by reducing its capacity. I analyze a game of emergency aid provision between a
potential aid donor and an expert, altruistic aid organization.3 The aid organization is
altruistic in that it always wants to minimize the negative impacts of some exogenous
crisis affecting a recipient country. I compare a donor’s aid policy and recipient
welfare outcomes across three states of the world: a world without the specialized
organization, a world where the organization exists but bans earmarking, and a world
where the organization allows “limited” earmarking. I define a limited earmark as
a policy granting the organization complete control over a donor’s aid if some pre-
specified observable condition applies in a particular case. The policy differs from a
traditional earmark in that if the condition is not met, the organization can still use
part of the donor’s contribution. I show that relative to a complete ban on earmarking,
giving donors the option of a limited earmark not only elicits larger contributions to
the pooled fund but can improve average outcomes for aid recipients. Intuitively,
donors contribute more to the pooled fund when they are able to place restrictions
on their aid. When the institution operates with a limited budget, crisis victims who
are unlikely to receive bilateral assistance often fare better when the organization
allows partial earmarking. As such, the limited earmarking option improves outcomes
in precisely those situations that the organization is most interested in addressing:
emergencies that are, or are likely to be, underfunded.
The models also illustrate some interesting dynamics regarding the role of shared
3I refer to the aid organization as an “organization,” “institution,” and “pooled fund” inter-
changeably throughout the paper.
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preferences in principal-agent relationships. Specifically, the analysis highlights that
an altruistic pooled fund should anticipate that donors who care most about provid-
ing emergency relief will be willing to act unilaterally so long as doing so is not too
costly. The pooled fund not only channels resources to underfunded emergencies, but
also gives fewer resources to crisis situations that it anticipates will receive bilateral
funding. It is this incentive that creates a conundrum for the organization and for ef-
ficient donors. With the exception of donors that are very inefficient at providing aid,
donors that generally share the organization’s preference for reducing humanitarian
crises and would like to reap efficiency gains by cooperating find that the organiza-
tion provides less aid the more likely it is that a donor would act bilaterally in the
organization’s absence.
This paper makes a number of contributions. First, the paper provides an answer
to a puzzle in the literature on strategic explanations for foreign aid. If states typically
give aid for strategic reasons, why do they sometimes delegate ex ante to pooled
funds? The analysis suggests that the potential gains in efficiency from working
through an institution can be enough for self-interested, rational states to contribute
to a pooled fund even when it is possible that the aid will be used to help states
that they would otherwise avoid helping. Second, it contributes to the literature
on delegation to international organizations (e.g., Hawkins et al. 2006; Milner 2006;
Milner and Tingley 2012). Most work that considers the choice of bilateral versus
multilateral aid still presupposes that states can give aid on a case-by-case basis
(e.g., Milner 2006; Raschky and Schwindt 2012).4 The theory here accounts for
cases where states may choose delegation ex ante. Third, the paper contributes to
4Though the choice of bilateral versus multilateral delivery of aid may depend on a number of
factors, the choice to give aid in the first place is still often influenced by at least some political
or strategic motive. Accordingly, it is not always the case that multilateral organizations provide
aid based solely on need. See Neumayer (2003) and Dollar and Levin (2006). There are, of course,
good reasons for states to work through multilateral organizations – e.g., to avoid incurring the
transaction costs of setting up a new aid project for every crisis – but it is not clear why states
would want to commit to this solution in advance when it seems they could just as easily deliver aid
multilaterally on a case-by-case basis. See, for example, Abbott and Snidal (1998).
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the formal literature on international institutional design and the “perverse” effects
of international organizations (Gilligan and Johns 2012, 240). The analysis suggests
that completely banning earmarking, though motivated by a desire to improve welfare
outcomes, may limit the effectiveness of the crisis relief regime. Finally, by focusing on
an institution that is designed to provide relief from natural disasters, it speaks to the
literature on designing institutions to adapt to the effects of climate change (Haas,
Keohane and Levy 1993; Biermann and Boas 2010; Keohane and Victor 2011; Tir
and Stinnett 2012). Considering how to design institutional mechanisms to prevent
or alleviate suffering in countries that are unable to manage the effects of natural
disasters by themselves is increasingly important given that climate change is expected
to increase the frequency and severity of natural disasters (Helmer and Hilhorst 2006;
Schneider et al. 2007; Van Aalst 2006; Oppenheimer et al. 2014).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the history
of international efforts to provide effective emergency aid. I argue that while the
CERF appears to succeed in providing relief impartially, the aid it provides amounts
to a marginal proportion of humanitarian aid. I then develop and present the formal
models and discuss some of their key results, as well as the intuition behind their
equilibria. Finally, I use a simulation to illustrate the potential gains to recipient
welfare from allowing limited earmarking.
3.1 The Crisis Relief Regime
Efforts to construct an international regime for humanitarian disaster and crisis
relief date back half a century.5 Throughout the 1960s, the United Nations (UN)
called for coordinated international action to respond to disasters.6 In 1971, the
5The classic definition of an international regime is provided by Stephen Krasner: “International
regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1982, 185).
6Unless otherwise noted, the history of the disaster regime is based on the account provided on
the UNISDR’s website, available online at http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/history.
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UN created the Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO), which initially served as a forum
for disseminating technical standards for reducing disaster risk and helping states
coordinate domestic policies. The UN continued appealing for technical cooperation
and coordination of natural disaster early warning systems throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, and it declared the 1990s the International Decade for Natural Disaster
Reduction. In 1994, the UN General Assembly convened the World Conference on
Natural Disaster Reduction. In doing so, the UN sought to raise global awareness
of the disproportionate impact of natural disasters in the developing world in the
hopes of spurring North-South cooperation. The UN’s International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) became a part of the UN secretariat in 1999 as the
institutional body responsible for continuing the agenda of the 1990s and coordinating
international efforts to increase disaster preparedness. Following the Indian Ocean
Tsunami of 2005, the second World Disaster Reduction Conference produced the
Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), which outlined how public and private sectors
could coordinate at the domestic level to reduce disaster vulnerability.7 The HFA
called for the building of institutional capacity at the domestic level to implement
policies consistent with disaster risk reduction and to enhance the technical ability of
states to monitor and warn vulnerable populations of impending crises.
While much of this agenda focuses on promoting crisis preparedness at the domes-
tic level, it also involves an international component. In 2006, the UN established the
Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in Resolution 60/124 as the successor
organization to the Central Emergency Revolving Fund. Riddell notes that,
“[t]he establishment of the CERF aims to remove two of the main prob-
lems of the prevailing system – the discretionary funding of emergencies on
a case-by-base basis and the growing practice of donors earmarking their
funds to specific agencies and purposes to create a cumbersome, and at
7The text of the Hyogo Framework is available online at http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/
hfa.
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times almost unworkable, bureaucratic system” (Riddell 2007, 323-324).
The innovation and appeal of the CERF is that it designed to respond to crises as
they develop. The institution aims to complement other forms of humanitarian as-
sistance, operating mainly by funding specialized UN development and aid agencies
that have the capacity and expertise required to respond to disasters quickly. For
example, when Hurricane Agatha hit Guatemala in 2010, the Guatemalan govern-
ment requested assistance from CERF, and CERF responded by distributing funds
to a number of specialized organizations, including the World Health Organization,
the World Food Programme, and UNICEF (Berry-Koch 2012). These organizations
coordinated and provided humanitarian relief in their respective areas of specialty in
concert with international and national nongovernmental organizations.
3.1.1 Is the Regime Working?
This regime seeks to distinguish crisis relief from the broader development agenda
and prioritize it in a world where humanitarian crises are expected to increase in
frequency and severity. It aims to prevent donors’ political interests from determining
which countries do or do not receive emergency aid by constructing an impartial
institution with the capacity to respond to crises quickly and efficiently. As such,
an assessment of the regime in terms of its needs to consider two questions. First,
do regime agents provide aid in an impartial, need-based manner? Second, does the
capacity of the regime allow it to have an important impact on outcomes? Regarding
the first question, the overarching goal and purpose of CERF is “to make funding for
emergencies more equitable and less contingent on donor predilections” (Taylor and
Stoddard 2012, 7). Evaluating whether the CERF works as advertised is difficult. One
way to measure its efficacy is to consider changes in the variance of funding coverage
before and after the CERF was created. One report finds that before the CERF’s
creation, “variance in funding coverage across emergencies was significantly higher
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than in the post-CERF years,” and that variance in funding across sectors decreased
in the post-CERF period (Taylor and Stoddard 2012, 7). The authors argue that
“it is reasonable to conclude that CERF allocations... directly contributed to the
increased equitability observed in overall humanitarian funding since 2006” (Taylor
and Stoddard 2012, 9). This report does not rule out that existing explanations for
aid allocation do not similarly motivate CERF aid, but evaluating existing theories
of foreign aid allocation in the context of the CERF is difficult because it is a pooled
fund. As such, it is not possible to test for whether variables like dyadic colonial ties
and alliances between donors and recipients affect aid allocation since we only observe
transfers of aid from the organization to recipients.8 On balance, however, it seems
reasonable to take at face value the organization’s claim of impartiality in delivering
humanitarian assistance.9
On the second question of whether the efforts of the CERF have had a substantial
impact on improving relief outcomes, the evidence is less encouraging. CERF aid
represents a very small proportion of overall humanitarian aid. Figure 3.1 plots the
proportion of total humanitarian provided by the CERF from its inception in 2006
to 2011.10 Throughout this period CERF aid never exceeded five percent of total
global humanitarian aid. This fact in itself is not necessarily discouraging, as it is
theoretically possible that the absolute size of the gap between what donors provide
and what is needed is covered by proportion of aid provided by the CERF. Yet “global
amounts of humanitarian aid continue to fall well short of what even conservative
estimates suggest is needed” (Riddell 2007, 324). Indeed, the initial funding target
of CERF was $500 million, of which donors pledged only $263 million in 2006. The
8It may be possible for states to condition their donations to CERF on whether or not a disaster
has aﬄicted a country that they want to help. In other words, a country may wait for a disaster to
happen, then deliver money through CERF with the expectation that most of its contribution will
flow to its preferred recipient. However, the top recipients of CERF aid tend to change over time,
while the top donors has remained relatively constant.
9See Section 3.5.1 of the Appendix for a novel empirical test that provides more support for this
claim.
102011 is the last year for which Global Humanitarian Assistance (2011) provides data.
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Figure 3.1: CERF Aid as Proportion of Total Humanitarian Aid
The solid line shows the proportion of aid contributed in each year by the CERF (drawn from the
OCHA CERF website) out of the total amount of global humanitarian aid as recorded by Global
Humanitarian Assistance (2011).
target, if obtained, would still only represent “less than 10 per cent of all humanitarian
aid provided in 2005” (Riddell 2007, 324).
Table 3.1 lists the top ten donor governments for the CERF according to the
CERF’s website alongside the top overall aid donors in aid allocation according to
the AidData project (Tierney et al. 2011). While there is a great deal of overlap,
it is notable that the top two overall donors (the United States and Japan) do not
appear on the list of top donors to the CERF. The same goes for France and Italy.
Additionally, four of the top donors to the CERF are not major overall aid donors
(Norway, Spain, Ireland, and Denmark). This rough comparison suggests that at
least a few major countries that provide a great deal of aid in other domains may be
reluctant to provide aid to the CERF.
So, while the regime appears to succeed in providing need-based relief, it provides a
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Top Donors to CERF versus Overall Aid Allocation
Ranking CERF Overall Aid Allocation
1 United Kingdom United States
2 Norway Japan
3 Sweden Germany
4 Netherlands France
5 Canada United Kingdom
6 Spain Netherlands
7 Ireland Canada
8 Germany Sweden
9 Denmark Australia
10 Australia Italy
small portion of overall humanitarian aid. This begs the question of how to restructure
donors’ incentives so as to increase the capacity and effectiveness of the organization.
In the next section I develop a formal principal-agent model to study the strategic
incentives facing donors and the organization.11
3.2 Strategic Interaction in the Provision of Humanitarian Aid
In this section I develop three related formal models. The first model considers
a baseline scenario of a donor’s optimal aid decision when there is no option of dele-
gating to an expert institution. The second model seeks to incorporate the essential
features of the CERF and the strategic problem faced by states that donate to the
CERF. First, the organization should be at least as efficient as any individual donor
since it is intimately tied to a network of expert organizations and agencies. Sec-
ond, the organization should distribute aid where it is needed. In other words, its
preference is for the extent of a crisis to be minimized no matter where it occurs.
Third, donors can both contribute to the organization and provide relief bilaterally.
In the third model, I consider the effect of allowing the donor to earmark part of its
contribution. For Models II and III I provide brief sketches of the intuition of the
11Scholars frequently invoke principal-agent models in studying donors’ decisions to provide aid.
See, for example, Milner (2006).
64
equilibria, leaving the details of the analysis to the Appendix.
3.2.1 Model I: Bilateral Humanitarian Relief
Consider a donor, D, and a victim of a humanitarian crisis, V .12 The victim is
passive and non-strategic (and, accordingly, is not a player), but it is affected by
the donor’s behavior. At the beginning of the game, Nature draws a shock ω ∈
[ωL, ωH ] where 0 ≤ ωL ≤ ωH for the victim and a measure of preference intensity
α ∈ {0, 1} for the donor. The shock, ω, can be thought of as a humanitarian crisis
or emergency. The donor knows the distribution of α, which takes a value of 1 with
probability p ∈ (0, 1) and 0 with probability 1− p. If α = 0, the donor is unaffected
by outcomes in the victim country. If α = 1, the donor’s utility function is sensitive
to outcomes in the victim country. The α parameter is intended to capture benefits
that a donor may receive from the wellbeing of a recipient country. For example,
it could be that constituents in the donor country intrinsically care about outcomes
in the recipient country. Alternatively, the recipient country could be an important
ally, and disasters may affect the ability of the recipient to carry out the provisions
of security agreements. Additionally, these concerns may be specific to a particular
regime in power in the recipient country, and disasters may weaken that regime’s hold
on power.13 The model is agnostic about which of these particular incentives operates
in any given case and simply assumes that the donor country does or does not care
about how a disaster affects outcomes in a recipient country. The donor observes α
and ω and can choose an amount of bilateral relief, r, to deliver to the victim.
The victim’s utility function is uV (r|ω, β) = βr−ω, where β ∈ (0, 1) is a measure
of the donor’s efficiency. That is, for 1 unit of aid provided by the donor, a proportion
of that aid equal to β benefits the recipient. The donor’s utility function is defined
12The donor could refer to a country or a private charitable organization, though throughout I
refer to it as a country.
13For empirical evidence of a relationship between disasters and leader survival, see Quiroz Flores
and Smith (2013).
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according to the quadratic loss function uD(r|ω, β, α, k) = −α(βr − ω)2 − kr, where
k > 0 is the marginal transaction cost of providing bilateral relief. This cost can be
thought of as a “start-up” cost for implementing an aid program. For example, the
United States’ efforts to fight Ebola in Liberia entail it also incurring the costs of
building medical facilities. Aid recipients benefit from this investment, but the donor
pays the costs. The greater the scale of the aid project, the higher the costs will be
for the donor.
Whether the donor provides any aid to the recipient depends on the costs of
providing aid, how efficient the donor is, and whether or not it shares the preferences
of the recipient (that is, whether or not α = 1). Clearly, if α = 0 then the donor does
not provide any aid (since its utility would be defined solely by −kr). When α = 1,
then the donor maximizes its utility with respect to r, the solution to which is
r∗1 ≡ max{0,
2βω − k
2β2
}. (3.1)
This is positive as long as β > k
2ω
. The recipient’s payoff is given by uV (r
∗
1) =
βr∗1 − ω.
3.2.2 Model II: Adding an Expert Organization
Now add to this model an institution (A) that represents a specialized pooled fund
for humanitarian relief. In this version of the game, the donor chooses an amount of
capacity to endow the institution with denoted by c ≥ 0 prior to Nature’s draw of
ω and α.14 This sequence of moves captures that the donor may not know whether
or not it will care about the effects of a humanitarian crisis at the time that it makes
its contribution to the institution. I model this contribution as a lump-sum cash
14Assuming a budget constraint for the donor would be more realistic but makes the analysis
unwieldy. That the donor pays a marginal cost for providing aid works as an indirect constraint.
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transfer that cannot be earmarked.15 The donor only pays a cost for contributing to
the institution if α = 0. This cost function, f(c), is an increasing convex function of c.
I give the cost function a specific functional form by treating the loss as proportional
to the squared amount that the donor contributed to the institution with parameter
h ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore the cost function is f(c) = hc2 and the loss incurred for the
donor is −hc2.16 Once the donor has chosen c and Nature has drawn ω and α, Nature
reveals ω to both donor and institution, but it reveals α only to the donor. The
institution knows the distribution of α (i.e., the institution believes that α = 1 with
probability p and α = 0 with probability 1−p). This assumption is motivated by the
fact that aid agencies often complain that bilateral contributions are unpredictable
and unreliable in any given crisis. Next, the institution can use the resources provided
by the donor (c) to allocate aid (a) to the recipient such that 0 ≤ a ≤ b + c, where
b ≥ 0 is the institution’s preexisting budget. The institution also pays a marginal
transaction cost γ > 0 for delivering aid. Polman argues that, “[s]tart-up costs in
distant crisis-hit countries are sky-high. Aid organizations have to recruit and hire
staff, rent and furnish housing and office space, and bring in materials and equipment,
such as Land Cruisers, aid supplies, satellite dishes, computers, air conditioners, office
equipment, and generators” (Polman 2010, 40).
Upon observing the institution’s allocation, the donor can distribute additional
resources, r, to the recipient in the form of bilateral aid. The institution’s efficiency
is normalized to 1, meaning that the parameter β now measures how much the re-
cipient benefits from a unit of aid from the donor relative to a unit of aid from the
institution.17 The donor’s efficiency (β), the marginal costs of providing aid for the
15That is, the donor cannot specify limits or place conditions on when the institution can and
cannot use the aid.
16I square the loss function for providing aid to the institution for the convenience of having a
convex cost function. The h parameter is included to provide flexibility for the scale of this loss.
17Coordination in itself should lead to greater efficiency in aid delivery. Indeed, “[i]n times of
crisis, when needs are great and officials are overburdened, trickles of uncoordinated donations can
be a distraction, some aid workers say, requiring a lot of attention without solving the biggest
problems” (Nossiter 2014). Additionally, governments often view specialized organizations as more
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donor and the organization (k and γ, respectively), and the scale of the loss the donor
incurs from giving aid when it otherwise would not (h) are all common knowledge at
the beginning of the game. The game sequence is summarized in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Sequence of Game in Model II
•
Donor chooses contribution c
Nature draws
α and ω
Organization chooses a
Donor picks r
Payoffs realized
The organization’s goal is to minimize the negative effects of the shock on the
victim, and thus its problem is to maximize uA(a|ω, β, r, γ) = −(a + βr − ω)2 − γa,
subject to the constraint that a ≤ b + c. This utility function ensures that the
organization does not want to provide too much aid to the victim such that its utility
is increased beyond the pre-crisis level, since its goal is providing disaster recovery,
not development assistance. Finally, the donor’s utility function is now also a function
of the aid provided by the institution and the potential costs of contributing to the
institution: uD(r, c|a, ω, β, α) = −α(a+ βr − ω)2 − kr − (1− α)hc2.
In sum, the organization would prefer that the shock is as small as possible, while
the donor only wants to minimize the shock if its preferences align with the victim.
Both donor and organization observe the shock, but the donor is less efficient at
providing aid than the institution and the institution is unsure of how the donor
values outcomes for the victim.
3.2.2.1 Equilibrium for Model II
I solve the game for the pure strategy Nash equilibria. The details of the analysis
can be found in Section 3.5.2 of the Appendix. The intuition is as follows. Just as
effective. For example, a British development minister was quoted in the New York Times as
saying,“[n]ongovernmental organizations are not only watchdogs, but also some of the best deliverers
of assistance... . Oxfam can do excellent water engineering. The British Red Cross delivers health
care. They are close to the people on the ground” (Crossette 1992).
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in the world of bilateral aid, the donor country never gives aid in the final stage of
the game if it does not have an interest relieving the crisis (i.e., if α = 0). There
is also a threshold of efficiency (β∗) below which the donor gives no aid even if it
does have an interest in helping since it is too inefficient. The organization conditions
its contribution on the efficiency of the donor. When the donor is too inefficient to
provide aid, the organization provides either as much aid as is needed to relieve the
crisis or the entirety of its available resources. When the donor could potentially
contribute to the crisis, the organization contributes less the more likely it is that
the donor will come to the aid of the victim. This affects the behavior of the donor
at the beginning of the game when it decides how much aid to channel through the
organization. Less efficient donors give more aid to the organization as it becomes
more likely that they share the preferences of the victim, but there is also an incentive
to free ride and provide less aid to the organization the greater its existing stock of
resources. More efficient donors behave similarly, but because of the organization’s
incentives to optimally under-provide aid when it expects that the donor will take up
responsibility for helping the victim, the efficient donor gives less the more efficient
it is. The model is thus consistent with some of the stylized facts motivating the
paper. For example, highly efficient aid providers like the United States tend not to
contribute much to the organization.
3.2.3 Model III: Allowing Limited Earmarking
Now consider a modified version of Model II where the donor can place restrictions
on the conditions under which the institution is allowed to use its aid. I model this
by having Nature draw a new variable, θ.18 Nature’s move now consists of a draw of
18I introduce this new variable rather than assuming that the organization observes α for two
reasons. First, I want α to represent the donor’s interest in helping in any given case, not its
predetermined interests. Using θ as the earmarking variable keeps the donor’s immediate interests
separate from its stated goals in providing aid. Second, there are problems with assuming that
the organization knows α. The assumption that the organization is uncertain about the donor’s
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ω, α, and θ. I assume that if θ = 0, the organization can only use a portion of the
donor’s aid denoted by q ∈ [0, 1], whereas if θ = 1, all of the donor’s contribution
may be used by the organization. I assume the distribution of θ is such that θ = 1
with probability m and θ = 0 with probability 1−m. I treat m and q as exogenous
parameters drawn by Nature. If m is very low, it is unlikely that the donor’s aid will
be fully available to the organization. (Model II is a special case of Model III where
m = 1.) Nature reveals θ to both the donor and organization after the donor makes
its first move.19
The q parameter is assumed to be common knowledge, binding, and enforceable
at the time that the donor makes its contribution to the organization (at the time
the donor chooses a). Whereas a traditional earmark might assume that no aid can
be used if the situation does not meet the requirement specified ex ante by the donor
(i.e., q = 0), I allow that proportion to vary. Since the q parameter limits the amount
of resources available to the organization if the earmark conditions do not apply, it
also limits the amount of costs the donor may incur from having the organization
use the aid in a way that harms its interests. That is, instead of a loss of −hc2, if
θ = 0 and α = 0, the donor only incurs a loss of −h(qc)2. Figure 3.3 summarizes the
modified sequence of the game.
3.2.3.1 Equilibrium Analysis for Model III
Similar to the treatment of Model II, I present the intuition of the key results
from the equilibrium analysis of Model III here and leave the details of the analysis
interests is substantively motivated. In the model, assuming that the organization knows α leads
it to contribute resources only when it knows that α = 0 or when the donor’s budget constraint is
binding.
19I assume that θ is objectively apparent to both the donor and the organization. In other words,
I assume away the potential for the organization or the donor to argue over whether the conditions
specified ex ante actually apply in any given case, acknowledging that this is not a trivial problem
in the principal-agent literature. See, for example, Hawkins and Jacoby (2006, 206).
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Figure 3.3: Sequence of Game in Model III
•
Nature draws
m and q
Donor announces c
Nature draws
α, ω, and θ,
reveals ω and θ
Organization chooses a
Donor picks r
Payoffs realized
to Section 3.5.3 of the Appendix. When earmarking is allowed, the donor makes the
same optimal allocation at the end of the game. However, the actual contribution and
the efficiency threshold may differ since both are functions of what the organization
provides, which depends on whether or not the conditions of the earmark apply (i.e.,
whether θ = 0 or θ = 1). Similarly, the organization conditions its allocation on the
efficiency of the donor and the likelihood that the donor will help in the last stage.
The key result of Model III relates to the donor’s decision in the first move of the
game, which I summarize in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The donor gives at least as much to the organization when the orga-
nization allows partial earmarking as it does when the organization bans earmarking.
The proof of Proposition 1 follows from the discussion in Section 3.5.3 of the
Appendix. The result is intuitive. When donors are at least partially insulated from
the costs of providing aid, they are willing to give more up front. The analysis also
shows that the efficient donor’s contribution to the organization decreases with the
likelihood that it makes an unconditional transfer (alternatively, as the conditions
that allow for the use of aid become broader) and in the proportion of its aid that
will remain available to the organization if θ = 0. For less efficient donors, there
are conditions under which the optimal contribution the organization is increasing
in q. Because inefficient donors will be unable to help in the last stage of the game,
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they would prefer that the organization is not so constrained that even it cannot do
anything to help.
3.3 Comparisons Across Models: A Simulation
Limited earmarking leads to greater contributions to the organization, which
seems intuitive and potentially encouraging. What is unclear is whether this can
improve outcomes for potential victims of humanitarian crises. It is straightforward
to show that the victim is always at least as well off when the organization is a player
(Models II and III) as when it depends wholly on bilateral aid (Model I). I present
the details of this analysis in Section 3.5.4 of the Appendix. Unfortunately, given the
difficulty of comparing two different allocations by the institution that may or may
not be binding, it is less straightforward to solve analytically for the victim’s expected
utility to determine whether Model III generally outperforms Model II (or vice versa)
when the organization must act on its own (when α = 0). This is the focus of the
next section.
3.3.1 Can Earmarking Lead to Better Outcomes?
Given that the earmark restricts the amount of funds the organization can use,
under what conditions, if any, do higher contributions lead to better outcomes in
recipient countries? I investigate this question using a simulation.20 The simula-
tion generates the model parameters from a uniform distribution and calculates the
players’ equilibrium contributions given those parameters along with the recipient’s
utility.21 Most of these variables have a minimum of zero and a maximum of one,
though I set k and γ (the proportional costs of aid to the donor and organization,
respectively) have an upper bound of .1, and m and q are set relatively high to vary
20The simulation is executed in R (R Core Team 2014).
21A single run of the simulation generates p, q, m, b, ωL, ωH , ω, h, k, β, and γ.
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between .75 and 1.22 These parameters are then used to calculate thresholds β′ and
β′′. Finally, I calculate the utility of the recipient for each of the three games as show
in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Recipient Payoffs Across Models I, II, and III
Model Recipient Payoff
I βr∗1 − ω
II a∗2 + βr
∗
2 − ω
III a∗3 + βr
∗
3 − ω
22I set these parameters high to illustrate the effect of allowing just a minimal amount of ear-
marking.
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Figure 3.4: Comparing Model III to Model II
For each iteration of the game, I code whether the victim’s utility is higher in
Model III than in Model II, and vice versa.23 This process is repeated 1000 times, after
which point I take the proportion of games where the victim did better in one model
versus the other, fixing the organization’s preexisting budget (b) and probability that
the donor cares about outcomes in the recipient country (p). I allow b to vary between
0 and 1, increasing in increments of .04 (such that I run the model for 25 values of
b), and I allow p to vary between .01 and .99 (also running for 25 values of p).24
23Since utility is an ordinal concept, measuring the difference in utilities has no meaning. However,
it is still possible to say whether the recipient has a higher utility in one institutional setting or not.
24For each combination of b and p, I compute equilibrium allocations and victim utilities given the
rest of the model parameters. For example, I set b = 0 and p = .01, generate the other parameters,
equilibrium contributions, and utilities of the model 1000 times, then repeat the process with p u .05,
and so on for all values of b and p.
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Figure 3.5: Comparing Model II to Model III
3.3.2 Simulation Results
Figure 3.4 shows that there is a region – when the organization has very few
resources (when b is low) and when a donor is unlikely to want to provide bilateral
aid to a victim (when p is low) – where more than fifty percent of the time the victim of
a crisis does better when the organization allows limited earmarking. This advantage
diminishes as b and p increase. This is unsurprising, since when the organization
already has a large standing pool of resources (when b is large), then outcomes in
the recipient country are less sensitive to the possible constraint of the earmark. In
other words, regardless of how much the donor contributes and what the conditions
of the contribution are, it is likely that the organization will have enough resources
to address a crisis. In the case of p, the advantage diminishes because the institution
contributes less as p increases, and thus outcomes are less affected by what the donor
contributes at the beginning of the game.
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While the region where earmarking leads to better outcomes on average is rela-
tively small, it tends to do better when victims are unlikely to receive adequate bi-
lateral support (where p is low) and when the organization has few resources (where
b is low). These are close to the cases that the CERF aims to address and similar
to real budget constraints. The intuition is that because the victim’s utility depends
heavily on the organization and the organization depends heavily on the immediate
contributions made by donors, the organization is able to make larger contributions
when conditions allow complete access to the donor’s contribution (when θ = 1).
When the conditions of the earmark do not apply (when θ = 0), the organization
still has b+ qc resources at its disposal, where the donor’s initial contribution to the
organization is larger than it would have been under Model II.
However, Figure 3.4 only tells us when allowing partial earmarking tends to give
the recipient a higher payoff than banning earmarking. Where this frequency is less
than fifty percent, there are two general possibilities: (1) banning earmarking gives
the victim a higher payoff; or (2) Models II and III give equal payoffs. To investigate
this possibility, I plot the frequency with which the victim’s payoff under Model II is
greater than Model III in Figure 3.4 (using the same scale as Figure 3.5). The results
suggest that the victim is rarely better off in Model II. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 together
imply that most of the time the victim is just as well off in Model III as it is in Model
II. For much of the parameter space, the victim often does at least as well as Model
II or better under Model III.
3.4 Conclusion
It is well documented that donors have strategic reasons for providing aid. This
paper suggests that accounting for that fact in the design of institutions for interna-
tional humanitarian relief could be beneficial. Allowing donors to insulate themselves
at least partially from the negative effects of perceived misallocations not only leads
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to greater contributions to a pooled fund for emergency relief, but can also lead to
better outcomes for countries facing crises.
More generally, this paper contributes to the literature on delegation to interna-
tional organizations as a principal-agent problem in a number of ways (Hawkins et al.
2006). First, the analysis highlights that the potential gains in efficiency from expert
organizations are often enough to get states to contribute even when funds are pooled
and not subject to earmarking. This is in contrast to much of the literature which
assumes principals must exercise some discretion over the agents they hire. Second,
the paper illustrates how extra-contractual features of principal-agent relationships
interact with design features to affect outcomes. Specifically, there is a tendency to
assume that closely aligned preferences between principal and agent make for more
effective delegation relationships. Here, the assumption that the principal (the donor)
can act on its own leads the agent (the organization) to contribute less to a shared in-
terest the more likely it is that the preferences of the actors align (though this is only
the case for relatively efficient donors). Finally, the paper emphasizes the importance
of agent preferences and strategies in affecting the delegation decisions of principals,
which others have argued is a neglected area of study in the principal-agent litera-
ture (Hawkins and Jacoby 2006). Specifically, the paper develops the implications
of assuming altruism and strategic thinking on the part of an agent for delegation
decisions and policy outcomes.
The model is also agnostic about what happens once aid reaches its destination,
though this obviously also has implications for recipient welfare. Indeed, I abstract
away from domestic politics in the victim country entirely, though this could be an
interesting avenue for future research, especially since others have argued that actors
who are less averse to suffering (i.e., actors who do not have altruistic preferences as
I model them here) may be more effective in alleviating poverty (e.g., Svensson 2000,
61). It is unclear to what extent this argument would apply to emergency assistance
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that largely bypasses government channels. For now, this paper helps identify how
existing institutions might be reformed to increase the supply of crisis relief.
3.5 Appendix for “The Design of International Institutions for Humanitarian Aid”
3.5.1 An Empirical Test of CERF’s Impartiality
One observable factor linked to receiving development aid (i.e., development aid)
is temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (e.g.,
Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009). Since the CERF
is designed to provide impartial rapid response to humanitarian disasters, political
factors like membership on the UNSC should not influence the likelihood of a state
receiving aid from the CERF. Alternatively, humanitarian emergencies should be
strong predictors of receiving CERF aid.
To test whether Security Council membership increases a state’s likelihood of
receiving CERF aid, I constructed a data set comprised of all countries that the
OECD lists as being eligible for Official Development Assistance. For each country-
year, I code whether or not a country received assistance from the CERF during that
year using data from the OCHA CERF website. The key independent variables are
(1) the total number of deaths that occurred from natural disasters during a given
country-year, and (2) whether or not that country held a rotating seat on the UNSC
during that year. The former should be a strong predictor of receiving CERF aid,
while the latter should not affect whether or not a country receives CERF aid.25
Table 3.3 presents the results of the statistical tests. Model 2 adds recipient
25I measure disaster deaths using the International Disaster Database. See EM-DAT (2009). The
measure is natural log of the total number of deaths from disasters that occurred in a given year (I
added one to each case to account for zero values). For every year from 2006 to 2013, I manually
coded a dummy variable to indicate whether or not a country was one of the ten temporary members
of the UNSC using the official website of the UNSC. See UNSC (2014). I also included measures of
GDP per capita from World Bank (2013) and regime type from Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2010) as
additional measures of need. More developed countries should have less need for disaster assistance,
as should more democratic countries. See, for example, Kahn (2005).
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Table 3.3: UNSC Membership and Likelihood of Receiving CERF Aid, 2006-2013
(Logit Models)
Dependent variable:
CERF Recipient? (Dummy)
(Model 1) (Model 2)
ln(Disaster Deaths) 0.262∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.091)
UN Security Council Member 0.101 −0.074
(0.428) (0.570)
GDP per capita −0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0002
(0.00004) (0.0002)
Polity Score −0.030∗ −0.047
(0.016) (0.101)
Constant −0.108 −19.866
(0.160) (4,031.799)
Recipient-fixed Effects? No Yes
Observations 741 741
Log Likelihood −392.495 −215.867
Akaike Inf. Crit. 794.989 659.734
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses.
Recipient dummies included in Model 2.
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country-fixed effects to Model 1 to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Consistent
with the claims of the CERF and independent reports evaluating the CERF’s alloca-
tion of disaster aid, the results in Table 3.3 support the claim the CERF allocates aid
independently of political pressures. The coefficient on the disaster deaths variable
is positive and statistically significant in both models, indicating that receiving aid
from the CERF becomes more likely as the extent of a humanitarian emergency in-
creases. The coefficients on the measures of GDP per capita and domestic institutions
are also consistent with the expectation that more developed, democratic countries
should have less need for CERF aid. Alternatively, the coefficient on the UN Security
Council Member dummy variable is not statistically significant. Clearly this test does
not rule out the possibility that CERF aid is motivated by strategic factors, but it
at least provides some further support for the claim that CERF allocates relief aid
independently of political factors that have been shown to affect aid allocation in
other domains.
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3.5.2 Equilibrium Analysis for Model II
The Donor’s Last Move
Consider the donor’s final move at the last stage of the game. At this point, the
donor has observed the agent’s allocation and knows α and ω. If α = 0, the donor will
not provide any aid. In the case where α = 1, then the donor may provide a positive
amount of aid. Defining a∗2 as the institution’s optimal allocation, the allocation that
maximizes the donor’s utility in the last stage with respect to r is
r∗2(c, a, α) =

0 if α = 0,
0 if α = 1 and β ≤ β∗ ≡ k
2(ω−a∗2) ,
2β(ω−a∗2)−k
2β2
if α = 1 and β > β∗ ≡ k
2(ω−a∗2) .
(3.2)
The Institution’s Choice
The institution’s allocation depends on its beliefs about whether the donor will
give bilateral aid as well as the value of β. In the case where β is sufficiently low,
then the institution knows that the donor will not provide aid whether or not it
wants to help the recipient in principle (i.e., whether or not α = 1 or α = 0). The
threshold that factors into the institution’s decision (and that ultimately factors into
the donor’s decision in the first stage) is whether or not β > β′ ≡ k
2ω
.26 If β ≤ β′,
then the institution chooses a to maximize its utility subject to the constraint that
a ≤ b+ c, the solution to which is
a∗L2 = max{0,min{ω −
γ
2
,
b+ c
1 + γ
}}.27 (3.5)
26This threshold of β is slightly different than the β∗ threshold identified in Equation (3.2). If
β ≤ k2ω , then the donor never provides bilateral aid at the end of the game regardless of α, and the
institution’s problem is straightforward. If β > k2ω , then the institution makes its allocation under
uncertainty about what the donor will do.
27This problem is solved using the following Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian:
LA0 = −(a− ω)2 − γa− λ(a(1 + γ)− b− c) (3.4)
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Now suppose that β > β′. While the type of donor that wants to minimize disaster
damage in the recipient will always contribute (which occurs with probability p), with
probability (1 − p) the donor will not want to help. The institution now seeks to
maximize its expected utility where uncertainty about the donor’s type matters. The
donor’s allocation when α = 1 is simply r∗ = max{0, 2β(ω−a)−k
2β2
}.28
The solution to this maximization problem is
a∗H2 = max{0,min{
γ
2(p− 1) + ω,
b+ c
1 + γ
}} (3.6)
which, again, depends on whether or not the budget constraint is binding. This
expression is decreasing in p and is non-negative as long as p ≤ 1− γ
2ω
. Intuitively, as
the institution increasingly believes that the donor will contribute aid at the end of
the game, it contributes less itself. Summarizing the institution’s allocation we have
a∗2(c) =
 a
∗
L2 ≡ max{0,min{ω − γ2 , b+c1+γ}} if β ≤ β′,
a∗H2 ≡ max{0,min{ω + γ2(p−1) , b+c1+γ}} if β > β′.
(3.7)
The Donor’s First Move
At the beginning of the game, the donor chooses the amount of cash, c, it will
provide to the institution. The donor has not yet observed ω but has prior beliefs that
ω ∼ U [ωL, ωH ], and believes that it will want to help the recipient with probability p.
The donor knows that if β ≤ β′, then it is credible that it will not contribute at the
end of the game either way. In the first stage the donor can only make a best guess
about ω, thus its decision depends on the expected value of ω. The critical factor from
the donor’s perspective is whether β > β′ ≡ k
2ω
. Since ω ∼ U [ωL, ωH ], E[ω] = ωL+ωH2 .
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions for this maximization problem are
∂LA0
∂a
≤ 0, ∂LA0
∂λ
≥ 0, a · ∂LA0
∂a
= 0, λ · ∂LA0
∂λ
= 0 (3.5)
28The Kuhn-Tucker Lagrangian and FOC for this problem are analogous to those used in solving
for a∗L.
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Therefore, the relevant threshold in the first stage is β′′ = k
2E[ω]
= k
ωL+ωH
. Consider
this case first.
When β ≤ β′′, the amount that the institution contributes is independent of
p, since it knows that the donor either does not want to contribute or will find
contributing too costly. Whether or not the institution’s budget constraint binds
depends on the true value of ω. If ω ∈ [ωL, b+cγ+1 + γ2 ] then the institution’s budget
constraint is not binding and it provides ω − γ
2
. If ω ∈ ( b+c
γ+1
+ γ
2
, ωH ], then the
institution’s budget constraint binds and it provides b+c
1+γ
. Thus, the donor’s expected
utility in this case is:
p
(∫ b+c
γ+1
+ γ
2
ωL
−(ω − γ
2
− ω)2f(ω) dω +
∫ ωH
b+c
γ+1
+ γ
2
−( b+ c
1 + γ
− ω)2f(ω) dω
)
+(1−p)(−hc2).
(3.8)
The value of c that maximizes Equation (3.8) is
c∗L2 = max{0, −
p (−4b+ γ2 + γ + 4(γ + 1)ωH)
4 (3(γ + 1)2h(p− 1)− p) }. (3.9)
When positive, c∗L2 is increasing in p (
∂c∗L
∂p
> 0), and is decreasing in the institution’s
existing resources, b (
∂c∗L
∂b
< 0). The optimal allocation is not a function of the donor’s
efficiency or its costs of delivering aid, since it does not deliver any bilateral aid in
the final stage.
Now consider the case where β > β′′. In this case, the donor knows that if α = 1,
it will not be too costly for it to provide some bilateral aid at the end of the game.
The optimal bilateral aid package it provides (r∗2) depends on the value of a
∗
2. If
ω ∈ [ωL, b+cγ+1 − γ2(p−1) ] then the institution’s budget constraint is not binding and
it will provide ω + γ
2(p−1) . If ω ∈ ( b+cγ+1 − γ2(p−1) , ωH ], then the institution’s budget
constraint binds and it provides b+c
1+γ
. For notational convenience, I write the donor’s
optimal offer given that the institution’s budget constraint is not binding as rN , and
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the optimal offer given that the institution’s constraint is binding as rB. The donor
maximizes its expected utility:
EUD =
p(
∫ b+c
γ+1
− γ
2(p−1)
ωL
−
(
γ
2(p− 1) + ω − ω + βrN
)
2 − krN f(ω) dω
+
∫ ωH
b+c
γ+1
− γ
2(p−1)
−
(
b+ c
1 + γ
− ω + βrB
)
2 − krB f(ω) dω)
+(1− p)(−hc2).
Solving for the optimum of this expression with respect to c yields
c∗H2 = max{0,
kp
4βh(1 + γ)(1− p)}. (3.10)
This allocation is increasing in the likelihood that the donor shares the preferences
of the recipient (
∂c∗H2
∂p
> 0), decreasing in the efficiency of the donor relative to the
institution (
∂c∗H2
∂β
< 0), and increasing in the costs of delivering aid bilaterally (
∂c∗H2
∂k
>
0). Summarizing the donor’s contribution we have
c∗2 =
 c
∗
L2 ≡ max{0,−
p(−4b+γ2+γ+4(γ+1)ωH)
4(3(γ+1)2h(p−1)−p) } if β ≤ β′′ ≡ kωL+ωH ,
c∗H2 ≡ max{0, kp4βh(1+γ)(1−p)} if β > β′′ ≡ kωL+ωH .
(3.11)
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3.5.3 Equilibrium Analysis for Model III
The Donor’s Last Move
The donor’s last move in Model III is the same as in the previous model, but it must
also account for the possibility that θ = 0, in which case the institution’s allocation
may be different if the budget constraint is binding. Still, defined in terms of the
institution’s optimal allocation in Model III, a∗3, the donor’s allocation is the same.
r∗3 =

0 if α = 0,
0 if α = 1 and β ≤ β∗ ≡ k
2(ω−a∗3) ,
2β(ω−a∗3)−k
2β2
if α = 1 and β > β∗ ≡ k
2(ω−a∗3) .
(3.12)
The Institution’s Choice in Model III
In this model the institution’s allocation depends both on β and θ. Writing the donor’s
optimal contribution to the pooled fund as c∗3, the institution’s optimal allocation is
given by
a∗3 =

a∗L3,0 ≡ max{0,min{ω − γ2 , b+qc
∗
3
1+γ
}} if β ≤ β′ and θ = 0,
a∗L3,1 ≡ max{0,min{ω − γ2 , b+c
∗
3
1+γ
}} if β ≤ β′and θ = 1,
a∗H3,0 ≡ max{0,min{ω + γ2(p−1) , b+qc
∗
3
1+γ
}} if β > β′and θ = 0,
a∗H3,1 ≡ max{0,min{ω + γ2(p−1) , b+c
∗
3
1+γ
}} if β > β′and θ = 1.
(3.13)
The Donor’s First Move in Model III
Solving for the donor’s optimal allocation in this model is similar to Model II, only
now there are four possible states of the world for each type of state (efficient or
inefficient). These states and their probabilities are summarized in Table 3.4. The
donor forms expectations about each outcome based on its prior beliefs about ω, how
it expects the institution to respond, and the likelihood that it wants to help the
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recipient minimize the shock. For instance, with probability pm the donor both cares
about the recipient (α = 1) and the institution is allowed to use the full amount of
aid (θ = 1). In this case, the institution makes its optimal non-binding contribution
up to a threshold, after which it contributes everything it can. The donor considers
what this threshold is and how it would respond in the last stage. The process for
each of the other states of the world is similar.
Table 3.4: Parameter Combination Likelihood
θ α Pr(Statei)
θ = 0 α = 0 (1−m)(1− p)
θ = 0 α = 1 (1−m)p
θ = 1 α = 0 m(1− p)
θ = 1 α = 1 mp
The donor’s optimal contribution when it is less efficient is now
c∗L3 ≡ −
p(m(q − 1)− q) (−4b+ γ2 + γ + 4(γ + 1)ωH)
4 ((m− 1)q2 −m) (3(γ + 1)2h(p− 1)− p) . (3.14)
The condition that determines whether the less efficient donor provides a positive
contribution is the same as in Model II, and the size of the contribution becomes larger
for less efficient donors. This can be seen by considering the ratio of − (m(q−1)−q)
((m−1)q2−m) ,
which is what distinguishes c∗L2 from c
∗
L3 and is always greater than a factor of 1 by the
fact that 0 ≤ m, q ≤ 1. When positive this allocation is decreasing in the likelihood
that the contribution will be unconditional (
∂c∗L3
∂m
< 0). The relationship between q
and the optimal allocation of the inefficient donor depends on q and m. Assuming
that the condition for a positive allocation holds,
∂c∗L3
∂q
> 0 if and only if m > q
2
(q−1)2 .
For q > 1
2
this can never hold, in which case increases in q lead to smaller allocations
to the institution. However, for q ∈ [0, 1
2
), the effect of q on c∗L3 depends on m.
For more efficient donors, the optimal contribution to the institution is now given
by
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c∗H3 ≡
kp(m+ q −mq)
4β(γ + 1)h(p− 1) ((m− 1)q2 −m) . (3.15)
Like less efficient donors, this allocation is always positive and is always greater
than the donor’s contribution when it cannot earmark. To see that the allocation
is always positive, notice that 0 ≤ m, q ≤ 1 implies that the numerator is strictly
nonnegative and that the denominator is positive. That c∗H3 is always greater than
c∗H2 can be seen by considering the ratio of
(m+q−mq)
((m−1)q2−m) , which is what distinguishes
c∗H2 from c
∗
H3 and is always greater than a factor of 1 by the fact that 0 ≤ m, q ≤ 1.
Note also that the allocation is decreasing in m and q. That is, the more likely
it is that the donor will be making an unconditional transfer, the less it contributes
(
∂c∗H3
∂m
< 0), and the same goes for the amount of contribution that remains available
for the institution to use (
∂c∗H3
∂q
< 0).
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3.5.4 Comparison of Models II and III with Model I
To see that the victim is always at least as well off when the institution is a player
as it is without the institution, suppose that the utility of the victim is greater under
Model I than under Model II. That is, suppose βr∗1 − ω > a∗2 + βr∗2 − ω. This implies
that a∗2 < β(r
∗
1 − r∗2). If α = 0, then r∗1, r∗2 = 0, implying that a < 0, which cannot
hold since a is constrained to be nonnegative. If α = 1, then plugging in the optimal
values of r∗1 =
2βω−k
2β2
and r∗2 =
2β(ω−a∗2)−k
2β2
leads to a contradiction (0 < 0). The same
argument shows that the victim is at least as well off in Model III as in Model I.
A similar logic shows that when the donor has both the interest in alleviating a
crisis (when α = 1) and the capacity to help (β > β∗), Model II and Model III give the
victim an identical payoff. To see this, notice that the assumption that a∗2 +βr
∗
2−ω <
a∗3 +βr
∗
3−ω where r∗1, r∗2 > 0 implies that a∗2−a∗3 < β(2β(ω−a
∗
3)−k
2β2
− 2β(ω−a∗2)−k
2β2
), which,
after simplifying, implies 0 < 0. Reversing the inequality in the initial assumption
obviously leads to the same contradiction. Therefore, when α = 1 and β > β∗, it
must be the case that a∗2 + βr
∗
2 − ω = a∗3 + βr∗3 − ω.
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Chapter 4
Leader Survival, Natural Disasters, and International Conflict
A growing literature studies how natural disasters affect the likelihood of con-
flict within and between states. While there is some agreement on the conditions
under which disasters matter for civil conflict, there is no consensus on the question
of whether disasters matter for interstate conflict (e.g., Nelson 2010; Kelman 2012;
Akcinaroglu, DiCicco and Radziszewski 2011). This paper considers the implications
of recent research on leader survival for the disasters-conflict nexus. Specifically, I ar-
gue that disasters may indirectly affect the risk of international conflict through their
effects on leader survival. Leaders of relatively inclusive “large winning coalition”
systems are sensitive to disaster deaths, while autocratic leaders who rely on a small
coalition of supporters are vulnerable to revolutionary threats catalyzed by disasters
(Quiroz Flores and Smith 2013, 821-822). When large-coalition leaders fear irregular
removal and post-tenure punishment (e.g., exile or imprisonment), international con-
flict may become an attractive policy tool. Alternatively, insecure large-coalition lead-
ers anticipating regular removal from office should become less belligerent (Chiozza
and Goemans 2011, 32-35). This paper departs from existing theory in arguing that
not all threats to survival should matter for international conflict.1 I argue that in-
ternational conflict is not necessarily a useful tool for leaders concerned with threats
from domestic extra-institutional sources. Since disasters are supposed to affect the
survival of small-coalition leaders through domestic extra-institutional channels (e.g.,
revolutionary movements), they should not affect the international conflict behavior
of small-coalition leaders in ways existing theory expects.
1To be clear, this variable is not novel to the more general literature on leader survival (e.g.,
Smith 2008).
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I test this theory using data from the International Disaster Database (Guha-
Sapir, Below and Hoyois 2015). I find a positive association between disaster deaths
and international conflict initiation in large-coalition systems where leaders face ir-
regular removal from office. However, in most models I find the same result for large-
coalition leaders facing regular removal. Overall, there is little statistical evidence
that the relationship between disasters and conflict differs across the two groups:
both appear slightly more likely to initiate international conflicts as deaths from dis-
asters increase. Small-coalition leaders facing regular removal are no more or less
likely to initiate international conflicts as disaster impacts (both deaths and disaster
events) increase, consistent with the theory. Yet, small-coalition leaders facing irreg-
ular removal appear to be less likely to initiate international conflicts when disaster
events occur. Given evidence that disaster events increase the risk of removal for
small-coalition leaders (Quiroz Flores and Smith 2013), we would expect that leaders
among that group facing the possibility of irregular removal should be more likely to
fight. As such, this finding is inconsistent with recent research on leader survival and
international conflict and suggests that future research on the topic should consider
conditions under which different types of threats matter.
The paper makes a number of contributions. First, it contributes to research on
climate change and political violence. Prevailing wisdom holds that the effects of
climate-related disasters will matter mostly for domestic politics and human security.
While true, this overlooks links between domestic turmoil and international conflict.
Critics of the climate-conflict literature have repeatedly called for theory-driven con-
tributions to this research agenda (e.g., Nordas and Gleditsch 2007, 633; Gleditsch
2012, 6; Salehyan 2008, 320; Streich and Mislan 2013). This paper answers that call.
Second, the paper advances theories of political survival by qualifying the conditions
under which international conflict might benefit leaders. Threats to leader survival are
varied (e.g., Smith 2008, 780), yet theories of leader survival and international conflict
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assume that any factor that affects the risk of removal is relevant for international
conflict (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). Though the occurrence of disasters increases
the risk that small-coalition leaders lose office (Quiroz Flores and Smith 2013, 838),
I show that disasters do not appear to affect the conflict behavior of small-coalition
leaders as existing theory would expect. Finally, the paper contributes to a growing
literature that goes beyond the traditional dichotomy of democracy versus autocracy
in studying the effects of domestic institutions on foreign policy (e.g., Weeks 2012).
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section briefly reviews the existing
literature on natural disasters and conflict. The third section develops a theory of
natural disasters, leader survival, and international conflict, deriving testable hy-
potheses. The fourth section presents a research design to evaluate those hypotheses.
The fifth section presents the results of the empirical tests, discusses the implica-
tions of the results, and describes a number of robustness checks. The sixth section
concludes.
4.1 Disasters and Conflict
The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction defines a disaster as “[a]
serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread
human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the
ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources.”2 Floods,
droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis are well-known examples of natural
events that might constitute disasters. Indeed, whether an event is a “disaster”
depends on the extent of the human and economic damage it causes. A hurricane in a
developed country might cause minimal damage, while the same hurricane could cause
2See http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology. For a review of various definitions of “dis-
aster,” see Perry (2007) and Quarantelli (2005). The International Disaster Database (Guha-Sapir,
Below and Hoyois 2015) records an event as a disaster if it causes at least ten deaths, affects at
least one hundred people, causes authorities to declare a state of emergency, or leads to a call for
international assistance.
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widespread death and suffering in an underdeveloped state. As such, the hurricane
would only count as a “disaster” in the latter case.3
Why would natural disasters influence the probability of conflict? Existing lit-
erature on disasters and conflict focuses primarily on domestic conflict (e.g., Drury
and Olson 1998; Brancati 2007; Nel and Righarts 2008; Omelicheva 2011; Bergholt
and Lujala 2012; Slettebak 2012; Nardulli, Peyton and Bajjalieh 2013). For instance,
natural disasters may increase societal grievances while simultaneously reducing state
capacity, creating a window of opportunity for civil conflict (Nel and Righarts 2008,
166). Additionally, disasters can aggravate scarcity problems, helping opposition
movements attract recruits (Brancati 2007, 722). These effects vary across contexts.
Indeed, Omelicheva (2011, 463) argues that preexisting institutions and domestic
conditions explain most of the negative impacts attributed to disasters. Besley and
Persson (2011, 5) find that disasters – which they argue serve as “negative shocks to
wages and positive shocks to aid flows” – interact with weak institutions to affect do-
mestic political violence. In any case, disasters can sometimes have dramatic political
consequences.
While most work focuses on disasters and civil conflict, some scholars empha-
size the international implications of disasters (e.g., Yim et al. 2009; Nelson 2010;
Kelman 2012; Akcinaroglu, DiCicco and Radziszewski 2011). For example, disasters
could either provide opportunities for rapprochement or exacerbate conflicts between
strategic rivals (e.g., Kelman 2012, 14). These studies have not produced conclusive
results. Though major disasters tend to increase the probability of conflict initiation,
there are no clear cases where a major disaster (at least 10,000 deaths) was directly
related to the initiation of a serious conflict (Nelson 2010, 174). Case studies suggest
that disasters may interact with domestic factors (e.g., civil strife) to indirectly affect
3There is evidence that disasters are less frequent and less severe in developed, democratic coun-
tries (e.g., Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore 2007; Plu¨mper and Neumayer 2009; Keefer, Neumayer
and Plu¨mper 2011; Quiroz Flores and Smith 2013).
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international conflict, but no systematic test confirms this hypothesis (Nelson 2010).
Streich and Mislan (2013, 16) conclude from this that “[d]isasters generally do not
lead to the initiation of conflict,” which is a fair assessment.
Yet, there are reasons to expect that disasters should be associated with interna-
tional conflict in ways that existing research does not anticipate. First, disasters may
affect the risk of leaders losing office (Quiroz Flores and Smith 2013). Second, leaders’
incentives to use international conflict may change when they become less secure in
office (Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Goemans 2000). My theory builds on these two
sets of findings to suggest a plausible link between disasters and international conflict.
4.2 Theory
To develop a theory of the relationship between natural disasters and international
conflict, I draw on selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and Chiozza and
Goemans’s (2011) theory of how the risk and consequences of losing office influence
conflict behavior. Selectorate theory says that the proportion of constituents whose
support is necessary for a leader to retain power (the size of the winning coalition)
shapes domestic and foreign policy. In large-coalition systems, leaders tend to provide
public goods to maintain power, their supporters are less loyal, and leaders have
few slack resources to use as compensation for perceived failure. In small-coalition
systems, leaders depend mostly on distributing private goods, their supporters are
more loyal, and leaders retain more state resources for themselves. I consider the
implications of disasters for leader survival and international conflict in large-coalition
and small-coalition systems separately.
Insofar as disasters cause deaths and damage in large-coalition systems, leaders
should face an increased risk of losing office.4 Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013, 828)
4Drury and Olson (1998, 154-155) detail many cases (winning coalition size, W ∈
{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, from Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) appears after year) – Haiti (1954,
W = 0.5), Nicaragua (1954, W = 0.5), Mexico (1985, W = 0.5), Guatemala (1976, W = 0.5),
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argue that this is so because these leaders have incentives to provide public goods like
security, and their constituents will evaluate them on this policy dimension. Although
this incentive should generally cause leaders to invest in disaster preparedness, when
disasters do occur, supporters may doubt a leader’s competence. Because the extent
of a disaster depends partially on the preparations and response of a government
(e.g., Kahn 2005, 283), it may reveal information about a leader’s competence to
govern.5 Coalition members in large-coalition systems are intolerant of incompetence
since they can expect to do similarly well under a challenger with identical incentives
to provide public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 279). When large-coalition
leaders fail to prevent deaths from disasters, coalition members will perceive them
as being incompetent, and their security in office should be threatened. Empirically,
these leaders are more likely to lose office as deaths from disasters increase (Quiroz
Flores and Smith 2013, 840).
Large-coalition leaders might fear regular or irregular removal. Consider the risk of
irregular removal first. An example is Chile, where public support for coups increased
following the 2010 earthquake (Carlin, Love and Zechmeister 2014, 11). Chiozza and
Goemans (2011, 18-32) argue that insecure leaders anticipating irregular removal
might gain from international conflict through two mechanisms. First, a leader may
“fight for survival” by sending suspected coup plotters within his regime to the front
lines to eliminate an internal threat a` la Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait
(Chiozza and Goemans 2011, 27). Second, a leader may “gamble for survival” by be-
having belligerently in the hopes of obtaining new resources to distribute to support-
ers. These could be public goods (e.g, national prestige, enhanced security through
Bangladesh (1970, W missing) – where unrest wrought by disasters heightened the risk of or led to
irregular removal for a number of leaders and regimes. For an analysis of the Guatemala case, see
Gawronski and Olson (2013).
5In some cases, disasters appear to be beneficial for leaders (e.g., Healy and Malhotra 2009;
Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011; Gasper and Reeves 2011; Lazarev et al. 2014). However, the findings
in Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013, 841) suggest that, when disasters do help leaders, the effects are
small relative to the negative effects they may have.
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victory in war) or private goods (e.g., natural resources) (See also Goemans 2000;
Downs and Rocke 1994, 364). Scholars frequently invoke the 1904 Russo-Japanese
War and the 1982 Falklands War as instances where insecure leaders sought to use
international conflict to ease domestic turmoil (Levy and Thompson 2010, 101). From
the perspective of a leader facing post-tenure punishment, international provocation
might be worthwhile if it improves survival chances. Empirically, even crises short of
war can help these leaders retain office (Chiozza and Goemans 2011, 89).6 As such,
both high-intensity (e.g., war) and low-intensity (e.g., threats) conflict might benefit
leaders.
This implies that as disasters worsen in large-coalition systems where leaders might
fear irregular removal, leaders should become more prone to engaging in international
conflicts. International conflict can introduce an additional policy dimension on which
constituents may evaluate leaders, and success on this dimension may compensate for
perceived failure in other contexts. Thus, these leaders may want to “gamble for
survival.” Some suggestive examples help illustrate the logic. In the 1998 war be-
tween Ethiopia and Eritrea, Abbink (2003, 221) argues that Ethiopian president Meles
Zenawi faced pressure to respond forcefully to Eritrea’s border violations because his
government was “in the midst of serious political problems and opposition from large
sections of the public.” One major problem was managing the effects of unusually
damaging El Nin˜o-induced flooding that killed hundreds of people in 1997 (Glantz
2000; Guha-Sapir, Below and Hoyois 2015). Given that Ethiopia had only recently
taken steps toward democracy and was in the midst of a hostile rivalry with Er-
itrea, it would be reasonable to expect that Zenawi feared irregular removal through
a coup or popular uprising. Tures (2009, 74) argues that Iran’s belligerent foreign
policy rhetoric under President Ahmadinejad was driven by efforts to “[distract] the
Iranian people from the deleterious shortcomings of its increasingly ineffective pres-
6The extent to which conflict outcomes affect leader tenure varies depending on domestic condi-
tions and the conditions that led to conflict (e.g., Croco 2011).
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ident.” While many factors contributed to popular dissatisfaction with the Iranian
government during Ahmadinejad’s tenure, one source of public discontent was the
government’s response to earthquakes (Valinejad 2012; Torbati 2012). In 2013, The
New York Times called public anger over the Philippine government’s response to a
typhoon the “biggest challenge” of President Aquino’s presidency (Jacobs 2013). The
Philippines is mostly democratic but has experienced a number of attempted coups
in the past few decades. Shortly after, Aquino took an increasingly hard line (rhetor-
ically) against China in disputes over islands in the South China Sea, comparing his
situation to that of “Czechoslovakia’s leaders in the late 1930s” (Bradsher 2014). The
theory would explain this as a case where a leader sought to boost his government’s
popularity, which was partially a function of a natural disaster, by framing a standoff
with a foreign country as dangerous and taking a strong stance (a potentially risky
choice). Finally, in their case studies of international conflict in Central America
from 1840-1918, Chiozza and Goemans (2011, 120-121) note that a cholera epidemic
contributed to “undermining [leader of the Federal Republic of Central America]
Moraza´n’s legitimacy,” which was an important factor in Moraza´n’s decision to make
war against Guatemala to preserve the union.
Additionally, a leader may fear a military coup if generals believe that she has done
a poor job governing. For example, Pakistan has occasionally reverted to military
rule when democratically-elected leaders have proven unable to cope with crises, and
there were “[r]umours of an army coup” following flooding in Pakistan in 2010 (The
Economist 2010). A recent report by the United States’ Congressional Research Ser-
vice expressed concern that popular dissatisfaction with the political system brought
on by environmental crises might lead Pakistan to behave more belligerently toward
India (Vaughn et al. 2010). Here and in other similar cases, it is plausible that the
“fighting for survival” mechanism may succeed in distracting the military (at least
temporarily) during a period of domestic upheaval, while simultaneously winning
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public favor through the “gambling for survival” mechanism.
H1: Leaders of large-coalition systems who face irregular removal initiate more in-
ternational conflicts as the human impacts of natural disasters increase.
Leaders of large-coalition systems who are concerned foremost with not being
voted out of office (e.g., stable, consolidated democracies) have little reason to fear
forcible removal. As such, holding office is not valuable enough to make international
conflict worthwhile, especially if heightened insecurity makes a leader less able to in-
sulate herself from any negative repercussions of conflict. While conflict might help a
leader retain power, it is also risky. The costs and risks of engaging in conflict while
in a relatively less secure position deter conflict for these leaders. This is the “peace
through insecurity” mechanism (Chiozza and Goemans 2011, 32-35). As the effects of
disasters worsen in these systems, leaders should feel less secure in office and should
find international conflict a less desirable option. For example, some commentators
attributed US President Bush’s more dovish foreign policy during the first part of
his second term to the public backlash against his response to Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 (Daalder and Lindsay 2005). Periods of relative dovish-ness in India’s for-
eign policy toward Pakistan have also been attributed to disasters (Kelman 2012, 37).
H2: Leaders of large-coalition systems who face regular removal from office initiate
fewer international conflicts as the human impacts of natural disasters increase.
Now consider the role of disasters in small-coalition systems. Here, a coalition
member’s fate depends critically on whether the incumbent is in power since the
likelihood of being included in an alternative winning coalition is low compared to
a large-coalition system. This induces loyalty to an incumbent leader. Additionally,
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small-coalition leaders have more slack resources to use as compensation for shocks
than do large-coalition leaders (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 285). Since coali-
tion members are more loyal and the leader is better able to compensate any losses
they do experience, human impacts of disasters per se should not be destabilizing for
small-coalition leaders. Consistent with this theory, Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013,
837) find that leaders in small-coalition systems are unaffected by disaster deaths. It
follows that deaths from disasters should be unrelated to international conflict be-
havior in small-coalition systems.
H3: Leaders of small-coalition systems are no more or less likely to initiate interna-
tional conflicts as the human impacts of disasters increase.
Still, disasters might catalyze threats to small-coalition leaders through extra-
institutional channels. A disaster can provide a focal point for anti-regime sentiments
while simultaneously corralling potential revolutionaries into geographically compact
areas, facilitating the recruitment efforts of opposition groups (Quiroz Flores and
Smith 2013, 821-822). In principle, this effect operates in both large- and small-
coalition systems, though this incentive is weak in large-coalition systems (Smith
2008, 791). So, while dictators may worry little about the human impacts of disasters,
the disaster-induced threat of revolution looms large when citizens can overcome co-
ordination problems. Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013, 828) argue that disaster events
– independent of the human toll – should be associated with an increased likelihood
of losing power in small-coalition systems, and they find empirical support for this
hypothesis. Nel and Righarts (2008, 159) recount how an earthquake in 465/464
B.C. helped “Messenian helots who were enslaved when Sparta” initiate a revolution-
ary challenge to Spartan rulers (which ultimately failed). The 1972 earthquake in
Nicaragua and the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala have also been linked to increased
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leader insecurity through similar mechanisms (Valenta and Valenta 1987; Jonas 1991;
Kelman 2012).
Given that disasters may affect the survival of small-coalition leaders, Chiozza and
Goemans’s (2011) theory would predict that these leaders should become more or less
likely to use international conflict depending on how they expect to lose office. The
question is whether the fighting or gambling for survival mechanisms would diminish
a threat that comes from outside the institutional system governing leader turnover.
In general, leaders might be threatened through three sources. First, a threat might
come domestically through existing institutional channels (e.g., members of winning
coalition). Second, a threat might come from domestic extra-institutional channels
(e.g., a rebel group). Finally, threats may come from outside a given state (e.g., a
foreign rival state). I will focus on the first two.
From the discussion above and the argument in Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013),
the way that disasters affect large-coalition leaders is by harming groups that are
necessary for them to retain power. Conversely, the way that disasters threaten
small-coalition leaders is by affecting groups that exist outside of the selectorate.
Thus, while it is a disaster that creates a threat in both cases, the “source” of the
threat differs across the two regime types. While others have pointed out that threats
to leaders come from a variety of sources (e.g., Smith 2008), theories of leaders and
international conflict ignore the source of a threat. Although Chiozza and Goemans
(2011, 5) do consider revolutionary threats as a potential source of interstate conflict,
their argument focuses on cases where (1) the revolutionary threat comes from groups
that enjoy safe havens across international borders or (2) the threat of revolution is
internal to the existing regime (e.g., a rival military faction). In the first case, a con-
flict becomes international because of the need to eliminate a threat that happens to
cross national borders. In the second case, fighting or gambling for survival might re-
duce internal opposition. However, small-coalition leaders should be well-equipped to
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offset any negative impacts of disasters that affect their winning coalitions. Whether
or not revolutionaries typically act from across borders is an empirical question that
is outside the scope of this paper. It is not clear that natural disasters, if they cre-
ate a revolutionary threat, should systematically increase the likelihood that that
threat comes from across a border. It is unclear how the fighting or gambling for
survival mechanisms would make international conflict a useful response to an extra-
institutional domestic threat like a revolutionary movement. In terms of selectorate
theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), groups outside the “selectorate” receive little
benefit from any goods the government provides or would obtain from international
conflict. Similarly, a leader cannot send these opponents off to war since she does
not control the revolutionaries. It would seem odd for the leader of a small-coalition
regime to send armed forces abroad exactly when there is a need to defend against
a potential revolution. If this argument is correct, then disasters should not affect
the international conflict incentives of small-coalition leaders even while they may
increase the risk of losing office for small-coalition leaders.
H4: Regardless of the anticipated consequences of losing office, leaders of small-
coalition systems are no more or less likely to initiate international conflicts as the
frequency of disaster events increases.
4.3 Research Design
Testing the theory requires data on natural disasters, domestic institutions, and
international conflict. I start with a data set of leader-years from the Archigos data set
(version 4.0) (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009).7 To measure conflict propen-
sity, I count the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) a country initiated
7Earlier versions of this paper used Archigos version 2.9. I have updated all the analyses with
version 4.0 of the data, which allows the extension of the temporal domain from 2004 to 2007 (the
full data set extends to 2014, though the domain here is now limited by the availability of data from
the Correlates of War and the W score discussed below).
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during a given year (or during a given portion of a year if a leader exited office mid-
year) using the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes data set
(Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996). MIDs are “united historical cases in which the
threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly
directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or
territory of another state” (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996, 168). This is the primary
dependent variable in the analysis below.8 I include all MID initiations since even
lower-level acts of conflict may affect leader survival and thus are relevant for the
theory (Chiozza and Goemans 2011, 89), though I also report the results using a
count of “high-hostility” MIDs that are coded as having hostility levels 4 and 5 (the
use of force and war, respectively).
The key independent variables are (1) human impacts of disasters, (2) disaster
events, (3) domestic institutions of leader survival, and (4) the anticipated means
and consequences of losing office. Using the International Disaster Database (Guha-
Sapir, Below and Hoyois 2015),9 I count both the total number of disaster events and
the total number of deaths from natural disasters that occurred in a given country
during the previous year, or during the previous portion of a year for years in which a
leader took power mid-year. I lag the disaster variables by one year to ensure that any
disasters occurred (or started) prior to the onset of conflict.10 While others distinguish
between rapid- and slow-onset disasters, I am mainly interested in the human toll
of disasters in large-coalition systems, and as such I include both. It may be the
case that coalition members are more or less forgiving for certain types of disasters,
8This variable counts all instances where a state is coded “1” for both the “sidea” and “orig”
variables in the MID participant-level (v. 4.01) data set. The “sidea” variable indicates that a state
is on the initiating side of a conflict, and the “orig” variable indicates that state was an initiator on
the first day that the conflict started.
9For a critical review of existing data sources on disasters, see Tschoegl, Below and Guha-Sapir
(2006), and for the EM-DAT data base specifically, see Guha-Sapir, Hargitt and Hoyois (2004).
Despite its limitations, EM-DAT provides the most comprehensive data on natural disasters spatially
and temporally (Kelman 2012, 74).
10See the Appendix for a description of the data and procedures for dealing with missing countries.
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but this is difficult to know ex ante. Alternatively, some types of disasters might
pose greater threats to small-coalition regimes. For example, earthquakes may more
effectively help rebels overcome collective action problems than a drought (or maybe
not). Because I do not have strong theoretical expectations about these relationships,
I follow Quiroz Flores and Smith (2013) in including all types of natural disasters.
I take the natural log of the disaster variables, adding one to each observation to
account for cases with zero deaths or events.
To operationalize winning-coalition size, I use the W score from Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2010). The variable is a function of component measures in the Polity
IV data set (xrcomp, xropen, and parcomp) and the Cross-National Time Series Data
Archive’s measure of regime type (Banks 2011). The variable ranges between 0 and
1 in increments of .25, with values closer to 1 indicating larger winning-coalitions. I
use this measure to create two categories of winning-coalition size. I code countries
that score 0.5 or higher as large-coalition systems, and those that score below 0.5 as
small-coalition systems.11
I use the Polity IV Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (xrreg) variable
(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2010) to measure how a leader expects to be removed
from office. This is similar to the approach taken by Goemans (2000, 56-57), who
uses “mixed” regimes (regimes that are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic)
to proxy for leaders who might anticipate irregular removal. Alternatively, Chiozza
and Goemans (2011) indirectly model the risk of losing office, since they theorize
that the risk of international conflict and the risk of losing office are endogenous.
However, their estimates of removal risks include components of domestic regimes
that factor into the W score in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010), which I use to
code large-coalition and small-coalition systems. Instead, I use the xrreg variable, a
11Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2008, 193) refer to predicted coalition sizes of .3 and .46 as “sub-
stantial,” so 0.5 would seem a reasonable and possibly even conservative cut point for separating out
large- from small-winning-coalition systems. Below I also report results for an alternative threshold
of W ≥ 0.75.
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three-category ordinal variable measuring the procedures of leader removal in a given
country. (Note that this is not one of the components of the W score.) This indicator
may not dynamically capture the threat of irregular removal, but where it does code
irregular removal we should be more confident that leaders do plausibly fear an irreg-
ular exit.12 A score of three indicates regular removal, lesser scores indicate irregular
removal.13 Using these two sources of data, I code a leader’s membership in one of four
categories of institutions: large-coalition/regular-removal, large-coalition/irregular-
removal, small-coalition/regular-removal, and small-coalition/irregular-removal.14
Control Variables
I control for potential confounders that might be correlated with disaster impacts
and conflict (Ray 2003; Achen 2005). First, since developed countries are better able
to prevent impacts from disasters (Kahn 2005) and may also be less likely to engage
in international conflict (Gartzke 2007), I include a measure of real GDP (logged and
lagged by one year) from Gleditsch (2002). Second, larger countries might experience
more disasters simply by virtue of their size and they may also share more borders
which could lead to a higher likelihood of fighting over territory (Bremer 2000, 30-
31; Gibler 2007). To account for this, I include a (logged) measure of land area in
square kilometers (World Bank 2013).15 I also control for military capabilities using
the Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) score
(Singer, Bremer and John Stuckey 1972), since well-equipped militaries might be
12In Table 4.11 in the Appendix, I report the empirical distribution of removal type by my coding
of regime type.
13The first and third categories of xrreg clearly correspond to irregular and regular removal,
respectively. The second category is less clear, but more closely corresponds to irregular removal.
The exact wording is reproduced in the Appendix.
14A random sample of large-coalition irregular removal country-years in the data include
Guatemala (1962), Czechoslovakia (1963), Albania (1982), Turkey (1983), and Colombia (1968).
Large-coalition regular removal country years include Bolivia (1989), Venezuela (1976), South Africa
(1953), France (1972), and Canada (1952). Small-coalition country-years include Iraq (1963), Kuwait
(1998), Nepal (2003), Equatorial Guinea (1972), and Burkina Faso (1991).
15Where this measure is missing, I manually coded land area in squared kilometers using
Wikipedia.
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able to successfully manage the effects of a disaster and prevent deaths, and stronger
countries might be more conflict-prone (or may have more opportunities to engage in
conflict) (Bremer 2000, 25). I lag this variable by one year. In some of the models
below, I also account for additional determinants of conflict with a count of years
since the last MID, a dummy for the post-Cold War period, and a count of years
that a leader has been in office. I also present the results controlling for a categorical
decade variable to account for conflict opportunity across time.16 The statistical tests
use data for the years 1950-2007. The spatial and temporal domains of the data are
limited by Archigos and the data from Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010). Table
4.4 in Section 4.7.2 of the Appendix reports summary statistics for the key variables.
4.4 Results
I estimate negative binomial regression models with leader-clustered standard er-
rors where the outcome variable is a count of conflicts initiated by a leader during a
given year.17 I interact the disaster deaths variable with the large-coalition/irregular-
removal and large-coalition/regular-removal dummy variables, leaving small-coalition
systems out as the baseline category. To evaluate H1 and H2, Table 4.1 reports the
estimated marginal effects of disaster deaths on conflict initiation in small-coalition
systems (the base coefficient) and large-coalition regular and irregular removal sys-
tems.18 Consistent with H1, the positive coefficient on the interaction term between
large-coalition systems with irregular removal and disaster deaths in Models 1 and
2 suggests that large-coalition leaders who face irregular removal from office initiate
more international conflicts as deaths from natural disasters increase, though the re-
16The results are also robust to using year-fixed effects instead. See Section 4.7.5 in the Appendix.
17I use a negative binomial model rather than a Poisson regression model because of overdispersion
in the outcome variables. Section 4.7.12 of the Appendix reports a list of observations where leaders
of large-coalition systems initiated at least one MID following a year with an above-average number
of disaster deaths.
18I carried out the significance tests for the interaction terms according to the procedures outlined
in Hilbe (2007, 523-526).
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lationship is only significant at the p < .10 level in Model 1. Model 2, which uses an
alternate threshold of 0.75 to separate large- from small-winning coalition systems,
provides stronger support for H1. Models 3 and 4 add a number of additional covari-
ates including decade-fixed effects to Models 1 and 2. The pattern here is similar:
the result for large-coalition irregular removal leaders is statistically significant in
both cases but stronger in the model that uses the alternate W threshold. Finally,
Models 5 and 6 include only high-hostility MIDs in the outcome variable. While the
estimated coefficient on disasters is not statistically significant for either subset of
large-coalition leaders in Model 5, it is still positive for both. In Model 6, the effect
of disasters is statistically significant and positive only among large-coalition leaders
facing irregular removal.
Notably, and against the expectations of H2, disasters also seem to be positively
associated with conflict in large-coalition systems where leaders likely face regular
removal. Indeed, in four of the six models (Models 1-4), the marginal effect of disasters
for large-coalition regular removal leaders is positive and significant. Further, in a test
of the linear restriction that the effects are the same across the regular and irregular
regimes, only in Models 2 and 6 is there even weak evidence that the coefficients are
statistically distinguishable from one another (the p-values in the F -tests are 0.07
and 0.2, respectively).
Overall, Table 4.1 provides support for H1, but it provides less evidence that the
positive association between disasters and conflict is exclusive to large-coalition, irreg-
ular removal regimes.19 The models so far attempt to account for differences within
regime types by controlling for a number of potentially confounding factors that might
affect disasters and international conflict propensity. To address possibles concerns
about selection bias or that disaster deaths and conflict are endogenous to regime
19When considering a subset of large-coalition, regular removal leaders with lower-than-mean
GDP and CINC scores, the coefficient on the disaster deaths variable is negative, consistent with
H2, though not statistically significant. These results are available upon request.
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Table 4.1: Disasters, Coalition Size, Removal Type, and International Conflict (Neg-
ative Binomial Regression)
Dependent variable: MIDs Initiated
Base W ≥ 0.75 Extra controls W ≥ 0.75, Hostile MIDs W ≥ 0.75,
Extra controls Hostile MIDs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) −0.034 0.007 −0.029 0.005 −0.014 0.008
(0.041) (0.030) (0.038) (0.028) (0.044) (0.035)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.819∗ −0.763∗ −0.853∗ −0.836∗ −0.917∗ −0.893∗
(0.236) (0.193) (0.238) (0.199) (0.305) (0.256)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.279 −0.835∗ −0.257 −0.852∗ −0.302 −1.142∗
(0.212) (0.228) (0.206) (0.222) (0.242) (0.337)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-R 0.082∗ 0.039 0.082∗ 0.044 0.055 0.030
(0.048) (0.040) (0.046) (0.038) (0.053) (0.048)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-I 0.080 0.138∗ 0.072 0.142∗ 0.048 0.127
(0.052) (0.059) (0.049) (0.057) (0.062) (0.081)
βˆDisaster Deaths for 0.046
† 0.146∗ 0.043† 0.147∗ 0.034 0.136∗
Large-coalition, Irregular Removal Leaders (0.0350) (0.050) (0.033) (0.050) (0.047) (0.074)
βˆDisaster Deaths for 0.048
∗ 0.046∗ 0.053∗ 0.048∗ 0.041 0.038
Large-coalition, Regular Removal Leaders (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033)
CINCt−1 5.515∗ 5.564∗ 5.727∗ 5.943∗ 5.917∗ 5.763∗
(1.754) (1.618) (1.673) (1.551) (2.437) (2.222)
Land area (km2, log) 0.138∗ 0.129∗ 0.107∗ 0.101∗ 0.124∗ 0.119∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047)
Real GDPt−1 (log) 0.205∗ 0.212∗ 0.180∗ 0.183∗ 0.123∗ 0.125∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.049) (0.048)
Peace Years −0.016∗ −0.016∗ −0.020∗ −0.020∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Post-Cold War Dummy −0.471∗ −0.438∗ −0.704∗ −0.653∗
(0.275) (0.264) (0.331) (0.309)
Leader Tenure −0.016∗ −0.021∗ −0.014 −0.021∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant −5.332∗ −5.380∗ −4.356∗ −4.394∗ −4.235∗ −4.281∗
(0.571) (0.562) (0.686) (0.665) (0.855) (0.833)
Decade-fixed Effects N N Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,843 6,843 6,843 6,843 6,843 6,843
Log Likelihood −3,373.894 −3,364.967 −3,304.790 −3,295.242 −2,501.214 −2,490.623
θ 0.630∗ (0.062) 0.637∗ (0.063) 0.734∗ (0.075) 0.740∗ (0.076) 0.480∗ (0.054) 0.492∗ (0.056)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,765.789 6,747.934 6,645.579 6,626.483 5,038.428 5,017.245
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Leader-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All models include CINC score, land area, and real GDP.
Models 3-6 include decade-fixed effects, peace years, post-Cold War dummy, and leader tenure.
106
type in ways that are not captured in the analysis, I estimated an alternative model
replacing the disaster deaths variable with a count of earthquake events. Deaths from
earthquakes may still be endogenous to regimes, but the timing of earthquake events
is random.20 Table 4.2 shows that the main result from Table 4.1 – the positive as-
sociation between earthquakes and conflict initiation in both types of large-coalition
systems but not small-coalition systems – also carries over to this specification.
20The results are also robust to controlling for the composite polity2 score from Marshall, Jaggers
and Gurr (2010), though doing this is problematic since components of this measure are used to
construct both the measure of W and my measure of removal type. These results are available upon
request.
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Table 4.2: Earthquake Events, Coalition Size, Removal Type, and International Con-
flict (Negative Binomial Regression)
Dependent variable: MID Initiations
Base Extra controls
(7) (8)
Earthquake Eventst−1 −0.023 0.007
(0.099) (0.093)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.716∗ −0.737∗
(0.205) (0.210)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.235 −0.211
(0.184) (0.178)
Earthquake Eventst−1× LC-R 0.323∗ 0.295∗
(0.130) (0.127)
Earthquake Eventst−1× LC-I 0.324∗ 0.258
(0.180) (0.160)
βˆEarthquakeEvents for Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal Leaders 0.301
∗ 0.265∗
(0.147) (0.131)
βˆEarthquakeEvents for Large-Coalition, Regular Removal Leaders 0.300
∗ 0.302∗
(0.087) (0.089)
CINC 5.839∗ 6.001∗
(1.908) (1.805)
Land area (km2, log) 0.138∗ 0.107∗
(0.038) (0.039)
Real GDPt−1 (log) 0.193∗ 0.170∗
(0.038) (0.038)
Peace Years −0.016∗
(0.004)
Post-Cold War Dummy −0.434∗
(0.249)
Leader Tenure −0.015∗
(0.008)
Constant −5.254∗ −4.298∗
(0.546) (0.665)
Observations 6,843 6,843
Log Likelihood −3,364.102 −3,295.959
θ 0.633∗∗∗ (0.061) 0.738∗∗∗ (0.074)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,746.204 6,627.918
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Leader-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Both models include CINC score, land area, and real GDP.
Model 8 includes decade-fixed effects, peace years, post-Cold War dummy, and leader tenure.
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Figure 4.1: Expected Count of MIDs Analysis.
The thickest to thinnest lines represent the 80%, 90%, and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The control
variables are held at their means within each regime type group, and the disaster deaths variable is increased from
the mean to the mean plus one standard deviation within each group. In the results for Model 7, the earthquakes
variable is changed from 0 to 1.
To see how disaster deaths affect a “typical” leader’s propensity for conflict, I ana-
lyze expected counts of MID initiations for the average leader in each regime category
(Long 1997, 237, 224). I characterize the uncertainty associated with these estimates
using 10,000 simulated sets of coefficients from the estimated sampling distributions
of the estimated coefficients from Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.1 and Model 7 in Table
4.2. The coefficients are drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with mean
βj and variance σj, where βj is a vector of estimated coefficients from model j and
σj is the leader-cluster-adjusted variance-covariance matrix for model j. For each
set of coefficients, I calculated the change in the expected count of MIDs when the
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Figure 4.2: Expected Count of Hostile MIDs Analysis.
The thickest to thinnest lines represent the 80%, 90%, and 95% confidence intervals respectively. The control
variables are held at their means within each regime type group, and the disaster deaths variable is increased from
the mean to the mean plus one standard deviation within each group. In the results for Model 7, the earthquakes
variable is changed from 0 to 1.
control variables are set to their means within regime categories when the disaster
deaths variable is increased from its mean to one standard deviation above its mean.
I take the mean of the distribution of differences and the quantiles for the 80%, 90%
and 95% confidence intervals and plot them in Figure 4.1. In Model 1, the change
in expected count of MIDs for both types of leaders is small and statistically distin-
guishable from zero only when considering the 80% confidence interval (The mean
percentage change is about 10% and 11% for each type of leader, respectively.) In
Model 2, which uses the alternative threshold of W ≥ 0.75, those changes increase
to about 38% and 41%, respectively, and the 90% and 95% confidence intervals do
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not include zero. Increasing the earthquake count from 0 to 1 in Model 7 leads to a
statistically significant 35% change in the expected count of MID initiations for both
groups of leaders. These changes are more modest when reestimating those models
with only high-hostility MIDs included in the outcome variable (Figure 4.2). When
including the covariates from Model 1, the change in expected count is only 7% for
both groups, though the confidence intervals include zero. In Model 2, that change
increases to about 30% and 32% for leaders facing irregular and regular removal,
respectively. (The 90% confidence interval does barely exclude zero.) Finally, reesti-
mating Model 7 using only high-hostility MIDs leads to an approximate increase in
the expected count of MIDs of 46% for both groups at the 90% confidence level. Dis-
asters are associated with modest increases in conflict propensity, but the relationship
appears weaker and less precise when considering only high-hostility MIDs.
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Table 4.3: Disasters, Removal Type, and Conflict in Small-Coalition Regimes (Neg-
ative Binomial Regression)
Dependent variable: MID initiations
Regular Irregular Regular Irregular
Removal Removal Removal Removal
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) 0.063 −0.016 0.005 −0.029
(0.117) (0.062) (0.085) (0.064)
Disaster Eventst−1 (log) 0.089 −0.465† 0.242 −0.451†
(0.656) (0.314) (0.473) (0.339)
CINC 52.280 44.883 101.996 35.004
(91.433) (70.849) (107.695) (72.814)
Land area (km2, log) 0.222∗ 0.012 0.110 −0.004
(0.124) (0.087) (0.144) (0.090)
Real GDPt−1 (log) 0.080 0.346∗ −0.022 0.369∗
(0.218) (0.108) (0.185) (0.100)
Peace Years −0.044 −0.021†
(0.062) (0.015)
Post-Cold War Dummy 0.374 −0.419
(0.881) (0.357)
Leader Tenure 0.008 −0.025∗
(0.014) (0.010)
Constant −6.046∗ −4.900∗ −4.217∗ −3.775∗
(2.326) (1.536) (2.491) (1.698)
Decaded-fixed Effects N N Y Y
Observations 551 1,221 551 1,221
Log Likelihood −172.330 −719.517 −157.783 −698.156
θ 3.082 (4.577) 0.769∗ (0.155) 7.173 (18.544) 1.081∗ (0.251)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 356.660 1,451.034 345.566 1,426.311
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Leader-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All models include CINC score, land area, and real GDP.
Models 11 and 12 include decade-fixed effects, peace years, post-Cold War dummy, and leader tenure.
The third hypothesis stipulates that disaster deaths should not affect the conflict
incentives of small-coalition leaders. Consistent with H3, the coefficient on the dis-
aster deaths variable (this coefficient refers to the effect of disaster deaths for the
baseline category of small-coalition systems) is close to zero and statistically insignif-
icant across all of the models in Table 4.1. Finally, H4 predicts that though disaster
events should increase the hazard of losing office for small-coalition leaders, they
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should not affect the conflict behavior of these leaders. Table 4.3 presents the results
of an analysis that separates the data into subsets of small-coalition leaders facing reg-
ular and irregular removal. For small-coalition leaders facing regular removal, there is
no significant effect of disasters on conflict behavior (Models 9 and 11). However, for
small-coalition leaders facing irregular removal, the direction of the coefficients points
to the opposite of what we would expect from Chiozza and Goemans’s (2011) theory:
the coefficients on disaster events are negative in both Models 10 and 12. While this
is nominally inconsistent with H4 given that the hypothesis takes an agnostic stance
in predicting a null effect, it is notable when interpreted in light of existing theory.
4.5 Discussion
The results above provide mixed support for H1, consistent support for H3, qual-
ified support for H4, and no support for H2. The appendix contains a number of
robustness checks. Nearly all of the auxiliary analyses produce results similar to those
reported here. This is the case when including year-fixed effects, country-fixed effects,
controlling for disaster propensity with a count of disasters in a given country up to
and including year t − 2, using zero-inflated negative binomial regression models,
controlling for aid, and controlling for civil conflicts.21
The findings have a number of important implications. First, even if disasters
only affect lower-level conflicts behavior for a subset of leaders, others have shown
that current disputes may make future crises and wars more likely (e.g., Colaresi
and Thompson 2002). While Nelson (2010) finds no cases of war initiation following
major disasters, this paper identifies more subtle conditions under which disasters can
affect international tensions. Second, the findings in Chiozza and Goemans (2011, 89)
suggest that lower-intensity conflicts and crises can benefit leaders, and as such they
21Using an un-lagged version of the disaster deaths variable, excluding the control variables,
dropping the US, dropping China, dropping Russia, and excluding cases with greater than 10 MID
initiations also makes no difference for the key results.
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are relevant for theory testing. Third, it may be unreasonable to expect disasters to
have a large substantive effect on conflict initiation. Chiozza and Goemans’s (2011)
models account for dozens of factors thought to influence leader survival, and it is not
necessarily surprising that when the analysis is confined to a single type of threat,
the substantive impact of that threat is smaller and less precise. Fourth, and related
to the last point, the findings here are consistent with most other studies on disasters
and conflict that find small effects. Finally, a key finding here is that small-coalition
leaders’ international conflict behavior does not seem to respond to disasters in ways
that existing theory suggests. I have argued that the reason for this is that disasters
pose threats to leaders through mechanisms that do not matter for international
conflict in small-coalition systems. This is a more general argument that should be
tested in other contexts.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that deaths from natural disasters are associated with a modest
increased risk of conflict in large-coalition systems. While the paper set out with
the expectation that how a leader expects to lose office should condition this rela-
tionship within large-coalition regimes, I find only limited statistical evidence that
this distinction matters in this context. The paper shows further that small-coalition
leaders are no more or less likely to initiate conflicts as a result of disaster deaths.
Yet, small-coalition leaders facing irregular removal appear to become less likely to
use conflict as more disaster events occur. This is an anomalous result for existing
theories and empirical studies of leader survival and international conflict.
From a policy perspective, this paper suggests that international efforts to invest
in disaster preparedness are particularly important in countries with relatively in-
clusive institutions in regions where acts of hostility and belligerence may escalate
quickly. Given that aid may be beneficial in these relatively inclusive systems (e.g.,
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Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 280), donors should be able to reduce the like-
lihood of international conflict by helping these countries prepare for and respond
to natural disasters without undermining (steps toward) democracy. The theoretical
argument, which emphasizes assessments of leader competency, suggests that efforts
should be focused on prevention and infrastructure development, rather than pallia-
tive measures.
The findings here should interest scholars studying potential connections between
climate change and conflict. Even as past work has repeatedly emphasized the need
to draw on theories of international conflict in studying climate-conflict linkages, few
scholars have taken this advice seriously. By emphasizing the role that leaders’ incen-
tives for political survival play in shaping international conflict decisions, this paper
provides a new way to think about how problems of human security might affect
international security. While others have highlighted how the domestic consequences
of disasters might spill over borders, this paper provides a theoretical framework link-
ing the impacts of disasters to international conflict as a deliberate strategy of some
leaders. A similar approach could be applied to acts of international cooperation.
Indeed, if leaders become less likely to use conflict under certain conditions, do they
substitute other less risky international policies to retain office? Others have pro-
posed mechanisms that would link climate impacts to peace (Gartzke 2012). Such an
approach would speak more broadly to theories of leader survival and foreign policy.
While this paper is motivated by a desire to use existing theories to anticipate
potential links between disasters and violence, it offers an opportunity to rethink and
reevaluate the mechanisms offered in those theories. Perhaps the most important
contribution of this paper is the argument that not all threats to leader survival matter
for international conflict. I have argued that Chiozza and Goemans’s (2011) “fighting”
and “gambling” for survival mechanisms would not necessarily reduce threats from
extra-institutional, revolutionary threats. The consequences of removal do not seem
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to matter when we distinguish between regular and irregular removal within small-
coalition regimes and consider the effect of disaster events on conflict behavior. This
is an important qualification to existing theories of leaders and international conflict.
However, future research should test whether this argument holds in other empirical
domains. For now, this paper helps further refine the conditions under which disasters
are associated with international conflict.
4.7 Appendix for “Natural Disasters, Leader Survival and International Conflict”
4.7.1 Notes on Disaster Data
Temporal and Spatial Domains
The following countries/territories are included in EM-DAT but are either not in-
cluded in Archigos, not included in the Correlates of War data set, or do not have
coding in the Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 W score data, and are excluded from
the analysis: American Samoa, Anguilla, Azores, Bermuda, Canary Islands, Cay-
man Islands, Cook Islands, Ethiopia, French Guiana, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe,
Guam, Macau, Martinique, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Niue,
Northern Mariana Islands, Palestine (West Bank), Puerto Rico, Reunion, Serbia, St
Helena, Tokelau, Turks and Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands (UK), Virgin Islands (US),
Wallis, Wallis and Futuna Islands. There are three cases that did not appear in the
EM-DAT data but do appear in Archigos: Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Repub-
lic of Vietnam. I include Qatar and United Arab Emirates in the analysis because
they both appear in the EM-DAT online database even though they have no disasters
listed during the temporal domain of this study. Dealing with the Republic of Viet-
nam (South Vietnam) is less straightforward, because EM-DAT does not distinguish
between Vietnam and South Vietnam pre-1975, while Archigos has observations for
Vietnam and South Vietnam pre-1975. For this reason, I excluded the Republic of
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Vietnam from the analysis, as well as all pre-1975 years for Vietnam, since it is not
possible to distinguish whether disasters occurred in Vietnam or Republic of Vietnam
before 1975.
Coding Disaster Deaths and Events
Though the database always records the year that a disaster started, many observa-
tions list the start day as “00” in the data, and some list the start month as “00”. I
treat these cases as if the disaster occurred on the first day of the month (or on the
first day of the year if both are missing). The data are aggregated by total deaths per
disaster. Accordingly, to contribute to the overall count of disaster deaths for a given
leader-year, I require only that the disaster started during that leader-year. Disaster
end dates are far less precise than start dates in EM-DAT. Often only a month and
year is listed, while some cases list only the year. For countries with no disasters
listed during a year, I code these values as zero so long as the country appears in the
data set in other years.
Why Not Use a Measure of Economic Damage? While economic damage might have
an effect similar to deaths, empirical measures of economic damage may not reliably
convey the extent of a disaster’s economic impact. For example, the International
Disaster Database records that Libya experienced $42.2 million in disaster damages in
1995. Yet, Cohen and Werker (2008, 811) note that insurance covered these damages,
so the extent of the loss is not clear from the $42.2 million figure. Alternative data sets
of economic damage may provide more fine-grained estimates of economic losses (e.g.,
Neumayer, Plu¨mper and Barthel 2014), but for the purposes of this project, they do
not necessarily provide any better estimate of disasters’ effects on the confidence of
the winning coalition in the leader. Deaths from disasters, which are permanent and
more readily visible, should serve as a clearer signal of leader competence. Quiroz
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Flores and Smith (2013) also use this measure as an indicator of disasters’ impacts
on human security.
4.7.2 Summary Statistics
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
mids init 6,843 0.199 0.648 0 23
hh mids init 6,843 0.131 0.543 0 23
ln deaths t1 6,843 1.342 2.262 0.000 14.510
ln events t1 6,843 0.462 0.654 0.000 3.638
eq events t1 6,843 0.108 0.470 0 10
lwc i 6,843 0.360 0.480 0 1
lwc r 6,843 0.381 0.486 0 1
lwc i 75 6,843 0.092 0.289 0 1
lwc r 75 6,843 0.377 0.485 0 1
small 6,843 0.260 0.438 0 1
peace years mid 6,843 19.581 45.204 1 191
post cw 6,843 0.380 0.485 0 1
leader tenure 6,843 8.644 7.381 2 49
ln realgdp 6,843 10.333 1.914 4.873 16.373
ln land 6,843 12.274 1.784 6.554 16.612
cinc 6,843 0.007 0.021 0.00001 0.319
Key
mids init : Count of MIDs initiated in year t
hh mids init : Count of MIDs with hostility ≥ 4 initiated in year t
ln deaths t1 : Natural log of disaster deaths in year t− 1
ln events t1 : Natural log of disaster events in year t− 1
eq events t1 : Earthquake events in year t− 1
lwc i : Large-coalition, irregular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.5)
lwc r : Large-coalition, regular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.5)
lwc i 75 : Large-coalition, irregular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.75)
lwc r 75 : Large-coalition, regular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.75)
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small : Small-coalition system (threshold W < 0.5)
peace years mid : Number of consecutive years without MID prior to year t
post cw : Dummy indicator for observation in post-1989 period
leader tenure: length of time in years that leader has been in office up to year t
ln realgdp: Natural log of real GDP in year t− 1
ln land : Natural log of land area in square kilometers
cinc: CINC score for country in year t− 1
4.7.3 Polity xrreg variable
The Polity codebook (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2010, 21) describes the second
category of xrreg as follows:
(2) Designational/Transitional: Chief executives are chosen by designa-
tion within the political elite, without formal competition (i.e., one-party
systems or “rigged” multiparty elections). Also coded here are transitional
arrangements intended to regularize future power transitions after an ini-
tial unregulated seizure of power (i.e., after constitutional legitimization
of military rule or during periods when the leader of the coup steps down
as head of state but retains unrivaled power within the political realm as
head of the military). This category also includes polities in transition
from designative to elective modes of executive selection (i.e., the period
of “guided democracy” often exhibited during the transition from mili-
tary to civilian rule) or vice versa (i.e., regimes ensuring electoral victory
through the intimidation of oppositional leaders or the promulgation of a
“state of emergency” before executive elections).
In short, a score of “2” indicates that the institutionalization of leader accession
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is fragile (at best), and leaders of these systems are likely more concerned about
irregular removal from office than leaders in regimes that score “3.”
4.7.4 Including Total Aid and Civil Conflict
Here I report the results for some alternative models that include measures that
may cause problems with post-treatment bias. Aid may reduce disaster impacts and
countries may be less likely to engage in provocative international behavior when they
are dependent on external assistance. I use the log of the sum of aid commitments (in
constant US$) from the project-level data provided by AidData (Tierney et al. 2011).
Since Nelson (2010) argues that the association between disasters and international
conflict results from the worsening of violent internal conflict which spills over into
international conflict, I include a count of civil conflicts in the previous year using
the UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2014 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). However,
since these variables potentially intervene between the key independent and dependent
variables, I omit these measures from the main analysis. The results are reported in
Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Controlling for Aid and Civil Conflict
Dependent variable: MID Initiations
W ≥ 0.75 W ≥ 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) −0.019 0.007 −0.046 −0.009
(0.043) (0.034) (0.038) (0.026)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.372 −0.453∗ −0.738∗ −0.736∗
(0.243) (0.202) (0.215) (0.181)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.101 −0.576∗ −0.158 −0.750∗
(0.245) (0.245) (0.197) (0.226)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-R 0.002 −0.028 0.067 0.023
(0.055) (0.052) (0.045) (0.040)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-I 0.062 0.105∗ 0.077∗ 0.143∗
(0.049) (0.061) (0.045) (0.055)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-I Leaders 0.043
† 0.11∗ 0.031 0.134∗
(0.033) (0.05) (0.029) (0.05)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-R Leaders -0.017 -0.02 0.021 0.013
(0.044) (0.046) (0.034) (0.034)
CINC 4.558∗ 5.208∗ 6.895∗ 7.258∗
(2.443) (2.253) (1.590) (1.527)
Land area (km2, log) 0.147∗ 0.129∗ 0.116∗ 0.106∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.037) (0.038)
Real GDPt−1 (log) 0.244∗ 0.259∗ 0.190∗ 0.199∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.038) (0.039)
Aid Commitments (log) −0.102∗ −0.100∗
(0.041) (0.038)
Aid Commitments (log, missing = zero) −0.009 −0.007
(0.006) (0.006)
Civil Conflictst−1 0.476∗ 0.471∗ 0.446∗ 0.444∗
(0.083) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080)
Constant −4.248∗ −4.195∗ −4.976∗ −4.991∗
(0.640) (0.646) (0.553) (0.538)
Observations 4,419 4,419 6,843 6,843
Log Likelihood −2,078.738 −2,073.259 −3,322.490 −3,313.483
θ 0.683∗ (0.078) 0.688∗ (0.079) 0.663∗ (0.063) 0.670∗ (0.063)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,179.477 4,168.518 6,666.980 6,648.967
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Leader-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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4.7.5 Year-Fixed Effects
In the main text I use decade-fixed effects to account for possible differences across
time in conflict opportunity. As an alternative solution, Table 4.6 reports Models 1
and 2 from Table 4.1 in the main text with year-fixed effects. The results are similar
to those reported in the main text.
Table 4.6: Base Models with Year-Fixed Effects (Negative Binomial Regression)
Dependent variable: MIDs Initiated
W ≥ 0.75
(1) (2)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) −0.023 0.007
(0.039) (0.028)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.857∗ −0.786∗
(0.230) (0.188)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.300 −0.839∗
(0.207) (0.224)
Disaster Deathst−1× LC-R 0.082∗ 0.048
(0.046) (0.038)
Disaster Deathst−1× LC-I 0.070 0.158∗
(0.049) (0.058)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-I Leaders 0.05
† 0.16∗
(0.033) (0.05)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-R Leaders 0.059
∗ 0.06∗
(0.026) (0.027)
CINCt−1 5.029∗ 5.210∗
(1.605) (1.485)
Land area (km2, log) 0.126∗ 0.119∗
(0.039) (0.039)
Real GDPt−1 (log) 0.223∗ 0.225∗
(0.040) (0.039)
Constant −5.368∗ −5.409∗
(0.649) (0.629)
Year-Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 6,843 6,843
Log Likelihood −3,320.479 −3,311.933
θ 0.726∗ (0.075) 0.734∗ (0.076)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,768.958 6,751.866
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Leader-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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4.7.6 Country-Fixed Effects
In the main text I attempt to account for unobserved heterogeneity across observa-
tional units using leader-clustered standard errors. As an alternative solution, Table
4.7 reports Models 1 and 2 from Table 4.1 in the main text with country-fixed effects.
The results are similar to those reported in the main text, though the marginal ef-
fect of disasters is no longer statistically significant for large-coalition regular removal
leaders.
Table 4.7: Base Models with Country-Fixed Effects (Negative Binomial Regression)
Dependent variable: MIDs Initiated
W ≥ 0.75
(1) (2)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) −0.044 0.001
(0.027) (0.018)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.292∗ −0.210
(0.150) (0.135)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.262∗∗ −0.503∗∗
(0.129) (0.221)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-R 0.065∗ 0.018
(0.036) (0.030)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-I 0.080∗∗ 0.087
(0.033) (0.056)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-I Leaders 0.036
∗ 0.088†
(0.022) (0.054)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-R Leaders 0.021 0.019
(0.026) (0.026)
CINCt−1 −1.984 −1.720
(2.521) (2.517)
Land area (km2, log) −28.350 −26.214
(1,017,867.000) (774,654.400)
Real GDPt−1 (log) −0.107∗∗ −0.093∗∗
(0.046) (0.047)
Observations 6,843 6,843
Log Likelihood −2,849.161 −2,849.646
θ 2.109∗∗∗ (0.316) 2.110∗∗∗ (0.317)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,038.321 6,039.291
†p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Standard errors in parentheses.
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4.7.7 Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression Models
A potential concern is that conflict is sufficiently rare to make estimating the
relationship between disasters and conflict difficult because of excessive zeros for the
conflict variable(s). I address this using zero-inflated negative binomial regression
models. The problem with using this model is that it assumes that there are multiple
processes that generates zeros for the outcome variable. In the context of this paper,
this means that I would have to assume that some leaders are restricted to be at
peace for some reason. It is not clear that there are conditions that prevent some
leaders from initiating conflicts or making threats, and, as such, it is unclear whether
this model is appropriate. However, it is possible that having a weak military would
cause a leader to be unable to initiate conflicts. I reestimate the main models using
the CINC score as the inflation factor. The zero-inflated negative binomial regression
models produces results similar to those reported in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.8: Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regression Models
Dependent variable: MIDs Initiated
W ≥ 0.75
(1) (2)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) −0.043 0.007
(0.027) (0.018)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.698∗ −0.627∗
(0.111) (0.098)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.258∗ −0.659∗
(0.099) (0.198)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-R 0.105∗ 0.052∗
(0.034) (0.026)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-I 0.100∗ 0.149∗
(0.034) (0.054)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-I Leaders 0.057
∗ 0.157∗
(0.021) (0.052)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-R Leaders 0.063
∗ 0.059∗
(0.021) (0.021)
CINCt−1 10.398∗ 10.540∗
(1.348) (1.353)
Land area (km2, log) 0.114∗ 0.108∗
(0.024) (0.025)
Real GDPt−1 (log) −0.042 −0.026
(0.033) (0.033)
Constant −2.140∗ −2.332∗
(0.430) (0.429)
Observations 6,843 6,843
Log Likelihood −3,299.204 −3,296.751
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses.
Zero inflation factor in inflation stage (not shown) is the CINC variable.
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4.7.8 Controlling for Disaster Propensity
To account for the possibility that some countries are more prone to experience
disasters in ways that would affect the relationship between disasters and leader
survival, I control for the disaster propensity of a country. To construct this measure,
I take the natural log of disaster events in a given country for all years before and
including year t − 2. The results are reported in Table 4.9, and are similar to the
findings in the baseline model in the main text. (Using an unlogged version of the
disaster propensity makes no difference for the results.)
Table 4.9: Controlling for Disaster Propensity (Negative Binomial Regression)
Dependent variable: MID Initiations
W ≥ 0.75
(1) (2)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) −0.035 0.002
(0.042) (0.026)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.820∗ −0.766∗
(0.237) (0.196)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.279 −0.850∗
(0.213) (0.230)
Disaster Events Up to Year t− 2 (log) 0.008 0.027
(0.053) (0.054)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-R 0.081∗ 0.037
(0.048) (0.041)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-I 0.079 0.139∗
(0.052) (0.059)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-I Leaders 0.044
† 0.14∗
(0.029) (0.052)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-R Leaders 0.046
∗ 0.039†
(0.029) (0.029)
CINCt−1 5.523∗ 5.588∗
(1.701) (1.568)
Land area (km2, log) 0.137∗ 0.127∗
(0.037) (0.038)
Read GDPt−1 (log) 0.203∗ 0.205∗
(0.039) (0.038)
Constant −5.313∗ −5.311∗
(0.527) (0.516)
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Leader-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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4.7.9 Correlations Between Key Variables
Table 4.10 reports correlations between the key independent variables used in the
analysis.
Table 4.10: Correlations Between Independent Variables
ln deaths t1 ln events t1 eq events t1 lwc i lwc r lwc i 75 lwc r 75 small peace years mid post cw leader tenure ln realgdp ln land cinc
ln deaths t1 1 0.785 0.391 -0.062 0.094 0.031 0.091 -0.037 -0.145 0.189 -0.016 0.333 0.289 0.320
ln events t1 0.785 1 0.459 -0.076 0.171 0.063 0.168 -0.106 -0.152 0.322 -0.028 0.415 0.309 0.379
eq events t1 0.391 0.459 1 0.010 0.024 0.004 0.026 -0.038 -0.074 0.087 -0.026 0.255 0.194 0.292
lwc i -0.062 -0.076 0.010 1 -0.588 0.424 -0.583 -0.444 0.002 -0.044 0.154 -0.173 0.049 -0.039
lwc r 0.094 0.171 0.024 -0.588 1 -0.249 0.993 -0.464 -0.003 0.119 -0.319 0.375 -0.032 0.156
lwc i 75 0.031 0.063 0.004 0.424 -0.249 1 -0.247 -0.188 0.030 0.199 -0.076 -0.063 -0.051 -0.055
lwc r 75 0.091 0.168 0.026 -0.583 0.993 -0.247 1 -0.461 0.0003 0.113 -0.317 0.372 -0.034 0.155
small -0.037 -0.106 -0.038 -0.444 -0.464 -0.188 -0.461 1 0.0003 -0.084 0.184 -0.226 -0.019 -0.131
peace years mid -0.145 -0.152 -0.074 0.002 -0.003 0.030 0.0003 0.0003 1 -0.104 -0.063 -0.285 -0.297 -0.112
post cw 0.189 0.322 0.087 -0.044 0.119 0.199 0.113 -0.084 -0.104 1 0.066 0.127 -0.054 -0.018
leader tenure -0.016 -0.028 -0.026 0.154 -0.319 -0.076 -0.317 0.184 -0.063 0.066 1 -0.099 -0.049 -0.079
ln realgdp 0.333 0.415 0.255 -0.173 0.375 -0.063 0.372 -0.226 -0.285 0.127 -0.099 1 0.426 0.519
ln land 0.289 0.309 0.194 0.049 -0.032 -0.051 -0.034 -0.019 -0.297 -0.054 -0.049 0.426 1 0.357
cinc 0.320 0.379 0.292 -0.039 0.156 -0.055 0.155 -0.131 -0.112 -0.018 -0.079 0.519 0.357 1
Key
ln deaths t1 : Natural log of disaster deaths in year t− 1
ln events t1 : Natural log of disaster events in year t− 1
eq events t1 : Earthquake events in year t− 1
lwc i : Large-coalition, irregular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.5)
lwc r : Large-coalition, regular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.5)
lwc i 75 : Large-coalition, irregular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.75)
lwc r 75 : Large-coalition, regular removal system (threshold W ≥ 0.75)
small : Small-coalition system (threshold W < 0.5)
peace years mid : Number of consecutive years without MID prior to year t
post cw : Dummy indicator for observation in post-1989 period
leader tenure: length of time in years that leader has been in office up to year t
ln realgdp: Natural log of real GDP in year t− 1
ln land : Natural log of land area in square kilometers
cinc: CINC score for country in year t− 1
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4.7.10 Empirical Distribution of Regime and Removal Type
Table 4.11 reports the empirical distribution of removal type for my coding of
regime type using the main W ≥ 0.5 threshold. To create this table, I reduced
the data set to only the last years that leaders were in office, recording the removal
type as I have coded it, along with how the leader actually lost office as coded by
Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009). Though large-coalition leaders face irreg-
ular removal less often than small-coalition leaders, my coding of regular versus ir-
regular removal within large-coalition systems still captures this distinction within
large-coalition regimes. Only 9% of large-coalition, regular removal leaders lost office
through irregular means, while 27% of large-coalition, irregular removal leaders lost
office through irregular means. So, while in both groups irregular removal happens
less often than it does in small-coalition systems, clearly there is a non-trivial risk of
irregular removal for the leaders I have coded as “large-coalition, irregular removal.”
The table also shows that the coding scheme also seems to capture a meaningful
distinction in removal types within small-coalition regimes. The same is true in Ta-
ble 4.12 which uses the alternative threshold of W ≥ 0.75 to separate large- from
small-coalition systems, though the differences are less pronounced.
Table 4.11: Empirical Distribution of Regime and Removal Type, W≥ 0.5 Threshold
Foreign Irregular Natural Death Regular Retired Due to Ill Health Still in Office Suicide Unknown
Large, Irregular 0.020 0.270 0.100 0.600 0.010 0 0 0
Large, Regular 0 0.090 0.030 0.850 0.020 0 0 0
Small, Irregular 0.020 0.510 0.050 0.400 0.020 0 0 0
Small, Regular 0.020 0.260 0.280 0.400 0.040 0 0 0
Table 4.12: Empirical Distribution of Regime and Removal Type, W≥ 0.75 Threshold
Foreign Irregular Natural Death Regular Retired Due to Ill Health Still in Office Suicide Unknown
Large, Irregular 0.010 0.140 0.020 0.820 0.010 0 0 0
Large, Regular 0 0.090 0.030 0.850 0.020 0 0 0
Small, Irregular 0.030 0.420 0.100 0.430 0.020 0 0 0
Small, Regular 0.030 0.260 0.260 0.420 0.030 0 0 0
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4.7.11 Alternative Dependent Variable: ICB Crisis Initiations
To provide an alternative measure of conflict behavior, Table 4.13 reports the
results of using a count of ICB crisis initiations (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997) rather
than MID initiations. The results in the baseline model are no longer statistically
significant (and, indeed, this is the only model whether the marginal effect of disasters
in large-coalition, irregular removal systems is negatively signed, though the standard
errors are considerably larger than the coefficient estimate). However, in the model
that uses the alternative W threshold (Model 2), there is a strong and statistically
significant effect of disasters, only in large-coalition, irregular removal systems. In
both models, the coefficient for disasters in large-coalition regular removal systems is
close to zero and not statistically significant.
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Table 4.13: Alternative Dependent Variable: ICB Crisis Initiations (Negative Bino-
mial Regression)
Dependent variable: ICB Crisis Initiations
W ≥ 0.75
(1) (2)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) −0.049 −0.028
(0.065) (0.042)
Large-Coalition, Regular Removal (LC-R) −0.399 −0.223
(0.342) (0.287)
Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal (LC-I) −0.542∗ −1.959∗
(0.271) (0.568)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-R 0.053 0.031
(0.075) (0.057)
Disaster Deathst−1 (log) × LC-I 0.034 0.255∗
(0.073) (0.114)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-I Leaders -0.015 0.23
∗
(0.045) (0.11)
βˆDisasterDeaths for LC-R Leaders 0.004 0.003
(0.042) (0.04)
CINCt−1 8.334∗ 7.917∗
(1.781) (1.757)
Land area (km2, log) 0.229∗ 0.221∗
(0.058) (0.061)
Real GDPt−1 (log) 0.035 0.039
(0.054) (0.053)
Constant −6.122∗ −6.225∗
(0.707) (0.738)
Observations 6,843 6,843
Log Likelihood −1,237.361 −1,232.370
θ 0.877∗ (0.339) 0.892∗ (0.350)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,492.721 2,482.739
Note: †p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; One-tailed tests. Leader-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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4.7.12 Cross Tabulation of Disaster Deaths and MID Initiations
Table 4.14 reports the raw counts and percentage of observations where leaders
in each of the large-coalition categories initiated at least one MID following a year
with less than the mean number of disaster deaths and more than the mean number
of disaster deaths.
Table 4.14: Distribution of MID Cases for Large-Coalition Leaders
Regime, Removal Type Zero MIDs MIDs > 0 % MID Cases
Large-Coalition, Irregular (Deaths ≤Mean) 1609 223 0.069
Large-Coalition, Irregular (Deaths >Mean) 504 132 0.21
Large-Coalition, Regular (Deaths ≤Mean) 1494 154 0.052
Large-Coalition, Regular (Deaths >Mean) 769 200 0.21
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Table 4.15 lists the cases in the data where large-coalition leaders initiated at least
one MID following a year where disasters killed an above-average number of people
in the leader’s country. Table 4.16 does the same for large-coalition regular removal
leaders.
Table 4.15: Cases of MID Initiations for Large-Coalition, Irregular Removal Leaders
with Greater than Mean Disaster Deaths in Previous Period
leader ccode idacr year
1 Berisha 339 ALB 1997
2 Duvalier, Francois 41 HAI 1963
3 Ruiz Cortines 70 MEX 1956
4 Laugerud Garcia 90 GUA 1977
5 Azcona Hoyo 91 HON 1989
6 Callejas 91 HON 1991
7 Reina 91 HON 1995
8 Anastasio Somoza Debayle 93 NIC 1977
9 Alarcon Fabian 130 ECU 1998
10 Fujimori 135 PER 1995
11 Geisel 140 BRA 1975
12 Figueiredo 140 BRA 1983
13 Kadar 310 HUN 1971
14 Husak 315 CZE 1986
15 Georgievski 343 MAC 2002
16 Milosevic 345 YUG 1991
17 Milosevic 345 YUG 2000
18 Zhivkov 355 BUL 1987
19 Yeltsin 365 RUS 1993
20 Yeltsin 365 RUS 1994
21 Yeltsin 365 RUS 1995
22 Yeltsin 365 RUS 1996
23 Yeltsin 365 RUS 1997
24 Yeltsin 365 RUS 1998
25 Yeltsin 365 RUS 1999
26 Putin 365 RUS 2001
27 Putin 365 RUS 2002
28 Putin 365 RUS 2003
29 Putin 365 RUS 2005
30 Putin 365 RUS 2006
31 Putin 365 RUS 2007
32 H. Aliyev 373 AZE 1996
33 H. Aliyev 373 AZE 2001
34 Taylor 450 LBR 2000
35 Biya 471 CAO 1987
36 Biya 471 CAO 1994
37 Biya 471 CAO 1995
38 Biya 471 CAO 1998
39 Biya 471 CAO 2005
40 Patasse 482 CEN 2001
41 Mobutu 490 DRC 1977
42 Mobutu 490 DRC 1978
43 Joseph Kabila 490 DRC 2007
44 Kenyatta 501 KEN 1978
45 Moi 501 KEN 1995
46 Mwinyi 510 TAZ 1995
47 Mkapa 510 TAZ 2000
48 Mkapa 510 TAZ 2002
49 Gouled Aptidon 522 DJI 1998
50 Dos Santos 540 ANG 1988
51 Dos Santos 540 ANG 2001
52 Dos Santos 540 ANG 2002
53 Dos Santos 540 ANG 2005
54 Machel 541 MZM 1986
55 Kaunda 551 ZAM 1983
56 Levy Mwanawasa 551 ZAM 2004
57 Ayatollah Khomeini 630 IRN 1984
58 Ayatollah Khomeini 630 IRN 1987
59 Ayatollah Khomeini 630 IRN 1988
60 Rafsanjani 630 IRN 1991
61 Rafsanjani 630 IRN 1992
62 Rafsanjani 630 IRN 1993
63 Rafsanjani 630 IRN 1994
64 Rafsanjani 630 IRN 1995
65 Rafsanjani 630 IRN 1996
66 Rafsanjani 630 IRN 1997
67 Khatami 630 IRN 2005
68 Menderes 640 TUR 1952
69 Menderes 640 TUR 1958
70 Evren 640 TUR 1982
71 Ozal 640 TUR 1986
72 Ozal 640 TUR 1987
73 Ozal 640 TUR 1988
74 Ozal 640 TUR 1989
75 Sadat 651 EGY 1980
76 Mubarak 651 EGY 1993
77 Mubarak 651 EGY 1995
78 Mubarak 651 EGY 1996
79 Bashar al-Assad 652 SYR 2005
80 Rakhmonov 702 TAJ 1998
81 Rakhmonov 702 TAJ 2006
82 Akayev 703 KYR 1993
83 Karimov 704 UZB 1993
84 Karimov 704 UZB 1999
85 Nazarbayev 705 KZK 1996
86 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1952
87 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1955
88 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1956
89 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1958
90 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1960
91 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1965
92 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1975
93 Mao Tse-Tung 710 CHN 1976
94 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1985
95 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1986
96 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1987
97 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1988
98 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1993
99 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1994
100 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1995
101 Deng Xiaoping 710 CHN 1996
102 Jiang Zemin 710 CHN 1999
103 Jiang Zemin 710 CHN 2001
104 Jiang Zemin 710 CHN 2002
105 Hu Jintao 710 CHN 2004
106 Hu Jintao 710 CHN 2005
107 Hu Jintao 710 CHN 2007
108 Chiang Ching-Kuo 713 TAW 1987
109 Lee Teng-Hui 713 TAW 1991
110 Lee Teng-Hui 713 TAW 1995
111 Rhee 732 ROK 1958
112 Chun Doo Hwan 732 ROK 1983
113 Chun Doo Hwan 732 ROK 1985
114 Chun Doo Hwan 732 ROK 1986
115 Roh Tae Woo 732 ROK 1991
116 Kim Young Sam 732 ROK 1996
117 Prem 800 THI 1987
118 Mahatir Bin Mohammad 820 MAL 1988
119 Mahatir Bin Mohammad 820 MAL 1992
120 Mahatir Bin Mohammad 820 MAL 2003
121 Ahmad Badawi 820 MAL 2004
122 Ahmad Badawi 820 MAL 2005
123 Ahmad Badawi 820 MAL 2006
124 Marcos 840 PHI 1979
125 Marcos 840 PHI 1982
126 Sukarno 850 INS 1957
127 Sukarno 850 INS 1964
128 Megawati Sukarnoputri 850 INS 2003
129 Megawati Sukarnoputri 850 INS 2004
130 Ahmadinejad 630 IRN 2007
131 Bakiyev 703 KYR 2005
132 Bakiyev 703 KYR 2006
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Table 4.16: Cases of MID Initiations for Large-Coalition, Regular Removal Leaders
with Greater than Mean Disaster Deaths in Previous Period
leader ccode idacr year
1 Berisha 339 ALB 1993
2 Khaleda Zia 771 BNG 1995
3 Khaleda Zia 771 BNG 2002
4 Eisenhower 2 USA 1954
5 Eisenhower 2 USA 1956
6 Eisenhower 2 USA 1957
7 Eisenhower 2 USA 1958
8 Eisenhower 2 USA 1959
9 Eisenhower 2 USA 1960
10 Kennedy 2 USA 1962
11 Johnson 2 USA 1965
12 Johnson 2 USA 1967
13 Johnson 2 USA 1968
14 Nixon 2 USA 1970
15 Nixon 2 USA 1971
16 Nixon 2 USA 1972
17 Nixon 2 USA 1973
18 Ford 2 USA 1976
19 Carter 2 USA 1979
20 Carter 2 USA 1980
21 Reagan 2 USA 1982
22 Reagan 2 USA 1983
23 Reagan 2 USA 1984
24 Reagan 2 USA 1985
25 Reagan 2 USA 1986
26 Reagan 2 USA 1987
27 Reagan 2 USA 1988
28 Bush 2 USA 1990
29 Bush 2 USA 1991
30 Bush 2 USA 1992
31 Clinton 2 USA 1994
32 Clinton 2 USA 1996
33 Clinton 2 USA 1997
34 Clinton 2 USA 1998
35 Clinton 2 USA 1999
36 Clinton 2 USA 2000
37 G.W. Bush 2 USA 2002
38 G.W. Bush 2 USA 2003
39 G.W. Bush 2 USA 2004
40 G.W. Bush 2 USA 2005
41 G.W. Bush 2 USA 2006
42 G.W. Bush 2 USA 2007
43 Mulroney 20 CAN 1988
44 Mulroney 20 CAN 1992
45 Chretien 20 CAN 1997
46 Chretien 20 CAN 2000
47 Blanco 42 DOM 1986
48 Hipolito Mejia 42 DOM 2004
49 Flores Facusse 91 HON 2000
50 Duarte 92 SAL 1989
51 Calderon Sol 92 SAL 1997
52 Violeta Chamorro 93 NIC 1994
53 Violeta Chamorro 93 NIC 1997
54 Aleman 93 NIC 1999
55 Turbay 100 COL 1980
56 Vargas 100 COL 1987
57 Vargas 100 COL 1988
58 Arango 100 COL 2001
59 Alvaro Uribe Velez 100 COL 2006
60 Alvaro Uribe Velez 100 COL 2007
61 Leoni 101 VEN 1968
62 Caldera Rodriguez 101 VEN 1995
63 Campins 101 VEN 1982
64 Lusinchi 101 VEN 1986
65 Hugo Chavez 101 VEN 2000
66 Hugo Chavez 101 VEN 2003
67 Hugo Chavez 101 VEN 2006
68 Velasco Ibarra 130 ECU 1954
69 Velasco Ibarra 130 ECU 1971
70 Belaunde 135 PER 1981
71 Belaunde 135 PER 1984
72 Fujimori 135 PER 1991
73 Fujimori 135 PER 1992
74 Frei Montalva 155 CHL 1967
75 Peron, Isabel 160 ARG 1976
76 Alfonsin 160 ARG 1986
77 Alfonsin 160 ARG 1987
78 Menem 160 ARG 1993
79 Wilson 200 UKG 1967
80 Wilson 200 UKG 1969
81 Thatcher 200 UKG 1982
82 Major 200 UKG 1992
83 Major 200 UKG 1996
84 Blair 200 UKG 1999
85 Blair 200 UKG 2000
86 Blair 200 UKG 2001
87 Blair 200 UKG 2002
88 Fitzgerald 205 IRE 1984
89 Kok 210 NTH 2000
90 Martens 211 BEL 1991
91 De Gaulle 220 FRN 1959
92 Giscard D’Estaing 220 FRN 1978
93 Giscard D’Estaing 220 FRN 1980
94 Mitterand 220 FRN 1984
95 Mitterand 220 FRN 1985
96 Mitterand 220 FRN 1988
97 Mitterand 220 FRN 1989
98 Mitterand 220 FRN 1990
99 Mitterand 220 FRN 1991
100 Mitterand 220 FRN 1992
101 Mitterand 220 FRN 1993
102 Chirac 220 FRN 2000
103 Chirac 220 FRN 2001
104 Chirac 220 FRN 2005
105 Gonzalez Marquez 230 SPN 1986
106 Aznar 230 SPN 2000
107 Aznar 230 SPN 2002
108 Aznar 230 SPN 2003
109 Kwasniewski 290 POL 2000
110 Orban 310 HUN 2000
111 de Gasperi 325 ITA 1952
112 Cossiga 325 ITA 1980
113 Mitsotakis 350 GRC 1992
114 Simitis 350 GRC 2000
115 Simitis 350 GRC 2001
116 Nyrup Rasmussen 390 DEN 2000
117 Mwai Kibaki 501 KEN 2004
118 Mwai Kibaki 501 KEN 2005
119 Mwai Kibaki 501 KEN 2006
120 Osman Daar 520 SOM 1965
121 Smith 552 ZIM 1976
122 Vorster 560 SAF 1975
123 Vorster 560 SAF 1978
124 Botha 560 SAF 1982
125 Botha 560 SAF 1984
126 Botha 560 SAF 1985
127 Botha 560 SAF 1988
128 Khatami 630 IRN 1999
129 Khatami 630 IRN 2001
130 Khatami 630 IRN 2002
131 Khatami 630 IRN 2003
132 Khatami 630 IRN 2004
133 Inonu 640 TUR 1963
134 Demirel 640 TUR 1967
135 Demirel 640 TUR 1976
136 Demirel 640 TUR 1993
137 Ecevit 640 TUR 2000
138 Ecevit 640 TUR 2001
139 Ecevit 640 TUR 2002
140 Ciller 640 TUR 1995
141 Erdogan 640 TUR 2004
142 Erdogan 640 TUR 2005
143 Erdogan 640 TUR 2007
144 Chen Shui-bian 713 TAW 2002
145 Chen Shui-bian 713 TAW 2003
146 Chen Shui-bian 713 TAW 2005
147 Kim Jong-Il 731 PRK 1997
148 Kim Jong-Il 731 PRK 1999
149 Kim Jong-Il 731 PRK 2000
150 Kim Jong-Il 731 PRK 2001
151 Kim Jong-Il 731 PRK 2005
152 Kim Jong-Il 731 PRK 2007
153 Hee Park 732 ROK 1964
154 Hee Park 732 ROK 1966
155 Roh Moo Hyun 732 ROK 2006
156 Obuchi 740 JPN 1999
157 Junichiro Koizumi 740 JPN 2002
158 Junichiro Koizumi 740 JPN 2003
159 Junichiro Koizumi 740 JPN 2005
160 Nehru 750 IND 1954
161 Nehru 750 IND 1955
162 Nehru 750 IND 1957
163 Nehru 750 IND 1958
164 Nehru 750 IND 1959
165 Nehru 750 IND 1961
166 Nehru 750 IND 1962
167 Nehru 750 IND 1964
168 Shastri 750 IND 1965
169 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1967
170 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1968
171 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1969
172 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1970
173 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1971
174 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1973
175 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1981
176 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1982
177 Gandhi, I. 750 IND 1983
178 Desai 750 IND 1979
179 Gandhi, R. 750 IND 1985
180 Gandhi, R. 750 IND 1986
181 Gandhi, R. 750 IND 1987
182 Gandhi, R. 750 IND 1989
183 Shekhar 750 IND 1991
184 Rao 750 IND 1992
185 Vajpayee 750 IND 1999
186 Vajpayee 750 IND 2001
187 Vajpayee 750 IND 2002
188 Vajpayee 750 IND 2004
189 Manmohan Singh 750 IND 2005
190 Manmohan Singh 750 IND 2007
191 Premadasa 780 SRI 1992
192 Leekpai 800 THI 1994
193 Leekpai 800 THI 1995
194 Thaksin Shinawatra 800 THI 2006
195 Rahman 820 MAL 1968
196 Marcos 840 PHI 1968
197 Ramos 840 PHI 1996
198 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 840 PHI 2002
199 Bambang Yudhoyono 850 INS 2005
200 Howard 900 AUL 1999
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